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Abstract
With limited personnel resource funding availability, senior US Air Force
(USAF) decision makers struggle to base enterprise resource allocation from rigorous
analytical traceability. There are over 240 career fields in the USAF spanning 12
enterprises. Each enterprise develops annual risk assessments by distinctive core
capabilities.
A core capability (e.g. Research and Development) is an enabling function
necessary for the USAF to perform its mission as part of the Department of Defense
(DOD). Assessing risk at the core capability is a good start to assessing risk, but is still
not comprehensiveness enough. One of the twelve enterprises has linked its task
structure to Program Element Codes (PECs).
Planners and programmers use amount of funding per PEC to assess tasks needed
to address a desired capability. For the first time, a linkage between core functions, core
capabilities, PECs, tasks and manpower has been developed. We now can provide an
objective nomenclatured way to compute personnel risk.
All resources planned are not programmed (i.e. resource allocated and budgeted);
the delta between the two translate into capability gaps and a level of strategic risk. A
USAF career field risk demonstration is performed using normal, sigmoid and Euclideannorm functions. Understanding potential personnel shortfalls at the career field level
should better inform core capability analysis, and thus increase credibility and
defensibility of strategic risk assessments.
v
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METHODS FOR USING MANPOWER TO ASSESS USAF STRATEGIC RISK
I.

Introduction

Personnel are a major United States Air Force (USAF) capability and are critical to
inventory management, logistics asset readiness and supply chain risk management.
Effective personnel management is difficult particularly in the logistics and supply chain
domain. However, there are analytical tools that can aid more objective personnel risk
assessment. This work places select techniques into a methodology for logistics and supply
chain manpower analysts to assist senior decision making. This research starts with a
literature review of those select analytical procedures to objectively assess personnel risk and
four quantitative methods that yield promising results for the logistics and supply chain
domain. These methods and respective applications are then described in a set of technical
papers. Each paper will set the context, describe the problem/challenge, present a
methodology and provide a demonstration of that methodology. The goal is to provide a
methodology the USAF can exploit to better assess strategic risk using manpower analysis.
This over-arching goal will better aid senior decision making as it relates to the management
and prioritization of USAF personnel capability focused on the logistics and supply chain
domain, and assist with respect to the objective assessment of USAF strategic risk.
This research adds another dimension to the assessment of USAF enterprise risk.
This work ascertains whether efficiency should be considered as a component of assessing
risk. For example, what if senior decision leaders were able to know if current management
of manning resources of one organization was subpar compared to similar organizations.
Should similar organizations with similar personnel makeups and missions be compared with
1

regards to personnel utilization? If so, could these efficiency comparisons be statistically
evaluated with respect to risk and inferences be gained to help senior decision leaders and
planners better advocate and prioritize resources? This research purports that before
personnel risk can be more accurately assessed, efficiency should be examined.

Background
The current Agile Combat Support risk assessment (ACS RA) process lacks
traceability to the justification of risk assessments, which severely weakens defensibility and
significantly decreases credibility in strategic risk assessments presented to senior decision
makers. The problem requires a systematic resolution in order to revamp the risk assessment
process.
The enterprise risk assessment entails various components: people, data, time,
stakeholders, and other various resources. The people component consists of various
practitioners like operations research analysts, program analysts, planners, functional area
experts and senior decision makers. At times, these practitioners do not share the same
philosophy or approach to resolve problems. A structured process is needed in order for
practitioners to reach commonality while working shared tasks and responsibilities to meet
collective goals.
The data component involves the use of personnel data in the form of the number of
personnel by career field and respective funded requirements, Program Element Codes, core
capabilities and task activities. These data elements are in different databases and require
linkage before analysis can occur.

2

The time component is a finite dimension which consists of plans and schedules
designed to meet milestones to achieve a given end state. The ACS RA has various
stakeholders in the form of customers, owners, enablers, experts and facilitators. These
groups may have different goals and as a result may possess different agendas and make
problem resolution challenging. Resources in the form of limited time, available subject
matter expertise and constrained budgets make dedicated resource allocation to the ACS RA
effort difficult. As a result of the aforementioned components to the ACS RA, a framework
is created as a means to guide USAF risk assessment practitioners as it relates to problem
resolution.
The framework involves five specific methodologies. First, a methodology is
presented comparing USAF core function (enterprise) risk. Second, a repeatable way to
compute personnel efficiency is demonstrated. Efficiency is the ratio of useful work to the
total energy expended in order to accomplish a task (Pisupati, 2018). In general, efficiency is
the ratio of outputs and inputs (Dario and Simar, 2007) . Third, a procedure is developed
examining relationships between efficiency and risk. Fourth, a personnel enterprise risk
assessment methodology is developed. Fifth, an application of the personnel enterprise risk
assessment is presented. Figure I-1 is a sequence of analytical methods used to revise the
ACS RA.

3

Figure I-1: ACS RA Risk Formulation
This research explores various analytical methods to assess personnel efficiency and
risk and examine if there are noteworthy relationships between these two factors.
Specifically, this research demonstrates the assessment of USAF personnel risk through the
specific analtycial tools: logistic regression, a normal distribution, Data Envelopment
Analysis, non-parametric correlation analysis and Lp spacing.
Risk
Merriam-Webster defines risk as the degree of probability of a loss (MerriamWebster, 2017). The subject of risk can be traced as far back as 3200 B.C. by a TigrisEuphrates group called the Asipu (Covello, Mumpower, 1985). The Asipu would try to
identify and understand the problem, develop courses of actions (COAs), collect data and
establish likely outcomes to include profit/loss or success/failure of each COA (Covello,
Mumpower, 1985). Over 2400 years ago, the Athenians offered risk assessments before
making decisions during the Peloponnesian War (Aven, 2003).
4

Military risk is a highly complex phenomenon to accurately assess. The United
States Air Force (USAF) defines risk as the probability and consequence of an event causing
harm to something of value (AFPD 90-16 draft, 2018). Whether subjectively, objectively or
both, USAF primarily assesses strategic risk in two contexts: Risk to Mission (RtM) and Risk
to Force (RtF). The official USAF definition of RtM is defined as the ability to execute a
mission at acceptable human, materiel, financial, and strategic costs (AFMAN 90-1606,
2017). USAF defines RtF as the ability to recruit, maintain, train, equip, and sustain the
force to meet strategic objectives (AFMAN 90-1606, 2017). RtM is typically characterized
by the levels of capacity (i.e. sufficient force structure) and capability (i.e. air, space, and
cyber effects) needed to provide National Authorities when called upon (AFMAN 90-106,
2017). RtF is characterized by the ability to maximize the effectiveness of the force
structure chosen to meet the desired operational requirements. RtF are essentially capability
enablers and practices in the form of munitions, training, equipment, infrastructure,
personnel and institutional 1.
These two strategic contexts are measured by four risk (not including endpoints 2)
levels (ordered by increasing risk) within the framework of achieving an objective or goal:
low, moderate, significant and high. An example of how the levels are defined and measured
is included in Figure I-2 also formally known as the Air Force Risk Assessment Framework
(AFRAF).

1
2

More details of this strategic risk context are supplied in several strategic planning documents.
Technically, there are six levels of risk, if we include the Success and Failure levels, which are numerically
0% and 100% respectively.

5

Figure I-2: AFRAF (AFMC/A9A, 2016)
Combining the two strategic contexts (i.e RtM and RtF) with the four risk levels yield a
framework in which the USAF assesses strategic risk. Figure I-3 provides an illustration of
the two strategic risk areas coupled with the four risk levels, which ultimately help
characterize USAF risk.

6

Figure I-3: USAF Military Risk Structure (AFMAN 90-106, 2017)
This research focuses specifically on the personnel piece of the RtF component of USAF
strategic risk. RtF must be assessed before RtM in order to more accurately depict USAF
risk. This work also assumes there is a relationship between risk and capability. That is to
say, the more capability (e.g. fuel, manning, higher mission capable rates (MCRs 3), positive
infrastructure levels (e.g. Common Output Level Standards (COLS)), equipment and supply
status, etc.) that exists, the less risk incurred and conversely, the less capability that exists,
the more risk incurred. Figure I-4 illustrates this relationship. This concept is further
extended to assume there is at least a curvilinear relationship (via Sigmoid function) between
risk and capability for Human Resources.

3

MCR is the degree to which a system, subsystem or equipment is in a specified operable and committable
state at the start of a mission, when the mission is called for at an unknown, i.e. a random, time.

7

Figure I-4: Capability versus Risk (Bradshaw, 2016)
A key assertion in the current methodology is that before personnel risk can be accurately
assessed, managerial efficiency, corporate preference, and objective risk computation, should
be examined. This work facilitates that examination. Efficiency is the next topic of
discussion.
Efficiency
Efficiency is hard to assess in a dispersed organization. USAF personnel capability is
spread across the world. The USAF has hundreds of installations geographically separated
across all continents. It is challenging for managers to provide efficiency assessments across
these installations if objective data are not used. A 2014 study using data from 35 USAF
organizations revealed millions of dollars possibly wasted due to various performance
inefficiencies (Boehmke, 2015). The Boehmke study prompts questions, e.g., is there a
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significant association or relationship between efficiency and risk? If there is a significant
association between efficiency and risk, how do we address it?
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is an aggregation technique that allows unit (to
include units without price points) (Han and Sohn, 2011) performance to be compared by
examining the ratio of weighted outputs and inputs (Colbert et al., 2000). While data in the
form of inputs and outputs alone cannot produce a holistic representation of efficiency, a
non-parametric objective technique such as DEA yields a potential start to assessing
personnel efficiency at USAF bases.
A desirable DEA property is that the weight values for each assessed organization are
defined by an optimization algorithm and not decided by the user (Huguenin, 2012). This
increases objectivity in determining the significance of the outputs and inputs. DEA
combines numerous relevant outputs and inputs into a single number that represents
productivity or efficiency (Metters et al., 1999). DEA is an established technique among the
management science and operations research communities. Between the inception of DEA
(Charnes et al., 1978) and 1992, over 470 articles were published concerning DEA (Seiford,
1994), and the pace appears to have accelerated since that time (Metters et al., 1999).
According to a 2010 DEA literature survey among application-based articles, the topfive industries addressed were: banking, health care, agriculture and farm, transportation,
and education. Of approximately 5,000 articles examined, the military industry represented
less than 20 of the total sample size or approximately 0.4% (Liu et al., 2013). Of record, it
appears only sixteen military articles have been published since 2010 (Zunker and Howard,
2018). This implies there exists a large opportunity for growth and examination of DEA and
its application to military organizations.
9

In summary, this research foci explore various analytical-based methods to compute
organizational risk using personnel data. Further, this work examines if there is a statistically
significant relationship between personnel risk and efficiency. That is to say, the higher the
risk, the lower the efficiency or vice versa. The next section explores this research from an
USAF enterprise perspective.
Agile Combat Support
This work uses a repeatable methodology using mathematical rigor to further quantify
and qualify strategic personnel risk. The scope of this work is from the Agile Combat
Support (ACS) perspective. ACS is a core function that enables air and space power to
contribute to the objectives of a Joint Force Commander (JFC). Effective combat support
operations allow combatant commanders to improve the responsiveness, deployability and
sustainability of forces. ACS allows combat support to be conducted whereby
responsiveness can be substituted for massive deployed inventories (Air University.com,
2017).
Further, ACS capability is the process from mission need to mission effect for all Air
Force weapon systems, which consists of six enterprises: Research & Development (R&D),
Life Cycle Management (LCM), Test & Evaluation (T&E), Logistics & Sustainment (L&S),
Installation & Mission Support (I&MS) and Institutional. Figure I-5 illustrates the ‘Big
picture’ view of ACS as it relates to risk delineated by force and mission.

10

Figure I-5: Agile Combat Support (ACS) Big Picture (AFMC A9A, 2016)
In the USAF, ACS is led by the Commander of Air Force Materiel Command
(COMAFMC). AFMC is a major command (MAJCOM) that develops, acquires and sustains
the aerospace power needed to defend the United States and its interests for today and
tomorrow (AFMC website, 2017). This is achieved through management, research,
acquisition, development, testing and maintenance of existing and future weapons systems
and their respective components (AFMC website, 2017).
As the core function lead (CFL 4) for ACS, COMAFMC defines RtM as the ability to
provide effects as called for within planning constructs for anticipated threat environments

4

Since, this writing, CFLs have been removed and replaced with a new leadership construct called the Air
Force Warfighting Integration Center (AFWIC).
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(e.g. Defense Planning Guide (DPG) scenarios). The DPG provides guidance in the form of
goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal constraints, for the development of each
military department (Acqnotes.com, 2017). RtM is dependent upon creating a future force
capable of providing the desirable effects. COMAFMC defines RtF as the ability to deliver
the future force (e.g. Trained Personnel, Weapon Systems, Equipment, Infrastructure) used to
evaluate RtM. In other words, RtF should drive RtM. Figure I-6 illustrates this concept.

Figure I-6: Agile Combat Support (ACS) Risk Type Definitions (AFMC A9A, 2017)

Problem Statement
There is a widespread perception among Core Functions that (i.e. enterprises of
people and systems) the logistics and mission support (which impacts RtF) required to
execute DPG scenarios (which impacts RtM) will be in place for war or (D-Day). The ACS
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) do not agree, but cannot provide sufficient analysis (Pitstick,
2017). A challenge to accurately depict RtF is a conundrum of assessing both programmatic
12

(i.e. weapon system programs) and capability risk. USAF programmatic risk is typically
managed in the form of cost, schedule and performance. While this approach is sufficient to
track, monitor and assess weapon system delivery and sustainment, it does not adequately
address ACS’ ability to meet DPG scenario requirements which should be a precursor to
determine RtM capability gaps and accurately assess strategic risk.

Capability gaps are

often categorized into three distinct timeframes: near (0-5 year), mid (>5-10 year) and far
(>10-30 year). A more comprehensive risk assessment is needed to characterize potential
capability shortfalls for a near, mid or far term crisis. The methodology presented in this
work provides a more rigorous alternative to assessing risk in each of the three distinct
planning timeframes.
The USAF uses the Strategic, Planning & Programming Process (SP3) as a guide to
strategic budgeting and decision making. One of the major outputs of the SP3 is the Program
Objective Memorandum (POM). The POM is an annual recommendation from the Military
Services and Defense Agencies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) concerning
the planning and allocation of resources (i.e. Personnel, Infrastructure, Readiness and
Modernization & Recapitalization) for programs to meet the Defense and Service (e.g.
USAF) planning guidance (Acqnotes.com, 2017). The POM covers the 5-year Future Year
Defense Program (FYDP) and presents the Service proposal on the intent of allocation of
available resources (Acqnotes.com, 2017).
The POM includes an analysis of capabilities across the aerospace and cyber domains
to include objectives, missions, alternative methods to accomplish objectives, and allocation
of resources. The resources are planned, managed and executed by 12 Air Force Core
13

Functions of which ACS is one and has the largest portfolio exceeding 60 billion dollars. All
resources planned are not programmed (resource allocated and budgeted); the delta between
the two translate into a level of strategic risk. Figure I-7 provides a visual of how the POM is
produced.

Figure I-7: Notional Strategic, Planning & Programming Process (SP3) (AF 5/8, 2011)
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This work will expound upon the aforementioned ideals and provide methods to
objectively assess personnel risk and enable senior Air Force leaders to better manage ACS
personnel capability and enhance maximization of readiness.

Research Objective and Questions
This research explores and develops a repeatable baseline personnel risk assessment
methodology, focused on the following research question: Can a baseline ACS
comprehensive risk assessment (ACS RA) methodology be developed that rigorously
accounts for personnel capability enablers and practices? This research question requires
examination of the following specific questions:
•

Is there a meaningful manning relationship between USAF Core Functions and full
manning levels?

•

To what extent can the examination of active duty manning increase awareness of
USAF efficiency?

•

Is there a statistically significant relationship between career field manning efficiency
and risk, which can enhance resource utilization and prioritization?

•

Can an algorithm be used to compute an organizational personnel risk assessment?

Insight gained into these questions will enhance traceability of current personnel capability
and requirements, will improve defensibility and credibility of the ACS risk assessment, and
enhance strategic decision making when faced with tough challenges.

Scope
There are five bedrocks to USAF capability: Personnel, Training, Equipment,
Infrastructure and Institutional, which are further characterized as the planning force. It is
impossible to provide capability without all of these components. USAF capability begins
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and ends with the airman. If airmen are not available and trained to perform desired tasks to
inject capability, the remaining equipment, infrastructure and institutional components are
ineffective. While Figure I-7 summarizes the SP3 process to include the planning force, the
data to adequately assess strategic risk regarding infrastructure, readiness and modernization
are either classified or not readily accessible to analyze. As a result, this research is scoped
to active duty military and civil servant personnel. Assumptions are applied to account for
the readiness and training components. Figure I-8 is an illustration of the scoped research
effort.

Figure I-8: Scoped Planning Force Analysis
People are needed to plan, manage, distribute and execute USAF capability. A goal of this
research is the identification of personnel risk to be used as a precursor to better inform the
infrastructure and modernization/recapitalization risk assessments. This approach should
produce a more comprehensive strategic risk assessment.
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Methodology
The theme of this research is to develop methods to help the Logistics Supply Chain
Management community use human resources as it relates to USAF strategic risk
assessments. The methodology incorportates advanced operational research techniques into
practice using personnel data. This work supports senior decision making as it relates to
managing personnel capability.
The first part of the USAF personnel risk assessment series uses statistical
comparisons of odds ratios and contingency table analyses revealing manning shortfalls in all
12 Core Functions or large enterprises. From a strategic risk assessment perspective, if
capability can be assessed via manning shortfalls, then risk vulnerabilities and drivers
become more traceable for decision makers.
The second part uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure and compare
efficiency among ten F-16 active duty bases utilizing pilot manning as inputs and sorties as
outputs. This work has two-fold purposes: 1.) demonstrate that efficiency can be objectively
assessed using personnel manning data and 2.) pave the way for a more comprehensive
methodology to assess if a statistically significant relationship exists between USAF
personnel efficiency and risk.
The third part uses the classic definition of risk and applies modeling techniques to
produce risk values for career fields and determine if statistically significant relationships
exist. There are inferences from a statistically significant relationship. For instance, if
efficiency is positively correlated with risk, this can infer more efficiency is related to more
risk. If more efficiency infers less risk, then, personnel resource planners could recommend
career field managers better utilize current manning levels before more resources are
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considered for allocation. The fourth part surveys risk aggregation techniques to ultimately
produce a valid, objective personnel risk assessment. The fifth part provides conclusions and
recommendations regarding methodology implementation. These added analytical insights
foster better strategic decision making by identifying capability gaps, and provide an
increased level of objectivity to support personnel resource allocation. The results of the
analysis hope to better inform the USAF Strategic, Planning & Programming Process (SP3).

Assumptions
To date, it appears there are no personnel capability assessments being performed to
measure efficiency and risk, and the implications thereof. USAF strategic risk assessments
are currently analyzed at the core capability level. A core capability is an enterprise
necessary for the USAF to perform its mission as part of the Department of Defense (DOD).
As of calendar year 2017, there were 48 distinct core capabilities. Assessing risk at the core
capability is a good start to assessing risk, but is not comprehensiveness enough. There are
many missed, unexamined and not well-understood issues that occur below the core
capability level, particularly as it relates to RtF which theoretically should influence RtM.
Understanding potential personnel shortfalls at the career field level should better inform
core capability analysis, and thus increase credibility and defensibility of strategic risk
assessments.
Currently, ACS planners and programmers use funding level per PEC, or Program
Element Code, to assess tasks needed to address desired capability. All USAF programs
have PECs. PECs are generally alphanumeric strings of characters that represent groupings
of Air Force Specialties (AFS) or career fields to carry out certain tasks. The PECs are also
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assigned cost values as the primary means to track and manage funding. While the PECs are
linked to ACS tasks, the amount of specific personnel (by career field) needed to accomplish
the tasks versus personnel requirements are not connected. Furthermore, there currently is
no repeatable way to assess USAF personnel efficiency.

Limitations
The risk of using data from a centrally managed personnel database to develop a
personnel risk assessment as a means to baseline personnel capability across all six ACS
enterprises has an unquantifiable impact on enterprise risk assessments. If the data are
inaccurate, the results are skewed and subsequent risk assessments may be invalid. To
compound the issue, some enterprises have independently developed manpower models to
assess their ability to meet current and future requirements (i.e. funded and unfunded).
Funded requirements are provided in the centrally managed personnel database, while
unfunded requirements are not provided to the enduser. Unfortunately, these manpower
models have not been validated by the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) or the Higher
Headquarters Personnel, Manpower and Services Directorate (AF/A1). If the data and
manpower assumptions from the A1 database are correct, the traceability, defensibility,
objectivity and credibility of the risk assessments increase.
This research used personnel as key force enablers of USAF capability to assess
strategic risk. Specifically, is there a rigorous way to assess personnel risk to ultimately
inform strategic decision making? Lastly, the analysis is conducted within the HQ AFMC
Strategic Plans, Programs, Requirements, and Analyses Directorate (HQ AFMC A5/8/9),
whereby the Analyses and Assessments Division (HQ AFMC A9A) serves as the lead
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integrator. The collection of this information requires support from the HQ AFMC 5/8
(Plans, Programs and Requirements Division).

Implications
ACS Planners and programmers defend the needs of their programs emotionally or
base their arguments on precedence instead of articulating what the requirements are and
what current capability exists to meet a desired endstate. This results in a lack of credibility
regarding the enterprise risk assessments, which are sometimes dismissed as over or
understatements of risk by senior officials at higher headquarters.
There is no repeatable, measureable baseline personnel capability assessment across
the six enterprises in ACS (Pitstick et al., 2016). Currently, each enterprise independently
assesses risk (HQ AFMC A9A, 2016). Some enterprises strongly consider manning
shortfalls and overages, while others do not (HQ AFMC A9A, 2016). However, ACS
enterprises depend upon one another to deliver capability in order to achieve a given mission.
Examining the relationship between efficiency and risk among the USAF career fields needs
study: for example, what if we discovered, while the Civil Engineering (CE) function may
not have adequate manning, it performs more efficiently with its current resources than other
career fields. This at a minimum suggests a level of managerial insight is available for
potential promotion across the rest of the personnel domain. The lack of personnel risk
accountability between and among the enterprises results in risk assessments that are
sometimes overstated or not comprehensive enough.
A defensible, traceable personnel risk assessment methodology allows all ACS
enterprises to defend why they need more resources to perform required tasks. Further, the
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successful implementation of a repeatable, proven process lends credence to other core
functions using this approach, which should increase USAF strategic risk assessment
confidence.
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Preview
Chapter II of this research presents a literature review and background of the
problem. The literature review examines problem resolution using various statistical and
analytical approaches to assess personnel organizational risk to include contingency table
analysis, logistic regression, normal, sigmoid and other known mathematical distributions
and functions. Chapter III is a paper that reveals mathematical evidence that a corporate
preference exists in what enterprises senior leaders choose to fully man or not fully man.
Chapter III uses logistic regression, relative risk and odds ratio computations to illustrate
significant manning relationships among the USAF’s 12 core functions and 32 functional
areas.

Chapter IV provides a production efficiency demonstration study optimizing USAF

F-16 active duty fighter pilot manning and sortie production rates among ten bases. Chapter
V utilizes a variant of the logistic function and normal distribution to quantify personnel risk
and statistically examines if there is a relationship between risk, capability and efficiency.
Chapter VI explores aggregation techniques to depict a core capability as a consolidated risk
score to be ultimately subsumed by a more strategic level, comprehensive risk assessment
model. Lastly, Chapter VII provides conclusions; dissertation significance; provides
recommendations for courses of action (COA); and presents several avenues for further
exploration.
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II.

Literature Review

Introduction
This chapter provides a literature search of various components of risk as it relates to
capability. The purpose is to better inform this research by providing past discussions about
the relationship between risk and capability. First, we identify the components of a risk
assessment. Second, we identify capability. Third, we address the question, what is risk in
the context of capability? Fourth, organizational efficiency is explored.

Risk Assessment Framework
A Risk Assessment Framework (RAF), presented by the Defence Research and
Development of Canada (DRDC), categorizes risk into three phases: Problem Formulation
and Scoping; Planning and Conduct of Risk Assessment; and Risk Management (Bayne and
Friesen, 2016). Figure II-1 represents a comprehensive scan of the RAF. What follows is an
adaptation of the RAF from a USAF perspective using Phases I and II. Phase III (risk
management) is less of a focus area effort for this research.
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Figure II-1: Canadian Risk Assessment Framework (Bayne & Friesen, 2017)
Framework Adaptation
A U.S. application of the Canadian RAF is used to illustrate Phase I: problem
formulation. U.S. military capability is formulated and managed by the Programming,
Planning, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process. There are volumes of literature on this
topic. Figure II-2 provides a visualization of the stages of PPBE. We see the requirements
generation stage is conducted in the first phase (Planning). That is to say, a National Security
Strategy (NSS) is envisioned by the National Command Authority (NCA).
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Figure II-2: PPBE Diagram (Manning, 2017)
The NCA consists of the US President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense and Deputy
Secretary of Defense. The NCA staff develops the actual NSS. This NSS is created to
inform the National Military and Defense Strategies (NMS and NDS, respectively)
(Manning, 2017).
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From these documents along with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 5), the chiefs of
military services along with combatant commanders and their staffs make recommendations
to form the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). These documents provide the services an
idea of the current and future threats and broad resource expectations to counter the threats.
This planning feeds the annual Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and fiscal guidance.
A takeaway from the planning phase of the PPBE process is if planners, programmers
and analysts get this wrong, the POM is misinformed; which misinforms the Presidential
Budget (PB); which limits the services’ ability to deliver, generate and sustain combat
capability to meet a desired end-state. This work does not revisit or recreate the military
requirements generation procedure. While problem formulation is critical to assessing risk,
we assume a well-formulated/scoped problem is defined, and thus, we use an existing
baseline of personnel capability and compare it to existing (and future) requirements to help
assess risk.
Phase II of the RAF is the planning and conduct of the risk assessment. It consists of
three stages: planning, risk assessment and measurement. The U.S. would use the Strategic
Planning, Programming Process (SP3) to guide the planning piece (stage one) of phase II.
This research is scoped to personnel capability and assumes funded personnel requirements
take into account the current threat and capability gaps. This assumption addresses the
threat/hazard identification component of the risk assessment stage. The impact is further
studied and examined in the form of a technical paper, which is discussed later in this
research. The focus of this literature review is proper characterization of personnel risk via

5

QDR is a legislatively-mandated review of Department of Defense strategy and priorities (Manning, 2017).
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the classic components: likelihood of failure to not meet a desired outcome and impact of this
failure. The next section addresses this phenomenon.
Risk Characterization
Risk is the likelihood of failure and severity of the consequences of this failure
(Lindbom et al., 2015). Further, risk consists of four factors: events, consequences,
uncertainties and tasks (Aven and Renn, 2009). Events are possibilities of unforeseen
situations or occurrences that can or will negatively affect an organization (Kenton, 2018).
From a personnel risk perspective, the events are probabilities of failures ranging from 0 to 1.
Consequences represent the severity of adverse effects (Aven, 2011). The consequences
from the distinctive manning rates uses a function that generates a backwards Sigmoid-curve
(S-curve). In other words, we seek to develop a mathematical relationship between manning
rate (x-axis) and impact (y-axis). The consequences from the distinctive manning rates are
developed using a sigmoid function, which is a variant of the logistic function.
Uncertainty is a potential, unpredictable, and uncontrollable outcome (Hansson and
Zalta, 2014). This research represents uncertainty as a likelihood of failure to achieve a
given manning rate. We explore several well-known mathematical distributions to examine
which are the most well-suited for demonstrating personnel uncertainty. A task is an
identifiable function of a job or activity (Shockey, 2012). For the ACS risk assessment, the
tasks are already defined by SMEs and are categorized by enterprise and PEC.
For further solidification of risk characterization, an example of a strategic risk
framework (SRF) is explored. Rowe et al. (2017) promote ways to prioritize investment
decisions in military cyber capability using risk analysis assert a SRF should contain
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independent security layers. Rowe et al. (2017) assert in a cyber context, a security layer
could be ‘Shape’. Shape refers to the change of motivation behind a threat. For example,
overtly promoting peace talks between potential threat nations is a form of shaping. This
layer is assigned a probability, which signifies a likelihood of success. By taking the
complement, we obtain a likelihood of failure. Figure II-3 illustrates the principle of creating
independent security layers across two risk components: likelihood of failure and
consequence. Each blue box represents a security layer. One goal of the SRF is to shape,
deter and prevent the threat, thereby reducing the likelihood of a failure. If a likelihood of
failure exists, the other goal of the SRF is to contain, adapt, investigate and protect against
the consequence of the failure. The overarching goal is to reduce the enduring impacts of the
threat.

Figure II-3: Cyber SRF (Rowe et al., 2017)
An example of how the cyber SRF could be applied to personnel follows. Perhaps
shaping is announcing troop increases. Deterrence could be increasing the Nuclear
Deterrence Operations (NDO) core functional personnel footprint. Prevention is a plus-up of
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personnel in certain strategic military installations. After a breach of security, protect could
mean a recall of recently retired airmen and national air reserves. Containment is the
addition of the National Guard component. Adapt is to support recovery and restoration of
potential lost personnel.
The existence of multiple independent security layers infers a joint probability can be
computed. The idea of ‘independence’ formally allows risk practitioners to compute a joint
probability (i.e. multiply the probabilities of failures and obtain an overall risk score). A
limitation with this approach is the more layers, the more likely risk will increase; the
multiplication of probabilities will yield an overall lower reliability or higher risk score.
While a possible credible approach to characterize cyber risk, the methodology
cannot be prescriptively applied to the ACS RA for two main reasons. First, manpower is
one of the most expensive assets in the USAF inventory. For any of the security layers, swift
maneuver and deployment of personnel to various locations is not only costly, but in practice
difficult to administer. Unlike a cyber maneuver, most actions can be conducted without the
movement of forces. Second, the scope of USAF strategic manpower spans across over 250
career fields, encompassing some 600,000 personnel. Each career field is arguably
interdependent and not independent, which violates the joint probability computation
procedure used in the cyber SRF. These levels of complexity make the application of the
cyber SRF to the ACS RA ill-advisable. However, the concept of likelihood of failure and
severity of the consequence of this failure to characterize risk is valid.
examines risk in the context of capability.
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The next section

Relationship between Risk and Capability
A study conducted by Lindbom et al. (2015) alluded to a worldwide literature search
of ‘capability’ and ‘capability and risk’, which yielded 500,000 and 34,000 hits, respectively.
The study mentions that while the querying resulted in large volumes of literature, very few
instances defined capability as it relates to risk. The data collected for the study from
scientific literature were condensed to 13 guidelines as it relates to the definition of
capability. From a military perspective, we present 4 of the 13 below:

I.

Capability refers to resources, systems, structures and processes necessary to
deliver current and future requirements (Bhatta, 2003).

II.

Capability is the framework an organization needs to make use of assets (e.g.
resources, competence and knowledge) and skills (e.g. capacity organization has
to manage external conditions or events) (Renn, 2008).

III.

Capability is the attributes of an organization, such as time, labor and capital
primarily used for exploitative purposes to implement a strategy (Kusumasari and
Siddiqui, 2010).

IV.

Capability is a demonstrable ability to respond to, and recover from, a particular
threat or hazard (U.K. Cabinet Office Glossary, 2014).

From these four definitions of capability, the following commonalities are observed:
capability is a type of resource; capability is necessary to implement strategy; and capability
is necessary in order to respond to a threat. Given these trends, we affirm the Air Force
guidance (discussed in Chapter I) and its approach to classify risk and capability. That is to
say, the Air Force definition of risk addresses its ability to prepare (capacity) and its ability to
respond (capability) to a given threat (Lindbom et al., 2015).
30

While there is a relationship between capability and risk, the relationship is at this
point still mathematically ill-defined. We assume there is a relationship between risk and
capability. That is to say, the more capability (e.g. fuel, manning, higher mission capable
rates (MCRs), positive infrastructure levels (e.g. Common Output Level Standards (COLS)),
equipment and supply status, etc.) that exist, the less risk incurred and conversely, the less
capability that exists, the more risk incurred. We explore mathematical functions to examine
if personnel risk can be further categorized in the form of a likelihood of failure and impact.
Mathematical exploration of likelihood of failure of an occurrence
Objective ways to compute personnel likelihood of failure are explored. Ultimately,
the goal is to obtain an operationally representative probability of having 100% or less
available and trained personnel to achieve a task or core capability. The likelihood of failure
is just half of risk; we also need the impact of this failure to fully compute personnel risk.
This portion of this work focuses on the likelihood of failure component of risk.
The ACS RA data can be either continuous or discrete. Manning rates are treated as
continuous whereas manning data decomposed by number of successes (positions filled),
number of trials (number of positions) and probability of success (100% manned) are treated
as discrete. We consider the following distributions: normal 6 (standard), binomial,
lognormal, Poisson, geometric, negative binomial, hyper-geometric and gamma.
The aforementioned distributions are compared using six categories: inputs,
probability function (𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)), range of values, expectation (𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥)), variance (𝑉𝑉(𝑥𝑥)) and relative

6

More details on the normal distribution are provided in Chapter V.
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application. The probability function p(x) estimates the likelihood a career field is not 100%
manned, trained and available. Several inputs and parameters are necessary to make this
computation. The variable p represents the probability of an event. The variable q (i.e.
absence of a probability of event) represents the complement of p (i.e. 1 − 𝑝𝑝).

The

probability function is either a probability distribution function (pdf) for continuous
distributions or a probability mass function (pmf) for discrete distributions. The range of
values is explicitly defined to allow for function feasibility. The expectation is the expected
value of a random probability-weighted average of all possible values (Hamming, 1991).
The variance is the expectation of the squared deviation of a random variable from its mean
(Hays, 1981). Table II-1 presents a summary of these distributions. Of the eight examined,
the normal, lognormal, gamma and binomial distributions are the most suited for the baseline
portion of the ACS RA.
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Table II-1: Distribution Summary (Mendenhall and Sincich, 2007)
Name

Inputs

Binomial

Probability of
success, # of
successes in n fixed
trials

Negative
Binomial

Probability of
success, # of trials
up through kth
success

Poisson

Geometric

Hyper
Geometric

*Normal
(Gaussian)

LogNormal

Gamma 7

Number of
successes per unit of
time, mean
Probability of
success, # of trials
up through 1st
success
N total # of
elements, M # of
successes, n # of
elements drawn, x #
of successes drawn
within n elements
Random variable x,
mean (𝜇𝜇) &
standard deviation
(𝜎𝜎)
Random variable x,
mean (𝜇𝜇) &
standard deviation
(𝜎𝜎)
Shape (∝), scale
(𝛽𝛽) and random
variable (x)

p(x)

Values of x

𝑛𝑛
� � 𝑝𝑝 𝑥𝑥 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛−𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥

�

𝑥𝑥 − 1 (𝑞𝑞) 𝑥𝑥−𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘
�
𝑝𝑝
𝑘𝑘 − 1

𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(1 − 𝑝𝑝)

𝑥𝑥 = 𝑘𝑘, 𝑘𝑘 + 1, …

𝑘𝑘
𝑝𝑝

𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
𝑝𝑝2

𝑥𝑥 = 0,1,2, …

𝜆𝜆

𝜆𝜆

𝑞𝑞 𝑥𝑥−1 𝑝𝑝

𝑒𝑒

𝑒𝑒

1 (𝑥𝑥−𝜇𝜇) 2
− [�
�]
2
𝜎𝜎

√2𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋

1 log(𝑥𝑥)−𝜇𝜇 2
[�− (
�]
2
𝜎𝜎

𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥√2𝜋𝜋

1 (𝛼𝛼−1) 𝛼𝛼 −(𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽)
𝑥𝑥
𝛽𝛽 𝑒𝑒
Γ(𝛼𝛼)

V(x)

𝑥𝑥 = 0,1, … 𝑛𝑛

𝑒𝑒 −𝜆𝜆 𝜆𝜆𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥!

𝑀𝑀 𝑁𝑁 − 𝑀𝑀
� ��
�
𝑥𝑥
𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥
𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛

E(x)

𝑥𝑥 = �

𝑥𝑥 = 0,1,2,3 …

1
𝑝𝑝

𝑞𝑞
𝑝𝑝2

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀[0, 𝑛𝑛 − (𝑁𝑁 − 𝑀𝑀)]
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑟𝑟, 𝑛𝑛)

𝑘𝑘
𝑝𝑝

𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
𝑝𝑝2

𝜎𝜎 > 0

𝜇𝜇

𝑘𝑘𝜎𝜎 2

>0
𝑥𝑥 = �
≤ 0, 0

𝜇𝜇

𝜎𝜎 2

𝛽𝛽
𝛼𝛼

𝛽𝛽
𝛼𝛼 2

𝜎𝜎 > 0

𝑥𝑥 > 0
𝛼𝛼, 𝛽𝛽 > 0

* Indicates the most applicable distribution

Application
The # of successes can
be represented by
personnel. The # of
trials is the number of
personnel reqmts. The
prob. of success can be
either a historical
manning rate or 100%.
Ideal for determining
number of personnel
reqmts
Appropriate for count
data where mean and
variance are equal.
Ideal for determining
number of personnel
reqmts
Ideal for determining
number of personnel
reqmts without
replacement

100% manning rate
reqmt can be
represented as a
Random Variable,
historical career field
rate as 𝜇𝜇 with respective
𝜎𝜎
Same as normal
however data are
typically right skewed,
and results tend to be
parsimonious
100% manning rate
reqmt can be
represented as a
Random Variable, and
historical std dev. and
manning rate as 𝛼𝛼 and
𝛽𝛽, respectively.

PDFs are stated in Table II-1, but the cumulative distribution function (cdf) is needed
in order to compute the probability of being at least 100% manned (𝑝𝑝∗ ). The general cdf is
7

For parametrization (i.e. assuming normally distributed data), 𝐸𝐸[𝑋𝑋] =∝ 𝛽𝛽 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟(𝑋𝑋) = 𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 2, respectively (SOCR, 2017).
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presented as 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 ≤ 𝑥𝑥) = 1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 > 𝑥𝑥), where 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 ≤ 𝑥𝑥) represents the probability
that a random variable X takes on a value less than or equal to x (Park, 2018). In the

probability of failure context, x is 1 or 100% manned. Table II-2 provides a listing of the
four relevant cdfs and respective parameters and formulae needed to compute 𝑝𝑝∗ .
Table II-2: CDF Summary

Name

Binomial

CDF
(approximation)

Parameters

𝑥𝑥

𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥; 𝑛𝑛, 𝑝𝑝) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 ≤ 𝑥𝑥)

𝑛𝑛
� � � 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑛𝑛−𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡

0 ≤ 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝑛𝑛

Normal

𝑡𝑡=0

𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥; 𝜇𝜇, 𝜎𝜎) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 ≤ 𝑥𝑥)

�

−∞ < 𝑥𝑥 < ∞

LogNormal

−∞

𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥; 𝜇𝜇, 𝜎𝜎) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 ≤ 𝑥𝑥)
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑥 < ∞

�

𝑥𝑥

0

𝜎𝜎 > 0

𝑒𝑒

𝑒𝑒

1 (𝑦𝑦−𝜇𝜇) 2
− [�
�]
2
𝜎𝜎

√2𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋

−(ln(𝑥𝑥)−𝜇𝜇)2
(
)
2𝜎𝜎 2

𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥√2𝜋𝜋

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≈ Φ(

𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ≈ Φ(

𝑥𝑥 − 𝜇𝜇
)
𝜎𝜎

ln(𝑥𝑥) − 𝜇𝜇
)
𝜎𝜎

−𝑦𝑦
𝑥𝑥
𝛼𝛼,
𝑦𝑦 ∝−1 𝑒𝑒 𝛽𝛽
𝛽𝛽
�
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 = 𝛾𝛾 �
�,
𝛼𝛼
Γ(𝛼𝛼)
0 Γ(𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽

𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥; ∝, 𝛽𝛽) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 ≤ 𝑥𝑥)

Gamma

𝑥𝑥

𝑥𝑥

0 < 𝑥𝑥 < ∞

Γ(α) = Γ(𝛼𝛼 − 1)!,

∝, 𝛽𝛽 > 0

where ∝ is an integer
manning std. deviation

𝑥𝑥

𝑥𝑥
𝛽𝛽
𝛾𝛾(𝛼𝛼, ) = � 𝑡𝑡 ∝−1 𝑒𝑒 −𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝛽𝛽
0

Table II-3 is a summary of notional career field probability of failure rates using lognormal,
normal, binomial and gamma functions.
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The binomial function behaves the most poorly, arguably followed by the lognormal
and gamma. The binomial distribution overstates risk as the illustration of having 77 people,
with 77 authorizations and a probability of success of 100% yields a failure probability of 0.
The gamma and normal distributions are competitive candidates to determine the probability
of not being fully manned given a historical career field mean and variance. The clearest
example of comparison is shown in notional sample 5, where the normal output is the most
operationally representative of personnel likelihood of failure given the parameters. The
interpretation is the Force Support Officer career field based on a historical manning rate of
43% and 1 standard deviation from the said rate with a goal of being 100% manned, has a
probability of failure of 0.72. The gamma function returns a probability of 0.87. These
values not only account for number of personnel versus funded authorizations, but also
available and trained personnel to achieve a task or core capability. The sole selection of a
distribution is based on practititioner experience, which includes a resampling of career field
data that reveal the gamma appears more sensitive to outliers than the normal distribution.
Further details of the normal distribution are discussed in Chapter V.
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Table II-3: Distribution Summary
No.
1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8

Career
Field
Clinical
SW
Logistics
Plans
Officer
Aero.
Medical
Service
Security
Forces
Force
Support
Officer
Civil Eng.
Officer
Civil Eng.
(Electrical)
Civil Eng.
(Ops
Mgmt)

Asgn

Auth

Manning
Rate

Hist.
Manning
Rate

Hist.
Std.
Dev.

937

950

0.99

1.04

65

111

0.59

77

77

810

3

Norm.
𝑝𝑝∗
0.50

Lognorm.
𝑝𝑝∗

1.00

Gamma
𝑝𝑝 ∗

0.61

3

0.55

0.42

1.00

0.28

1.00

1.04

1

0.49

0.15

0.00

0.61

816

0.99

0.99

3

0.50

0.37

1.00

0.11

25

63

0.40

0.43

1

0.72

0.33

1.00

0.87

654

662

0.99

1.04

2

0.50

0.30

1.00

0.21

63

103

0.61

0.66

2

0.57

0.37

1.00

0.40

106

174

0.61

0.65

2

0.58

0.37

1.00

0.41

0.36

Binom.
𝑝𝑝∗

0.09

Mathematical exploration of impact of failure
There is a dearth of objective-based literature regarding the impact of personnel
capability failure. This is mainly attributed to an inherent level of uncertainty. That is to say,
even if all personnel requirements are filled, risk is still not completely eliminated. This
phenomenon causes risk assessment analysts and managers to make general assumptions
about personnel risk assessment practices. For example, in an organizational risk assessment
which consists of hundreds of thousands of personnel, we assume personnel capability
degradation is not linear. This means for every one funded personnel requirement not filled,
there is not a similar reduction in overall personnel capability in a given enterprise. The
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impact of personnel failure is arguably a hybrid of linear and non-linear effects (Menon et al.,
1996).
Sigmoid Function
The relationship between personnel resources and capability satisfaction is arguably
not completely linear or entirely non-linear; Figure II-4 visually demonstrates this
phenomenon. We seek to better actualize the relationship between the inability to meet
manning expectations coupled with the impact of this shortfall. A way to approximate a mix
of linear and non-linear effects is to use a sigmoid function (Menon et al., 1996). The
sigmoid function is represented as a variant of the logistic function:

𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑦𝑦 =

1

1+𝑒𝑒 −(𝑥𝑥)

,

Eq. II-1

where e is the natural logarithm base. The inverse is represented as

𝑥𝑥 = ln(

𝑦𝑦

1−𝑦𝑦

).

Eq. II-2

Menon et al. (1996) provide theoretical demonstrations of sigmoid function applications as it
relates to trigonometry and neural networks. This literature is more theoretical based and
does not provide any reference to real-world applications. An application-based utilization
of the sigmoid function is published to include the prediction of cost savings (Mahalingam
and Vivek, 2016).
Based on historical account balances and respective dates, the algorithm is presented
to automate savings management (Mahalingam and Vivek, 2016). The scope is internet
banking in India where the currency is the rupee. For example, a bank member savings of
10,000 rupees is equivalent to 141 US dollars (current as of 1/30/2019). The data consist of
member bank transactions to include debits, credits and alert messages (e.g. overdraft
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threshold warnings). A recommended savings percentage (not to exceed 20% of available
account balance) is computed using a sigmoid function every 8 days or quarter of a month.
For example, with an overall savings goal (e.g. 10,000 rupees), duration goal (e.g. 5 months)
and maximum savings rate of 20%, the algorithm computes impact scores. Impact scores are
calculated for quarter-monthly current transaction and transaction message values. The
maximum difference between the transaction value and transaction message value determines
the upper bound input for the sigmoid function. Date intervals are absolute differences of
current and future quantized values. Date intervals are computed in 8 day increments within
a month (i.e. 1, 9, 17, 25). Figure II-4 illustrates the example.

Figure II-4: Example Savings Scenario (Mahalingam and Vivek, 2016)
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The y-axis represents the output values of the sigmoid function ranging from zero to
one. A pictorial representation of the automated savings sigmoid curve is provided in Figure
II-5.

Figure II-5: Automated Savings Curve (Mahalingam and Vivek, 2016)
Other notable applications of the sigmoid function include consumer risk reduction
strategies (Mitchell et al., 1999) and enterprise capability assessment prioritization (Bryan et
al., 2010).

A perceived risk theory study is presented examining consumer behavior during

holiday periods (Mitchell et al., 1999) using artificial neural networks (ANNs). ANNs are
fairly sophisticated models that require inputs and outputs typically coupled with the use of
calculus (e.g. back propagation) to attempt to predict a phenomenon under examination
(Hecht-Nielson, 1992). Mitchel et al. (1999) use the classic definition of risk (i.e. probability
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of failure coupled with impact of failure) as a focal point of risk foundation. The central
premise of this research stems from the ideal that if more tourism marketing insight can be
gained through perceived consumer risk behavior, then strategies among the holiday travel
promotion industry can become better focused to ultimately increase revenue and build
branding. Further, this work uses a survey instrument comprised of 60 questions with 152
British undergraduate respondents to collect tourism data to assess the following two
objectives: 1.) what are the perceived risk and risk-reduced strategies associated with
holiday-package purchases; and 2.) determine if a relationship exists between perceived risk,
risk reduction and purchase intent.
The most popular ANNs consist of three categories or layers of units: input, hidden
and output. A layer of ‘input’ units is connected to a layer of ‘hidden’ units, which is
connected to a layer of ‘output’ units (Rumelhart et al., 1986). The connections are often
referred to in neuroscience terms as ‘synapses’ similar to an interworking process of the
human brain. The activity of the input units represents the raw data fed into the network.
The activity of each hidden unit is determined by the activities of the input units and the
weights on the synapses between the input and the hidden units. Similarly, the behavior of
the output units depends on the activity of the hidden units and the weights on the synapses
between the hidden and output units. ANNs have training components. The training of the
network consists of feeding it multiple training samples and calculating the output for each of
them. After each sample, the weights are adjusted in such a way so as to minimize the output
error, defined as the difference between the desired (target) and the actual outputs (Vasilev,
2019). In the holiday package perceived risk study, the input units are risk variables
(likelihood of perceived risk and impact), while the outputs are purchase intent and risk
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reduction strategy. Figure II-6 provides a basic visualization of an ANN with one hidden
layer.

Figure II-6: ANN example (Mitchell et al., 1999)
The sigmoid function is relevant to the ANN because it is used as a nonlinear
function that has the ability to propagate error through the network through the use of
thresholds. The threshold is modeled via the sigmoid function that maps values from zero to
one as stated in the previously discussed automated cost application. Typically referred to as
a loss activation function, the derivative of the sigmoid function is expressed as:
𝑒𝑒 −𝑧𝑧

1

𝑓𝑓 ′(𝑧𝑧) = (1+𝑒𝑒 −𝑧𝑧)2 = (1+𝑒𝑒 −𝑧𝑧) ∗

(1+𝑒𝑒 −𝑧𝑧−1)
(1+𝑒𝑒 −𝑧𝑧 )

= 𝒐𝒐(1 − 𝒐𝒐),

Eq. II-3

where z represents the net of the desired input vector, output vector and hidden layer. The
error expression is generalized to include all squared errors at the outputs k =1, 2, 3…K. The
end result is the output vector (o) multiplied by its complement vector. The number of
hidden vectors depends on the dimension n of the input vector and on the number of
separable regions in n-dimensional input space. For the personnel risk application, when the
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manning rates are large, the sigmoid function slopes steeply to signify minimal impact, but
the curve steadily grows through a midpoint and continues to incline until a gradual ascend to
the maximal impact as manning rates are very low. Mitchell et al. (1996) purport the use of
ANNs allowed a relationship between perceived risk and risk reduction strategies such that
holiday travelers see increasing knowledge of destination by reading and watching relevant
television programs as a useful way to increase confidence in a trip. Further, travelers are
less likely to become as adversarial when situations arise that require adaptation.
The last exploration of sigmoid function application relates to an enterprise capability
assessment and prioritization methodology from Idaho National Labs (INL) supporting the
Department of Energy’s (DOE) interest to help develop a rigorous way to assess and
prioritize capability gaps of an US Army enterprise (Bryan et al, 2010). An enterprise is an
organization or undertaking of scope that involves complication and risk (American Heritage,
1993) that possesses capabilities such as facilities, equipment, hardware/software, skilled
personnel and knowledge management (Bryan et al., 2010). In order to identify capability
gaps, a structured approach is needed to assess risk. A pre-cursor to implementing a
structured approach to risk assessment is to assess the current or baseline capability against a
set of required capabilities to support an enterprise mission (Bryan et al., 2010). To support
this tenet, INL developed a tool called Gap Relationship & Interface Planning (GRIP) to
examine enterprise relationships, identify and prioritize capability gaps and assess risk.
The analytical underpinnings associated with the tool are not disclosed in the article.
However, Figure II-7 provides a visualization of an US Army Brigade Control Team
effectiveness using a nonlinear utility curve which notably resembles a sigmoid function.
The x-axis represents a measure of effectiveness score from 0 to 5 (higher is more favorable),
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while the y-axis represents a required capability performance level between 0 and 1 (higher is
more favorable).

Figure II-7: Notional Utility Curve (Bryan et al., 2010)
INL developed a tool called Gap Relationship & Interface Planning (GRIP) to assess
and prioritize capability gaps of an US Army enterprise. The INL developed framework
could be a potential topic of interest for further research as the USAF matures its risk
assessment process.
Generally, there are five stages of risk assessment: planning, identification,
computation, mitigation and monitoring. This research in this dissertation assumes the
planning guidance is provided and primarily focuses on the identification and computation
stages of a risk assessment.
The sigmoid function explored in the aforementioned use cases are used in various
contexts and are intended to inform further research as it relates to assessing impact of
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personnel manning deficiency. This research uses the sigmoid function as a static function to
represent impact values from personnel manning rates. The values are then translated from
the Air Force Risk Assessment Framework (AFRAF) to an impact score. The classifier
function adaptation is applied in Chapter III. The static function adaptation is applied in
Chapter V.
Using an S-curve function computation accounts for the personnel impact portion of
risk computation. The S-curve uses a manning rate from (0-100%) coupled with a special
case of the logistic function to arrive at a probability. These probabilities are used to
translate into personnel risk factor values from the AFRAF risk scale. Using both the normal
distribution to compute a probability of failure occurrence and the S-curve function coupled
with the AFRAF risk scale to compute impact of failure; yields an overall risk for a given
career field. This methodology allows for objective prioritization of resources as it affords
senior personnel capability planners to readily identify career fields with greater risk, which
arguably should be considered for more resource advocacy than career fields with less risk.
This premise is based on equal equity among career fields. Statistical techniques used to
examine categorical data response variables are further explored. This work better informs
the examination of career field equity in the view of the corporate USAF.
Determining relationships through categorical data
USAF personnel risk assessments are quite challenging because while each career
family or functional equity (FE) provides distinctive abilities as a means to achieve desired
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effects, each career field 8 is evenly valued by a governing body. For example, the USAF is
mandated to keep all career fields manned at certain historical averages or even 100% at
certain units (Schiefer et al., 2007). This makes prioritization of resources quite challenging
because all career fields are theoretically evenly valued or weighted. While governing
guidance is to man all career fields at the maximum of the two conditions (i.e. 100% or
historical world-wide average), is there an objective approach to validate that this guidance is
being applied across the enterprises or functional equities? In other words, is there any
statistical evidence of corporate preference towards certain core functions (CFs) or FEs?
Whether intentional or un-intentional, the existence of corporate preference could shed
insight into how the USAF corporately views certain CFs or FEs. If some CFs or FEs are
better manned than others, there inherently exists a weight structure among CFs, FEs or even
specific career fields that can be used for prioritization of resources. Statistical techniques
such as contingency table analysis, generalized linear modeling and odds-ratio analysis are
ways to examine this phenomena.
When we seek to compare estimated probability of events or examine if variables are
independent, we can use contingency table analysis. A way to categorize an experiment with
categorical data from the same population is to construct a table of frequency counts called a
contingency table. Samples from the same population should yield equivalent contingency
tables. Contingency table analysis via hypothesis testing can be used to statistically examine
associations or dependence between categorical variables from the same population (Haug,

8

A career field is a subgroup of a career family. For example, an analytical scientist is a subgroup of the
acquisitions career family.
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2019). The main premise of the analysis is to determine independence between the variables.
Each partition within the contingency table represents a cell. Further, hypothesis test
computations using contingency tables examine whether or not certain effects (i.e.
relationship between row and column variables) are present. That is to say, are the levels of
the row variable differentially distributed over levels of the column variables?
There are five steps to conduct contingency table analysis: 1) state the hypothesis; 2)
identify the structure of the table; 3) determine the test statistic to create a rejection region; 4)
analyze the data; and 5) interpret the results. The identification of a hypothesis test
examining independence between categorical variables can be stated as follows:
𝐻𝐻0 (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.

Once the hypothesis is identified, we can examine the structure of the contingency

table to determine the associated distributions. Theoretically, if one random variable (Y) is a
response variable and the other an explanatory or fixed variable (X), then F(Y) has a
probability distribution (Agresti, 2013). Further, assuming Y is in columns, then the row
totals represent the conditional probability: P (Y | X) or P (Y | X = x). If both row and column
variables are responses, then the cells represent outcomes for the joint distribution (X, Y).
The row and column totals equate to subsets of a collection of random variables or marginal
distributions. Table II-4 is a theoretical matrix, which depicts the general structure of a
contingency table, where 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents the probability (X, Y) occurs in a cell of column and
row variables m and p respectively within row i and column j with sample size n.
Therefore, the sample size n is equivalently written as �∑𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖=1 ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑗𝑗=1 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �.
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Table II-4: Theoretical Contingency Table
Column Variable (m columns)
1

1

Row
Variable

...

f 11





i

…



f i1

j

…



…



p



f p1

…



…

f ij

(p rows)



…

f1 j





…

f pj

m

proportions
m

f1m

p r1 =



p c1 =

…

p

∑
k =1

p cj =

…

∑
k =1

n

1k

n

m

f im

p ri =



∑f
k =1

ik

n


m

f pm

p cm =

∑f
k =1

pk

n

1

p

p

f k1

k =1



p rp =

proportions

∑f

∑f

f kj

k =1

km

n

n

Extrapolating these concepts, we derive an expected value 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 under 𝐻𝐻0 as follows:

𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) ∗ (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) ∗ (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝)

= 𝑛𝑛 ∗ �

𝑝𝑝

∑𝑖𝑖=1 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛

�∗�

∑𝑚𝑚
𝑗𝑗=1 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
𝑛𝑛

� = (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) ∗ �
47

𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗ℎ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡

�∗�

𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

�

=

𝑝𝑝

�∑𝑚𝑚
𝑘𝑘=1 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �∗�∑𝑘𝑘=1 𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 �
𝑛𝑛

=

(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)∗(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗ℎ 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

Eq. II-4

where i and j represent the indices of the number of p row and m column totals (sample
sizes) respectively, from 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … . 𝑝𝑝; 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … . , 𝑚𝑚.

A popular approach to determine independence among category variables is to

conduct a chi-square test for independence. For example, fully manned (i.e. 100% or more
manned) versus not fully manned. Significance in this hypothesis test infers dependence.
Non-significance infers independence. The chi-square statistic used to reflect the difference
between the observed value and the expected value is represented as:
𝑝𝑝

𝑚𝑚

𝜒𝜒 = � �
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑗𝑗=1

+

(𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )2
(𝑓𝑓11 − 𝑒𝑒11 )2 (𝑓𝑓12 − 𝑒𝑒12 )2
(𝑓𝑓1𝑚𝑚 − 𝑒𝑒1𝑚𝑚 )2
=
+
+ ⋯+
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑒𝑒11
𝑒𝑒12
𝑒𝑒1𝑚𝑚

(𝑓𝑓2𝑚𝑚 − 𝑒𝑒2𝑚𝑚 )2
(𝑓𝑓21 − 𝑒𝑒21 )2 (𝑓𝑓22 − 𝑒𝑒22 )2
+
+⋯+
+⋯+
𝑒𝑒21
𝑒𝑒22
𝑒𝑒2𝑚𝑚

+

(𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝1 −𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝1 )2
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝1

+

(𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝2 −𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝2 )2
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝2

+⋯+

�𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 −𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 �
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

2

.

Eq. II-5

Eq. II-5 is a Pearson chi-square statistic summarized as follows (Agresti, 2013):
𝑝𝑝

𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝜒𝜒 2 = ∑𝑖𝑖=1 ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑗𝑗=1

(𝑂𝑂−𝐸𝐸)2
𝐸𝐸

Eq. II-6

where O and E 9 are observed and expected values of the dataset, respectively.
Recall, the null hypothesis is the row and column variables are independent, which
implies the alternative hypothesis is the row and column variables are not independent. As
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 5 for every i and j, the chi-square test with level of significance (α) is as follows:
9

For proper usage of the Pearson chi-square, each expected value needs be greater than or equal to 5.
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The rejection region is defined as:

2
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜 : 𝜒𝜒 2 > 𝜒𝜒(𝑝𝑝−1)(𝑚𝑚−1),𝛼𝛼
= 𝐺𝐺 2

𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜 : 𝜒𝜒 2 ≤ 𝐺𝐺 2 ,

2
2
where 𝐺𝐺 2 is computed from 𝑃𝑃�𝜒𝜒(𝑝𝑝−1)(𝑚𝑚−1),
> 𝜒𝜒(𝑝𝑝−1)(𝑚𝑚−1),𝛼𝛼
� = 𝛼𝛼. Therefore, the p-value is

2
𝑃𝑃�𝜒𝜒(𝑝𝑝−1)(𝑚𝑚−1)
> 𝜒𝜒 2 �.

Another approach to determine statistical significance between row and column

variables is to compute a Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT). There are many versions of LRTs to
use as an estimator depending on the functional form of the data under examination. The
LRT is another goodness of fit test. An alternative more complex function to determine a
LRT is to use a logarithm function defined as (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 2013):
𝑒𝑒

−2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙. 𝑅𝑅. = 2 ∑𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖=1 ∑𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1 �𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ ln �𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 �� = 𝐺𝐺 2 .
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

Eq. II-7

If the LRT has a significant p-value (i.e. less than α), this infers a ‘more than chance’
relationship exists between the row and column variables. Dividing this value by 2 yields
similar results to the chi-square test statistic.
Another method to examine relationships between row and column variables is via an
odds ratio. The odds ratio is one when the odds and probabilities of success are the same for
each group. Consider a 2x2 contingency table with two dichotomous sample sizes or classes:
Group 1 is X and Group 2 is Y which is expressed in Table II-5.
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Table II-5: Example of 2x2 Contingency Table
Group\Outcome
Group 1

Successes
𝑚𝑚

� 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖

𝑚𝑚 − � 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖

m

� 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖

𝑛𝑛 − � 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖

n

𝑖𝑖=1

𝑛𝑛

𝑛𝑛

𝑖𝑖=1

Total

Total

𝑚𝑚

𝑖𝑖=1

Group 2

Failure

𝑚𝑚

𝑛𝑛

𝑖𝑖=1

𝑖𝑖=1

� 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + � 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖

𝑖𝑖=1

𝑚𝑚

𝑛𝑛

𝑖𝑖=1

𝑖𝑖=1

(𝑚𝑚 + 𝑛𝑛) − (� 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + � 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 )

𝑚𝑚 + 𝑛𝑛

The odds ratio is the ratio of the odds for two groups: OR = oddsX / oddsY. The odds ratio
can be expressed as (Conover, 1980):
∑𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖=1 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
∑𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 (𝑛𝑛 − ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 )
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑋𝑋 𝑚𝑚 − ∑𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 =
=
= 𝑛𝑛
.
∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
∑𝑖𝑖=1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 (𝑚𝑚 − ∑𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖=1 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 )
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑌𝑌
𝑛𝑛 − ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖

𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄. 𝐈𝐈𝐈𝐈 − 𝟖𝟖

An odds ratio of one suggests the condition or event under examination is equally likely to
occur in both groups. An odds ratio of greater than one suggests the event is more likely to
occur in Group 1. An odds ratio of less than one suggests the event is less likely to occur in
Group 1. The odds ratio must be be nonnegative, otherwise it is undefined.
In determining the likelihood of an outcome (e.g. determining the likelihood of a
functional equity or service core function being fully manned) the logistic function can be
used. Logistic regression analysis describes how a binary (success or fail) response variable
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is associated with a set of explanatory variables (categorical or continuous). The general
1

form of a logistic function is 𝑓𝑓(𝑧𝑧) = 1+𝑒𝑒 −𝑧𝑧, where the value of 𝑓𝑓(𝑧𝑧) is dependent on the

value of z (Chatterjee and Chatterjee, 2010). To obtain the logistic model from the logistic
function we write z as a function of independent variables Xs and undetermined coefficients
βs:
𝑧𝑧 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑋𝑋1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑋𝑋2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛 = 𝛽𝛽𝒙𝒙 .

Eq. II-9

From this expression we write the logistic model as follows:
1

𝑓𝑓(𝛽𝛽𝒙𝒙) = 1+𝑒𝑒 −(𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽0+𝛽𝛽1 𝑋𝑋1+𝛽𝛽2 𝑋𝑋2+⋯+𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛 ) =

The general logistic function is

𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑒𝑒

(

𝑒𝑒 (𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽0 +𝛽𝛽1 𝑋𝑋1 +𝛽𝛽2 𝑋𝑋2 +⋯+𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛 )

1+𝑒𝑒 (𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽0 +𝛽𝛽1 𝑋𝑋1 +𝛽𝛽2 𝑋𝑋2 +⋯+𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛 )

(𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽)

(1+𝑒𝑒(𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽) )

)

𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

= 1+𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

Eq. II-10

Eq. II-11

where x is the independent variable and e is the exponential function, and p(x) is the
probability of a functional equity or core function being fully manned.
A relationship exists between the logistic function and the odds ratio. All formulae
and theory are adapted from Agresti’s Categorical Data Analysis text (Argresti, 2013). The
outcome variable of the logistic function is the log odds ratio via logistic transformations
(logits), which are computed and compared among CFs and FEs. The logistic odds is
represented as
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿[𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)] = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �

𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)

1−𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)

� = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑋𝑋1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛

Eq. II-12

where 𝛽𝛽0 is the intercept, 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛 (the parameter) is the log odds ratio of one unit increase in an

independent variable X whereas e(β) is the odds ratio of one unit increase in X (Agresti,
2013).
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The log-odds interpretation is a function of the logit distribution. We can motivate
𝑝𝑝

the logit model in terms of the odds of success vs. failure, which is given by: (1−𝑝𝑝), where p

is a probability of an event occurrence. The logistic transformation (logit) is the logarithm
of the odds. Hence, model estimates from the logit are properly referred to as ‘log-odds’
1

estimates. The appeal of applying a logistic function 𝑓𝑓(𝑧𝑧) = 1+𝑒𝑒 −𝑧𝑧 to the data from a
personnel manning perspective is due to the following reasons:

1. Estimates always range between 0 and 1 in personnel being either fully manned or
not. Such a probability provides an estimate of the risk a CF or FE will not be
fully manned as required.
2. It has an S-shaped curve, which indicates for low values of z the risk of not being
fully manned remains minimal, until some threshold is reached. Then the risk
rises rapidly as z increases, and then again reaches its asymptotic limit and
remains high once z gets large enough (Stanford Logistic Regression Tutorial,
2018).
To obtain estimates of odds and odds ratio from logistic regression we need to rewrite
the logistic model in the logit form. By definition, if p is the probability that an event will
occur and is represented as follows:
•

•

𝑝𝑝

Odds are defined as 1−𝑝𝑝, i.e. probability that event will occur divided by the
𝑝𝑝

probability that the event will not occur or 𝑞𝑞.

The logit of p is as follows:

52

𝑝𝑝

Logit (𝑝𝑝) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 1−𝑝𝑝 = ln(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜).

Eq. II-13

The logistic model in terms of a conditional probability of being fully manned or not (F =1 or
0) is denoted as:
𝟏𝟏

𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹|𝑋𝑋1 , 𝛽𝛽𝒙𝒙) = 𝟏𝟏+𝒆𝒆𝜷𝜷𝜷𝜷
1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹|𝑋𝑋1 , 𝛽𝛽𝒙𝒙) =
∴ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 =

Eq. II-14

𝒆𝒆−(𝜷𝜷𝜷𝜷)
𝟏𝟏 + 𝒆𝒆−(𝜷𝜷𝜷𝜷)

𝟏𝟏
𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹|𝑋𝑋1 , 𝛽𝛽𝒙𝒙)
= −(𝜷𝜷𝜷𝜷) = 𝒆𝒆𝜷𝜷𝜷𝜷
1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹|𝑋𝑋1 , 𝛽𝛽𝒙𝒙) 𝒆𝒆
𝑝𝑝

∴ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑃𝑃) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 1−𝑝𝑝 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝒆𝒆𝜷𝜷𝜷𝜷 )

Eq. II-15

Thus, the logit form of the logistic model yields an expression for the log odds of being fully
manned for a CF or FE with a specific set of independent variable Xs. Therefore,
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋1 � − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋0 � = 𝛽𝛽1 , where, 𝛽𝛽1 represents the change in logistic odds that would
result from one unit change in independent variable X.

𝑏𝑏

For odds ratio development, we know from algebra that 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑏𝑏) − 𝑙𝑙 𝑛𝑛(𝑎𝑎) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑎𝑎).

Therefore,

𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋1 � − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋0 � = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑋𝑋 )

𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋
1
(1−𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋 )
1
𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋
0
(1−𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋 )
0

= 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑋𝑋1 ) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) = 𝛽𝛽1.

Therefore, 𝑒𝑒 𝛽𝛽1 = 𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) = 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂.

0

Eq. II-16

Eq. II-17

Generalized linear models (GLMs) are a broad class of models that include

categorical response variables (Agresti, 1999). There are three components that are common
to all GLMs:
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•

Random component;

•

Systematic component; and

•

Link function.
The random component refers to the probability distribution of the response Y. We

observe independent random variables 𝑌𝑌1 , 𝑌𝑌2 , . . . , 𝑌𝑌𝑁𝑁 . The random variables Yi, I = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁𝑁,
have expected values µi, I = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁𝑁. The systematic component involves the explanatory
variables 𝑥𝑥1 , 𝑥𝑥2 ,· · · , 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 . as linear predictors:

𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥2 + · · · +𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 .

Eq. II-18

The link component of the GLM ‘links’ the random and systematic components. It
determines how the mean µ = E(Y) relates to the explanatory variables in the linear predictor
through specifying a function 𝑔𝑔(µ) and is denoted as:

𝑔𝑔(µ) = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑥𝑥2 + · · · +𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 .

Eq. II-19

For the logistics model, the link function is:
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙[

𝜋𝜋(𝑥𝑥1 ,𝑥𝑥2 ,…,𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 )

] = 𝑔𝑔(𝜇𝜇).

Eq. II-20

1−𝜋𝜋(𝑥𝑥1 ,𝑥𝑥2 ,…,𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 )

The observations Y1, Y2, . . ., YN have a binomial distribution (the random component).
𝜇𝜇

Thus, for logistic regression, the link function can be rewritten as ln( 1−𝜇𝜇) and is called the

logit link.

When the model is fit with only an intercept (i.e. no predictors), the value of the
likelihood equation (the probability of the data) at its maximum value translates to a
-2LogLikelihood (-2LogL). If we subtract the -2LogL of a reduced model (i.e. intercept
only) from the -2LogL of a full model (i.e. intercept and k predictors), this has a chi-square
distribution with k degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis (i.e. βs = 0). If the null
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hypothesis is rejected, at least one of the k predictors is significant (i.e. at least one of the β ≠
0), which suggests at least one parameter is statistically significant.
Popular variation metrics such as R-square and MSE are not very helpful in
examining model performance when using logistic regression. Misclassification rates and
Area Under the Curve (AUC) metrics are two of several model performance indicators used
to assess logistic regression model performance. The complement of a misclassification rate
is a classifier rate. A classifier rate is computed from a confusion matrix. A confusion
matrix is expressed in terms of true and false positives and negatives, respectively. Table II6 provides a general confusion matrix.
Table II-6: A confusion matrix.
Matrix
Actual
Success
Successes
Failures

Positive
(Success)
a

Negative
(Failure)
b

c

d

Components of a confusion matrix are as follows:
•

a is the number of successes correctly classified.

•

b is the number of successes misclassified as failures.

•

c is the number of failures misclassified as successes.

•

d is the number of failures correctly classified.

Therefore, the classifier rate (𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ) defined over all classification errors is represented as:

𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 =

𝑎𝑎+𝑑𝑑

𝑎𝑎+𝑏𝑏+𝑐𝑐+𝑑𝑑

.
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Eq. II-21

Further, classifier performance can also be distinguished by true and false positives
𝑎𝑎+ and 𝑎𝑎− respectively denoted as:

𝑎𝑎+ =

𝑎𝑎

𝑎𝑎+𝑏𝑏

; 𝑎𝑎− =

𝑐𝑐

𝑐𝑐+𝑑𝑑

.

Eq. II-22

True positives are often referred to as sensitivity and false positives are referred to as (1specificity), where specificity represents the true failure or negative rate (Sensitivity and
Specificity, 2018).
A common approach to visually represent tradeoffs between true and false positives is
to construct Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves (Karimollah, 2013). ROC
curves are plots of the rate of correctly classified true positives (𝑎𝑎 + ) with respect to the
percentage of incorrectly classified false positives (𝑎𝑎− ). JMP 12 (used for part of this

research) software computes specificity and sensitivity values to build ROC curves and
establishes a tangential line to the most optimal position of the ROC curve to build an AUC
or ‘goodness of fit’ metric. AUCs are expressed as values within the lower and upper bounds
of zero and one, respectively. AUC interpretations are subjective, but one common
interpretation is any value greater than 0.50 suggest modeling predictions have more than a
‘chance’ of being accurate (Narkhede, 2018).
Given the restrictions regarding the way USAF personnel are viewed and managed,
we can prioritize personnel capability by risk. That is to say, if career field A has greater risk
than career field B, career field A should receive more prioritization with regards to
resources than career field B. This portion of the chapter focuses on objectively computing
personnel risk by core function and functional equity. The next chapter seeks to add another
dimension to the assessment of personnel risk.
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Organizational Efficiency
Is there a strong correlation (positive or negative) between risk and efficiency? This
work seeks to add another dimension to the assessment of personnel risk. We seek to
ascertain if efficiency should be considered a component of assessing risk? That is to say,
the more organizational efficient, the less organizational risk, and conversely, the less
organizational efficient, the more organizational risk. For example, what if senior decision
leaders knew if current management of manning resources of one organization was subpar
compared to like organizations? Should similar organizations with similar personnel
makeups and missions be measured with regards to personnel utilization? If so, could these
efficiency comparisons be statistically compared to risk and inferences gained to help senior
decision leaders and planners better advocate and prioritize resources? We argue before
personnel risk can be more accurately assessed, efficiency should be examined.
Figure II-8 is a notional schematic of how ACS efficiency could be assessed as it
relates to personnel impact in order to maintain, sustain and deliver capability. The arcs are
directed from the top (Core Capability) to bottom (Career Fields). In other words, to what
extent with regards to risk can a core capability (e.g. Research & Development) conduct its
steady state operations to support the warfighter? The core capability is measured by tasks
which have sub and sub-sub tasks. These tasks are linked to Program Element Codes (PECs)
that are linked to Air Force Specialties (AFS) or career fields.
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Figure II-8: Notional ACS Risk Assessment (Personnel Centric) node structure
If outputs could be obtained at the various tasks, subtasks, and sub-sub task levels, a
technique entitled Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) may be useful in examining potential
personnel efficiency before assessing risk.
DEA is an aggregation technique that compares unit (to include units without price
points) (Han and Sohn, 2011) performance by examining the ratio of weighted outputs and
inputs (Colbert et al., 2000). Fundamentally, DEA requires m inputs, s outputs, k
organizations and a sample size N to ultimately measure efficiency (Subhash, 2004).
A series of related DEA techniques were published by multiple authors in the early
1950s [(Debreu, 1951; Shephard, 1953)]. The objective of DEA is to produce the maximum
quantity of output from a specific input bundle (Subhash, 2004). The benchmark is
determined by the comparison of the actual output produced with the benchmark quantity
yielding a measure of technical efficiency between Decision Making Units (DMUs)
(Subhash, 2004). A Decision Making Unit (DMU) is technically efficient (TE) if it can
produce the maximum possible output from its capacity (Atkinson and Cornwell, 1994). A
DEA formulation of technical efficiency is (Huguenin, 2012):
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𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 = 𝑧𝑧 =

∑𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 𝑼𝑼𝑟𝑟 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

,

Eq. II-23

where TEk is the technical efficiency of an observed DMU k using m inputs to produce s
outputs. Yrk represents the quantity of output r produced by DMU k. Xik represents the
quantity of input i consumed by DMU k. Ur and Vi are weights of the output r and input i
respectively. DEA modeling requires prerequisite knowledge of the following properties:
returns to scale, orientation, model type and slack. Returns to scale (RTS) refers to the rate
by which an output changes if an input is changed by the same factor (OECD, 2001).
DEA variants can accommodate two foundational types of returns to scale: constant
and variable [(Charnes et al., 1978; Banker et al., 1984)]. The constant return to scale or
(CRS) model created by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (CCR) reflects the ability of a DMU to
maximize outputs from a given set of inputs (Mogha et al., 2015). CRS can also be
interpreted as overall technical efficiency (OTE). CRS models are appropriate when all
DMUs under examination have a linear relationship i.e. the outputs increase at the same rate
of inputs (Ozcan, 2014). The Banks, Cooper and Charnes (BCC) or Variable returns to scale
(VRS) model is more appropriate when all organizations (DMUs) under comparison do not
have the same rate of change with regards to proportion of outputs to inputs (Banks et al.,
1984). VRS models determine pure technical efficiency (PTE). For DEA CRS and VRS
models, scale efficiency (SE) is computed as the ratio of respective CRS and VRS efficiency
values (Alvarez et al., 2016) regardless of orientation (i.e. input or output). OTE, PTE and
SE are often referred to as relative efficiencies due to computation distinctions (Mogha et al.,
2015).
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Another DEA property is orientation. There are generally three types of DEA
orientation: input, output (Charnes et al., 1978) and directional distance (Chambers et al.,
1996). Input oriented (io) models measure how much an organization can decrease its inputs
(e.g. manning) to achieve given outputs such as sales or generated combat sorties, compared
to its most efficient peers. Output oriented (oo) models reverse the idea and identify how
much additional output should be possible for given inputs, again relative to the
organization’s most efficient peers (Jarzebowski and Bezat-Jarzebowski, 2014). For
completeness, the directional distance DEA model is briefly discussed. Directional distancetype models are universally oriented, i.e. there is no need to distinguish between input or
output orientation (Toloo and Tavana, 2017). Directional distance models are typically used
to distinguish between desirable and undesirable variables (Cheng and Zervopoulos, 2012).
While the majority of inputs and outputs for this research are not considered interchangeable,
an excursion is discussed in Chapter V illustrating an application of the said orientation.
A third DEA property involves model type of which this study considers two: radial
(Charnes et al., 1978) and additive (Lovell and Pastor, 1995) models. Radial DEA models
require that all inputs be contracted and/or outputs expanded from a center (e.g. origin) or
radius. These models are the first of several explored to compare and contrast DMU
efficiency.
The CRS and VRS DEA model solutions identify efficiency frontiers. All DMUs
which fall on the efficient frontier (i.e. CRS or VRS) are said to be technically efficient (i.e.
there are no shortages or overages of the inputs/outputs). These shortages or overages are
known as negative or positive slack values respectively. DMUs with zero slack set the
standard or ‘benchmark’ for other DMUs that are spatially located some distance from the
60

efficiency frontier. A practical interpretation is that DMUs operating below the efficiency
frontier are deemed to have potential for performance improvement (Huguenin, 2012). All
of the said models use two-stage 10 optimization to compute slack variables. For output
orientation DEA models, the first stage (envelopment or primal form) of optimization
maximizes the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs while assuming this ratio is less
than or equal to unity for all DMUs (Cook and Zhu, 2005). The second stage (multiplier or
dual form) of DEA optimization minimizes inputs radially to maximize outputs levels (Cook
and Zhu, 2005).
The other DEA model type examined in this work is an additive model (AM) or
slacked based model (SBM). The major difference between the radial and additive model is
the way by which technical efficiency is computed. DEA additive models simultaneously
consider positive and negative slack variables (Charnes et al., 1985) in order to determine
technical efficiency.
The summation of the weights of the ratio of DMU outputs and inputs are used to
determine managerial implications (Bowlin, 1985). There are differing managerial
implications depending on DEA decreasing or increasing RTS. Decreasing or non-increasing
RTS (DRS) suggest DMU reduction in size (e.g. base reduction in manpower). Nondecreasing or increasing RTS or (IRS) infers the DMU is being mismanaged to an extent as
resources are being underutilized [(Lu, 2010); (Cook and Zhu, 2005)]. The aforementioned
types of managerial implication are further explored in the analysis portion of this study.

10

Two stage DEA optimization refers to first: optimizing the DMUs for model type (e.g. radial) efficiency and
second: computing the possible input excesses and output shortfalls or slacks to determine technical
efficiency (Alvarez et al., 2016).
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A brief exposition of DEA terminology is provided. Specific DEA modeling formulae now
follow in the form of non-linear and linear programs succeeded by applications.
Models
CCR
Farrell (1957) published a nonlinear program formulation of DEA. A fractional
program maximizing technical efficiency of the observed DMU k is stated below to include
two constraints (Huguenin, 2012):

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡:

𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
∑𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 𝑼𝑼𝑟𝑟 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

∑𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 𝑼𝑼𝑟𝑟 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

≤ 1; 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … 𝑁𝑁

𝑼𝑼𝑟𝑟 , 𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖 > 0; ∀𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠; ∀𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚𝑚.

Eq. II-24

Eq. II-25
Eq. II-26

Eq. II-24 is the maximum technical efficiency of an observed DMU k using m inputs
to produce s outputs. Yrk represents the quantity of output r produced by DMU k. Xik
represents the quantity of input i consumed by DMU k. Ur and Vi are optimal weights of the
output r and input i respectively. Eq. II-25 requires that the ratio of weighted outputs and
inputs for each of the N DMUs cannot exceed one. Eq. II-26 restricts the weighted outputs
and inputs to positive values. DMU k is CCR-efficient if 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘∗ = 1, and there exists at least

one optimal set of weighted input and output bundles (𝑼𝑼𝑟𝑟∗ , 𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖∗ ), otherwise, DMU k is CCRinefficient (Cooper, 2007). After algebraic manipulation, we can reformulate the nonlinear
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fractional program as an LP (primal form 11-oo) and obtain the following CRS model
(Cooper et al., 2007):

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡:

min 𝑧𝑧 = ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

Eq. II-27

∑𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 𝑼𝑼𝑟𝑟 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 1

Eq. II-28

∑𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 𝑼𝑼𝑟𝑟 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 − ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 0; ∀𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁
𝑼𝑼𝑟𝑟 , 𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0; ∀𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠; 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚𝑚.

Eq. II-29
Eq. II-30

Eq. II-27 (objective function) minimizes the quantity of weighted bundle input Vi
consumed by DMU k for all m inputs. Eq. II-28 is a constraint that ensures the quantity of
weighted output(s) Ur consumed by k DMUs for all s outputs sum to one. Eq. II-29 is a
constraint that ensures the difference between the quantity or bundle of weighted outputs Ur
consumed by k DMUs for all s outputs, and the quantity of weighted inputs Vi consumed by j
DMUs to the total amount of DMUs for all m inputs, is less than or equal to zero. Eq. II-30
constrains the weighted bundled outputs and inputs to positive values.
The dual of the preceding formulation is as follows:

𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡:

max 𝜃𝜃

Eq. II-31

∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 = 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

Eq. II-32

𝑼𝑼𝑟𝑟 , 𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0; ∀𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠; 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚𝑚; 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 ≥ 0; ∀𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁

Eq. II-34

∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 = 𝜃𝜃 ∗ 𝑼𝑼𝑟𝑟 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟

11

Eq. II-33

For more information on dual/primal LP relationships, reference ‘DEA in the Black Box’ (Charnes et al.,
1994).
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Eq. II-31 is the objective function, which is to maximize TE of DMU k without the
consideration of slack variables. Eq. II-32 constrains the quantity of input i consumed by
DMU k to equate to the sumproduct of the quantity of output r produced by DMU k and a
non-negative vector 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 . 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 is introduced as a non-negative transposed vector

(𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 = (𝜆𝜆1 , … 𝜆𝜆𝑁𝑁 )𝑇𝑇 . The 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 s represent the set of optimal weights for each base. The

summation of each base’s weighted set determines the RTS (i.e. decreasing, constant or
increasing scale). Values greater than one are considered DRS; values less than one are
considered IRS and values equal to one are considered CRS (Dario and Simar, 2007).
Eq. II-33 constrains the sumproduct of the quantity of output r produced by DMU j
and a non-negative vector 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 to equate to a maximized TE of DMU k coupled with the

quantity of output r produced by DMU k consumed by k DMUs for all s outputs. Eq. II-34
constrains the weighted bundled outputs and inputs as well as optimal weights to positive
values.
Recall, TEk is the technical efficiency of an observed DMU k using m inputs to
produce s outputs. Yrj represents the quantity of output r produced by DMU j. Xij represents
the quantity of input i consumed by DMU j. TEk will result in a value [0, ∞), where 1
represents benchmarked DMU j. Values greater than or less than 1 are considered
technically (radially) inefficient. The following CCR model is formulated with slack
variables.
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CCR (with slacks)
A modified version of the CCR (dual form-oo) formulation (Eq. II-31) incorporates
input and output slack variables into the calculation of DMU efficiency (Cook and Zhu,
2005):

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡:

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀 ∑𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + 𝜀𝜀 ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
∑𝑁𝑁
= 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ; 𝑟𝑟 = 1, … 𝑠𝑠
𝑗𝑗=1 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 − 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ; 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … 𝑚𝑚

𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 , 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0; ∀𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁; 𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠; 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚𝑚.

Eq. II-35

Eq. II-36
Eq. II-37
Eq. II-38

The quantity 𝜀𝜀 represents a small positive number and 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 and 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represent output

and input slack variables, respectively. TEk will result in a value [1, ∞), where 1 represents
benchmarked DMU j. 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 ’s are optimal weights for each base. Values greater than 1 are
considered technically inefficient.
BCC (with slacks)

Some DEA variations differ by scaling properties (Banker et al., 1984). The Banker,
Cooper and Charnes output oriented (BCC-oo) LP (dual form) formulation is:

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡:

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀 ∑𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + 𝜀𝜀 ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
∑𝑁𝑁
= 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ; 𝑟𝑟 = 1, … 𝑠𝑠
𝑗𝑗=1 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 − 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ; 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … 𝑚𝑚

∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 = 1

𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 , 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0; ∀𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁; 𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠; 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚𝑚.
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Eq. II-39

Eq. II-40
Eq. II-41
Eq. II-42
Eq. II-43

The only difference between the CRS and BCC-oo LP formulations is that the BCC
model scaling constraint (Eq. II-42) replaces the upper bound inequality with an equality
(Huguenin, 2012). TEk will result in a value [1, ∞), where 1 represents benchmarked DMU
j. Values greater than 1 are considered technically (radially) inefficient.
Weighted Additive Model (WAM-VRS)
There are several versions of weighted additive models (WAM-VRS), but we use the
Lovell and Pastor weighted technical efficiency algorithm. For additive models, technical
efficiency is based solely on input excesses and output shortages (Alvarez et al., 2016). In
other words, the model considers total slack of the inputs and outputs when arriving at a
point with respect to the efficient frontier (Wen, 2015). Further, the goal of the function is to
maintain technical efficiency while simultaneously maximizing feasible decreases and
increases in inputs and outputs respectively.
The WAM-VRS LP formulation is:

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡:

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ∑𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 𝜔𝜔𝒚𝒚 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 𝜔𝜔𝒙𝒙 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
∑𝑁𝑁
= 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ; 𝑟𝑟 = 1, … 𝑠𝑠
𝑗𝑗=1 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 − 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟 = 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ; 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … 𝑚𝑚

∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 = 1

𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 , 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0; ∀𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁; 𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠; 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚𝑚.

Eq. II-44

Eq. II-45
Eq. II-46
Eq. II-47
Eq. II-48

Two differences between the slack-based output-oriented models and WAM-VRS
formulations are: the WAM model objective function (Eq. II-44) does not include technical
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efficiency, and output/input weight vectors (𝜔𝜔𝒚𝒚 , 𝜔𝜔𝒙𝒙 ) are introduced as a Measure of
Inefficiency Proportions (MIP) (Alvarez et al., 2016). The MIP is defined as:
1

1

�𝜔𝜔𝒚𝒚 , 𝜔𝜔𝒙𝒙 � = 𝒚𝒚 , 𝒙𝒙
0

0

Eq. II-49

where x and y are minimum observed values (Alvarez et al., 2016). TEk will result in a value
[0, ∞), where 0 represents benchmarked DMU j. Values greater than 0 are considered
technically (radially) inefficient.
Superefficient Additive Model (SAM-VRS)
There are cases where multiple DMUs within a sample size are considered equally
technically efficient. A methodology to provide further distinction between efficient DMUs
is to use a superefficiency model. A superefficient DEA model is obtained when a DMU
under evaluation is excluded from the reference set (Alvarez et al., 2016). Removal of
efficient DMUs from the reference set shrinks the production set, which allows efficient
DMUs to become superefficient and yield scores greater 100%. If DEA efficiency results
from previous model application (e.g. WAM, which uses all DMUs versus Superefficient
Additive Model (SAM) where exclusion of referenced DMU is computed) remain
unchanged, then these DMUs are said to be inefficient while scores that change are
considered superefficient (Osman et al., 2014).
The basic function of a superefficiency model determines the maximum percentage
change which is feasible such that the DMU remains efficient (Vescovi and Favaretto, 2002).
Essentially, the observed output exceeds what is necessary for a DMU to be considered
efficient relative to other DMUs in the sample (Subhash, 2004). In other words, assuming
more than one DMU is efficient; the efficient DMU with greater capacity for reduction of is
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more super-efficient than the other DMUs. The model is unit and translation invariant (also
for slacks) for the VRS specification. That is to say, input or output data may thus assume
negative or zero values (Lovell and Pastor, 1995). Thus, superefficiency allows measuring
DMU efficiency beyond 100% relative to peers. There are several versions of the
supefficiency model, but we use the function in the MATLAB Toolbox (Andersen and
Petersen, 1993).

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡:

The SAM-VRS LP formulation is:
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ∑𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 𝜔𝜔𝒚𝒚 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + ∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 𝜔𝜔𝑥𝑥 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟

∑𝑁𝑁−1
𝑗𝑗=1,≠𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟.

𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟

∑𝑁𝑁−1
𝑗𝑗=1,≠𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟.

+ 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ≤ 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ; 𝑟𝑟 = 1, … 𝑠𝑠

𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

− 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ; 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … 𝑚𝑚

∑𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 = 1

Eq. II-50

Eq. II-51
Eq. II-52
Eq. II-53

𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 , 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0; 𝜔𝜔𝒚𝒚 , 𝜔𝜔𝑥𝑥 > 0; ∀𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁; 𝑟𝑟 = 1, … , 𝑠𝑠; 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚𝑚. Eq. II-54

The quantity 𝜔𝜔 represents in Eq. II-50 a small positive number and 𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 and 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represent
output and input slack variables. Note Eq. II-50 are Eq. II-44 are equivalent objective
functions.
The constraints between the two objective functions are what differ. Eq. II-51
constrains the quantity of output r produced by DMU k to be greater than or equal to the
sumproduct of the quantity of output r produced by DMU j for all DMUs besides the

referenced DMU, and a non-negative vector 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 . Eq. II-52 constrains the quantity of input i

produced by DMU k to be less than or equal to the sumproduct of the quantity of input i

produced by DMU j for all DMUs besides referenced DMU, and a non-negative vector 𝜆𝜆𝑗𝑗 .

Eq. II-53 constrains the summation of the optimal weights for all bases to sum to one. Eq. II68

54 restricts the weighted bundled outputs and inputs as well as optimal weights to positive
values.
A DMU is regarded as super-efficient if score exceeds 100% when measured against
a production possibility set constructed from the input-output data of all other firms in the
sample (Subhash, 2004). TEk will result in a value [0, ∞), where a value equal to 0 represents
a benchmarked DMU j and is considered technically efficient. The reader should know there
are instances where feasibility12 can not be obtained.
Application
This research uses known mathematical forms to examine and assess complex
organizational risk and efficiency using personnel data. A literature survey of DEA
published papers in journals indexed by the Web of Science database from 1978 through
August 2010 asserted almost two-thirds were application-based, while the remaining onethird was theoretical (Liu et al., 2013). The phenomena under investigation for this research
is application-centric versus theoretical. Among application-based articles, the top-five
industries addressed were: banking, health care, agriculture and farm, transportation, and
education. Of almost 5,000 articles examined, the military industry represented less than 20
of the total sample size or approximately 0.4% (Liu et al., 2013). Highlights from the leading
industries of published application-based DEA articles are discussed.
A leading cited article applying the DEA CCR model compares operating efficiencies
among 14 branch offices of a savings bank (Sherman and Gold, 1985). Sherman and Gold

12
Infeasibility of a superefficient model can occur if an efficient DMU under evaluation cannot reach the frontier formed by the rest of
DMUs via increasing the inputs or decreasing the outputs, depending on the orientation of the model (Mehdiloozad and Roshdi, 2019).
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argue DEA results provide meaningful insights regarding efficiency otherwise not available
from other techniques. Further, a study compared 174 Italian banks and concluded efficiency
is best explained by productivity specialization, size, and location (Favero and Papi, 1995).
DEA was used to examine activity-based accounting with cost as an input and performance
as an output of 250 branches in a large Mideast bank (Kantor and Maital, 1999). For health
care, efficiency among 3000 urban government and non-government hospitals is compared
(Ozcan and Base 5, 1993). The results assert government hospitals are more efficient. As far
as agriculture and farming, Australian dairy farms are evaluated to examine efficient
irrigation systems (Fraser and Cordina, 1999). Among the transportation industry,
operational performance is compared using 15 international airlines to better understand
strategic factors of profitability (Schefczyk, 1993). Worldwide public transportation
performance in metropolitan areas and small cities is examined and results show Singapore,
London, San Francisco, and Chicago are considered scaled efficient (Chu et al., 1992). DEA
is used in the education industry to measure the efficiency of Israeli academic departments at
Ben-Gurion University (Sinuanystern et al., 1994). Lastly, DEA is applied to economics
graduates from United Kingdom universities to evaluate teaching efficiency; results were
inconclusive (Johnes, 2006). While relatively a large amount of DEA literature exist for
several industries, there appears to be a dearth of military-centric papers. One aspect of this
research seeks to add analytical knowledge to the said domain.

Conclusion
Chapter II explored known mathematical functions, distributions and techniques to
examine personnel risk and efficiency. While structured to accommodate the ACS core
70

function, this problem resolution framework can be extended to all USAF core functions.
Four application-based approaches are examined to assess strategic risk from a personnel
perspective. The first approach uses logistic regression, odds-ratios, relative risk and
contingency table analyses to assess the 12 core functions in the USAF from a manning
perspective. A core function personnel manning comparison has never been conducted, and
thus is the first time explored. The second approach uses Data Envelopment Analysis to
explore efficiency using personnel data. The third approach uses normal and sigmoid
functions to compute probability of failure of not being manned (among USAF career fields)
at required levels and the respective impact. These two functions are used to compute risk.
The fourth and final paper uses a Euclidean norm to subsume the said computed risk scores
that will ultimately produce aggregate risk values for the five core capabilities within Agile
Combat Support. These scores are to be subsumed by another risk model controlled by
higher headquarters. With the theoretical lens in place, we now use the said applicationbased approaches to demonstrate a successful USAF enterprise risk assesssment upgrade.
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III. Methodology to Determine, Compare and Assess USAF Core Function Personnel
Risk
Introduction
As discussed in Chapters I and II, USAF capability is planned, managed, distributed
and executed through 12 service core functions (SCFs) or enterprises of personnel. These
various enterprises are mandated to provide annual risk assessments to inform resource
allocation and prioritization decision making. Capability and capacity are resources
consisting of people, infrastructure, readiness and training, and modernization and
recapitalization. The highest ranking uniformed member of the USAF believes personnel
are the service’s greatest asset to maintain a global competitive edge (Air Combat Command,
2019). These personnel sum to over 400,000, across 300 career fields ranging from pilots to
cooks dispersed all over the world. The career fields are interconnected to ultimately enable
and execute air operations whenever, wherever, when needed. USAF career fields are often
undermanned and task-saturated which results in a stressed, overworked workforce that
equates to increased military risk.
When service planners, programmers and analysts do not rigorously define personnel
requirements, comprehensively assess capability gaps and risk; a service failure may arise in
more accurately informing and enabling senior leaders to advocate for resources given a
fiscally constrained environment. In the world of doing either the same amount of workload
or less workload with fewer resources, how does one effectively manage resources with
respect to assessing personnel capability?
In the past, the USAF has developed numerous MAJCOM manpower assessments
and techniques. MAJCOM and Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) manpower models were
72

the highest tiered enterprise-level personnel assessments. However, since 2010, the USAF
has adopted a broader enterprise-level approach via the SCF. A SCF may utilize several
MAJCOMs in order to execute its mission. One enduring challenge is accurately assessing
personnel deficiencies across the USAF by SCF. If planners could more accurately assess
and identify the personnel readiness by SCF, this would help substantiate the risk associated
with a lack of required manpower to deliver wartime and peacetime capability. If such
statistical evidence exists, this suggests a weighting structure among career fields can be
obtained and an interdependency model can be objectively developed. Prior to 2016, no
USAF personnel analysis conducted among SCFs existed.
A proposed methodology presents a suite of objective, mathematical approaches to
examine and assess personnel risk by SCFs. First, since SCFs differ in sample size, multiple
comparison confidence intervals via a Tukey-Kramer test are used to determine if a
statistically significant relationship exists between SCF manning rates. Insight from this
technique is used to determine if SCF manning rates means are equal. This is considered
exploratory analysis. Second, logistic regression is used to determine the probability of
being at least 100% or more manned by SCF and functional equity (FE). The results from
this analysis can be used to predict future SCF and FE manning levels. This insight reveals if
preferential treatment at the corporate USAF level exists as it relates to the way SCF and FE
manning is resourced. Third, through the use of logistic regression, logistics odds ratios can
be computed to determine the probability of one SCF or FE to be more likely to be fully
manned than other SCFs and FEs. This insight is noteworthy because the analysis allows
risk assessment practitioners to understand how SCFs and FEs are related as it relates to
manning allocation. Fourth, relative risk determine the magnitude (i.e. number of times) one
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SCF or FE is more likely of being 100% or more manned than another SCF or FE. These
four inferences from the methodology are handy inputs to compute risk as it relates to
personnel capability assessments.
A methodological enterprise risk comparison is demonstrated examining 12 USAF
core functions and 32 functional equities. This methodology can be used as a way to
determine if evidence of corporate preference exists. The methodology decomposes and
synthesizes personnel data to compute, compare and contrast enterprise level risk. The
methodolgy helps identify capability gaps and serve as a good planning tool for validating
risk. This further helps senior leaders to qualify risk with analysis and increase the odds of
filling or mitigating personnel capability gaps.
A methodological enterprise risk comparison is demonstrated examining 12 USAF
core functions and 32 functional equities. This methodology can be used as a way to
determine if evidence of corporate preference exists. The methodology decomposes and
synthesizes personnel data to compute, compare and contrast enterprise level risk. The
methodolgy helps identify capability gaps and serve as a good planning tool for validating
risk. This further helps senior leaders to qualify risk with analysis and increase the odds of
filling or mitigating personnel capability gaps.

Background
The primary objective of this methodology is to examine ways to assess and analyze
manning data to help senior Air Force leaders manage personnel capability and enhance
maximization of readiness. The desired endstate is a more defensible, rigorous methodology
to better inform SCF (Figure III-1) strategic risk assessments. This will help SCF personnel
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planners assess manning shortages to more accurately inform the USAF budget, yielding
better management of personnel combat capability.
Manning is defined as the ratio of the number of personnel assigned to the number of
funded authorizations:

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 =

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 (𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

.

Eq. III-1

Each USAF unit has a unit manning document (UMD) which stipulates the number of
personnel and funded authorizations. Each authorization represents a funded position.
Ideally, funded authorizations should have assigned, trained personnel filling the positions,
but this is usually not achieved across the USAF.

Figure III-1: USAF Service Core Functions (SP3 2011)
As of July 2016, there were over 400,000 active duty military and civil servants in the
USAF. Of the 400,000+ personnel, 55% are enlisted, 13% are officer and the remaining 32%
are civil servants. The USAF has approximately 250 career field specialties or Air Force
Specialties (AFS). AFSs are further compartmentalized into Air Force Specialty Codes or
AFSCs. The AFSCs are condensed into 32 functional equities (FEs) across the 12 SCFs. A
mapping of the career fields to the functional equities is provided in Figure III-2.
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Figure III-2: Functional Equity Mapping
Thirty-two FEs across 12 SCFs equate to a dataset of 375 observations 13. Figure III-3
shows the assigned USAF personnel by the 12 SCFs in the top chart along with associated
manning rates in the bottom chart. Figure III-4 shows manning rates by FE. The amount of
personnel differs by SCF. The mean and median are the same for the FEs. Each of the twelve
SCFs are supported by Core Function Support Plans (CFSPs), developed and approved by one
of the seven Core Function Leads. CFSPs translate the vision for the specific SCFs into riskinformed, resource-constrained, planning force proposals that guide follow-on Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) and Science & Technology (S&T) decisions and activities

13

The reader should be advised not all 32 functional equities are represented in every SCF, so although 32 x
12 is 384, there are actually only 375 observations.
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(NAP, 2014).
Figure III-3: USAF SCF Manning Summary

Figure III-4: USAF Functional Equity Manning Summary
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Data Overview
This study consists of over 416,485 authorizations collapsed into 375 subsets as of
July of 2016 from the Air Force Manpower, Personnel and Services database. Each subset
represents a group of FE by SCF. Each observation contains 6 variables listed in Table III-1.
The variable type characteristics are categorical (to include nominal and ordinal) and
numeric.
Table III-1: Variables for categorical analysis
Name

Description and effect type

Type

Levels and notes

SCF
Functional Equity
(FE)
Manning category

Service Core Function (Fixed)
Career Field Family (Fixed)

Nom.
Nom.

There are 12 USAF SCFs.
There are 32 FEs.

Binned manning categories between
≥ 100% and < 80% (Fixed)
Assigned personnel vs Authorizations
(Used to determine ‘Fully Manned’ & ‘Manning
category’)
Factor which consists of (Fixed)
either fully manned or not
Number of surplus/shortage of
authorizations (Fixed)

Ord.

6 ordered categories

Cont.

This is a continuous value.

Nom.

Binomial variable
(outcome)
This is a discrete value.

Manning rate

Fully Manned (Y/N)
Overage/Shortage (-)

Disc.

Methodology
An analytical methodology to conduct SCF personnel risk analysis is provided. The
methodology consists of several mathematical techniques to understand, compute and assess
enterprise risk. The methodology uses five mathematical procedures to examine USAF
personnel data by core function and functional equity. First, a multiple comparison method
is used to examine whether the core functions and functional equities are similar. Second,
the application of contingency table analyses determines existence of dependency among
core functions and functional equities. Third, the use of odds ratios compare the odds of
achieving 100% or more manning levels by core function and functional equity. Fourth,
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logistic regression computes the likelihood of full manning levels by enterprise and
functional equity. Fifth, relative risk is used as a quantitative way to compare ratios of the
probabilities of success (i.e. probability a SCF or FE is fully manned). These techniques are
part of a framework developed to compare and contrast strategic personnel risk.
This SCF manning assessment approach can help identify capability gaps, and serve
as a good planning tool and as a means of validating risk. This helps senior leaders to qualify
risk with analysis and increase the odds of filling or mitigating personnel capability gaps. A
potential tertiary inference is to determine if corporate preference exists. If such statistical
evidence exists, this suggests a weighting structure among career fields can be obtained and
an interdependency model can be objectively developed.
The interdependency model is the analytical substantiation for a more comprehensive
model that takes into account dependent relationships between and among career fields. This
improved strategic manning assessment is used to improve the strategic planning and
programming process and enable the senior decision makers to better advocate for personnel
resources. The subsequent research questions and hypothesis, tested at a 5% significance
level (α = 0.05) are as follows:
• Is there a meaningful manning relationship between USAF SCFs and full manning
levels?
Null Hypothesis (𝐻𝐻0 ): There is an association between SCF and Full manning
levels.
Alternate Hypothesis (𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 ): There is no association between SCF and Full
manning levels.
• Given, SCFs are unique: is there a rigorous way to compare manning levels among
SCFs and FEs?
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The goal of this study is to build a SCF and FE comparative manning assessment that
decision makers can utilize for personnel capability advocacy. Techniques explored focus on
logistic analysis in the form of contingency tables, logistic odd ratios and other methods to
compare the SCFs and FEs against the manning levels.
Exploratory Analysis
The next portion uses multiple comparison methods to examine if the 12 SCF
populations, that consist of primarily 32 functional equities, are similar. Figure III-5
provides a box and whisker plot by SCF population with a grand mean. Box and whiskey
plots are simply visual ways to depict data. Bow and whisker plots do not infer statistical
significance.

Visually, there are some mean overlaps, but in order to determine statistical

similarity, a multiple comparisons statistical test is required.

Figure III-5: Box and Whisker plot of SCF Manning Levels
A way to evaluate if there are any statistically significant differences between SCF
manning rates is via a confidence interval (CI) simultaneous test. Some key elements of any
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multiple CI test are the per experiment (PE) error rate, per comparison (PC) error rate and
familywise (FW) error rate (Howell, 2007). The PE error rate represents the number of Type
I errors we expect to make when the Null Hypothesis (Ho) is true.
The PE error rate is typically calculated by taking the sum of comparisons and
multiply this by the alpha level (e.g. ∝ = 0.05) (Montgomery, 2013). The PC error rate

represents the alpha or significance level for each test (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). The
FW error rate estimates the probability that we have at least one Type I error in the family of
comparisons (c) (Denis, 2016). It is typically calculated as follows: 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝑐𝑐
(Denis, 2016).

The Tukey-Kramer (for unequal sample sizes) group comparison method is
considered one of the most robust comparison techniques (Montgomery, 2013). Unequal
sample sizes require the computation of estimated standard deviations for each pairwise
comparison (McDonald, 2014). It assumes constant variance, independence and a normal
distribution. The Tukey method allows many confidence intervals to be compared while still
assuring an overall confidence coefficient is maintained (Tukey, 1949). The Tukey FW error
rate (β) is typically expressed as ∝/𝑘𝑘 where α represents the family error rate and k
represents the number of comparisons (NIST, 2015).

The procedure is performed using JMP 11 Pro. An overall significance level of 0.05
or simply there is a 5% likelihood of committing a Type I error (rejecting the null hypothesis,
when it is true). Figure III-6 is a Tukey-Kramer multiple comparison among the SCF mean
manning rates. Figure III-6 shows evidence of SCF dissimilarity. Specifically, the majority
of the Tukey-Kramer test results reveal the SCFs are statistically dissimilar. The only SCFs
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that appear to be statistically similar are Special Operations (SO) and Personnel and
Training (P&T) as well as Global Precision Attack (GPA) and Cyberspace Superiority (CS).

Figure III-6: Tukey-Kramer test of SCF Manning Levels

Contingency Analysis
In this analysis, the main response variable is binary (i.e. fully manned or not) and
the other factors are fixed nominal and ordinal variables. We use contingency analysis to
examine if there are meaningful associations between SCFs and manning levels as well as
studying associations between SCFs and FEs. The results visually show there is a clear
distinction between Fully Manned and not fully manned core functions and functional
equities. A total of 375 samples represent the number of FEs multiplied by the number of
CFs (12), which technically is 384, but not every CF has the maximum amount of FEs, so
375 is the final sample size N. There exists more failures (i.e. 267 of 375) versus successes
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(107) of the total sample size. An illustration is provided in Figure III-7 that demonstrates
the use of contingency analysis using the ACS CF.

Figure III-7: Portion of SCF Contingency Table Analysis
Figures III-8 and III-9 provide visual results of the overall contingency analysis of the
CFs and FEs. The mosaic plots presented reflect the amount of CFs and FEs fully manned
and not fully manned. A complete blue vertical bar indicates the CF or FE is meeting
personnel requirements. A composition of blue and red indicate the CF or FE is not 100% or
more manned. A senior decision maker’s preference is that all of the mosaic plots are blue.
Figures III-8 and III-9 reveal evidence of only partially filled manning requirements. For
example, note how Global Mobility (GM) and Personnel Recovery (PR) core functions get
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more manning support than Nuclear Deterrence Operations (NDO) and Global ISR (GISR).
Simliarly, note how the Commander/Sr Leader functional equity gets more manning support
than all of the other functional equities. A procedure is applied to determine if these
manning disparities are statistically significant.
In addition to the success and failure inputs, other parameters of contingency analysis
include the degrees of freedom, -loglikelihood, Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) and p-value.
The degrees of freedom are the number of CFs and FEs minus one, respectively, thus, 12 −
1 = 11 and 32 − 1 = 31. The computation for the –loglikelihood is computed using

formulae (Eq. II-5 through Eq. II-7), discussed in Chapter II. When the –loglikelihood is
multiplied by 2, a Chi-square test statistic is obtained. The LRT statistic shows the chisquare values from the SCF and FE observations are 27.814 and 50.507, respectively. With
∝= 0.05, and respective DFs, significant p-values of 0.0035 and 0.0153 are obtained from

the CF and FE data. These p-values suggest there is an association between manning status
and CF or FE. This further suggests (whether intentional or unintentional), it appears there is
some level of corporate preference among the CFs and FEs.
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Figure III-8: SCF manning Contingency Analysis

Figure III-9: FE manning Contingency Analysis
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The analysis implies the SCFs are not similarly manned, which suggests certain SCFs
are more favorable towards being at full funding capacity levels than others. Reasons for this
phenomenon are not yet understood. Potential reasons could be retention and recruitment
shortfalls in certain undermanned career field specialties such as inspections and science &
technology (S&T) career fields.
Figures III-10 and III-11 depict results of contingency analysis to examine response
homogeneity (i.e. is there a statistically significant difference in the manning levels among
CFs and FEs). The manning categorical variable (‘Mann_Cat’) is an ordinal response with
six levels. Each level corresponds to a manning range (e.g. < 80%). The hypotheses for the
core functions and functional equity manning level proportions are as follows:
𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜 : 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 = 𝐶𝐶2𝑀𝑀 = ⋯ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀

𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 : 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 ≠ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶2𝑀𝑀 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 … 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀
and

𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜 : 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀 = 𝐶𝐶2 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀 = ⋯ 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀

𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 : 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀 ≠ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶2 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 … 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀

Only 117 of 375 or (31%) of FEs across 12 CFs are 100% or more manned. Since,
the likelihood ratio test p-values (computed using Eq. II-7) are smaller than α, the results of
both tests suggest at least one SCF and FE manning level is statistically significantly
different.
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Figure III-10: SCF Ordinal Categorical Analysis

Figure III-11: FE Ordinal Categorical Analysis
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The implication of this analysis suggests that while Air Force guidance promotes equal
career manning equity across SCF and FE, the statistical results indicate otherwise.
Modeling Approach
A logistic regression model can provide more meaningful insight among the SCFs
and FEs as it relates to being fully manned or not. Logistic regression analysis describes how
a binary (0 or 1) response variable is associated with a set of explanatory variables
𝑒𝑒 (∝+𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽)

𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

(categorical or continuous). The general logistic function is 𝜋𝜋(𝑥𝑥) = 1+𝑒𝑒 (∝+𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽) = 1+𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

where x is the independent variable or factor and e is the exponential function, and 𝜋𝜋(𝑥𝑥) is

the probability of being at least 100% manned. For this nominal outcome variable, each
factor is examined individually and associated model statistics are compared to a joint

(combined) model. The joint model has (𝑘𝑘 − 𝑝𝑝) degrees of freedoms when both SCF and

FE parameters are combined, where k and p represent the number of groups (44) and
parameters (2), respectively.

Negative loglikelihood (–loglikelihood ) estimates are computed for the full and
reduced models. The Full model refers to the model without any predictor variables or
simply the intercept. The Reduced model includes the predictor variables. Thus, the
Difference –loglikelihood model estimate is the difference between the Full and Reduced
model –loglikelihood estimates. The Chi-square estimate is simply twice the Difference
–loglikelihood estimate. When the test for model significance is applied, the results of the pvalue indicate the model results are statistically significant. Figure III-12 provides a
summary of the results.
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Figure III-12: Joint Model Results
The accuracy rates (1- misclassification rate) regarding predictability classifies
success 76% of the time. The joint model has an Area under the Curve (AUC) of 0.782.
This suggests the modeling predictions have more than a ‘chance’ of being accurate. In fact,
a strict interpretation of this model is that when presented randomly with a given number of
SCF and FE manning observations that are ≥ 100% and ≤ 100%, there is a 78.2% chance of
correct classification. Figure III-12 depicts the model probability estimates of being 100% or
more manned by SCF and FE. This means given a similar population, there’s a 78% chance
of predicting a SCF by FE is fully manned. This is informative to senior planners,
programmers and analysts to better assess personnel capability gaps which are tied to the
identification of enterprise risk.
Findings also suggest none of the FEs by SCF are likely to be 100% manned or more.
Notably, the Science & Technology and Security Forces FEs are highly likely to not be fully
manned in any SCF or FE. Conversely, the commander or senior leader FEs has the potential
in the Global Mobility and Personnel Recovery SCFs to have 100% or more manning. This
is illustrated via the likelihood color palette scale in Figure III-13. Arguably, rows (FEs) in
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red are highly less likely to be 100% or more manned. A translation of Figure III-13 in terms
of success/fail results is presented next.

Figure III-13: SCF and FE Likelihood being fully manned 14

14

Cells without values indicate the FE was not represented in the SCF.
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Modeling Results

Figure III-14 is a matrix of the modeling interpretations of the success/failure
1

probabilities of the 375 observations. Probability of Success ((1+𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙[𝜋𝜋(𝑥𝑥)] )) is considered

100% or more manned or a green ‘Y’, otherwise blank in the matrix of cells. If the model

estimate is greater than 0.50, the results are considered successful, otherwise failure. Cells
with ‘-‘ notation are not applicable as the FE is unrepresentative for a particular SCF.

Figure III-14: Likelihood of 100% manning in binary form
The full joint model equation is listed in Appendix A. The results of Figure III-14 suggest
there is statistically significant evidence that the USAF does show preference with regards to
which core functions and function equities it chooses to fund and man. Whether the
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preferential treatment is deliberate or un-intentional, there is evidence of corporate
preference, which suggests all career fields are not treated the same. This infers a weighting
structure of the career fields exists. This further infers a more comprehensive risk
prioritization of career field resource management could be introduced.
Odds Ratio Analyses
The near (within 5 years), mid (5 to 10 years) and far (beyond 10 years) term goal of
the USAF is to provide air operations in support of the defense of the nation. To achieve
this, planners, programmers, analysts and managers should take advantage of existing data
resources and base decisions not only on anectdotes, but also on insights gleaned from
reliable data. For example, it may appear intuitive to some risk assessment practitioners that
all SCFs and FEs should be equally resourced in terms of manpower and are equally likely to
be able to provide or support air operations. This attitude is myopic, and if not tempered
with supporting facts can lead to unintended consequences as it relates to proper risk
identification. If risk is severely understated, personnel resources can be misallocated and
misprioritized. It is possible that other insight might be gained in rigorously identifying
which SCFs and FEs are more likely to be fully manned than others. Finding the most
valuable indicators is a not only helpful for senior risk assessment practitioners, but is also
critical to advanced predictive analytics as it relates to personnel risk assessment to inform
senior decision making in the near, mid and far planning timeframes.
Unfortunately, for many companies, these indicators reside across different, siloed
databases, which makes analysis difficult. But if the data is successfully and accurately
linked together, we can begin to take a more comprehensive look at customer behavior.
Looking at odds ratios in relation to a particular target of interest can allow us to gain
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insights across a wide array of indicators. While interpretation and understanding of
statistical or predictive models isn’t always simple or straightforward, the ability to interpret
odds and odds ratios is a key step in being able to better understand the results of logistic
regression output
The outcome variable is a success/fail response variable (i.e. 100% or more manned)
so odds ratios via logistic transformations (logits) are computed and compared among SCFs
and FEs. The logistic odds is represented as 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿[𝜋𝜋(𝑥𝑥)] = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 �

𝜋𝜋(𝑥𝑥)

�=

1−𝜋𝜋(𝑥𝑥)

𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑋𝑋1 + ⋯ 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝 where 𝛽𝛽0 is the intercept, 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 (the parameter) is the log odds ratio of

one unit increase in x whereas e(β) is the odds ratio of one unit increase in x (Agresti, 2013).
The odds ratios are computed from the joint model previously discussed. A total of 1,124
12   32 
(  +  ) permuted odds ratios are computed and compared of which 45 (34%) and 160
2 2
(16%) are considered ‘statistically significantly different than one,’ respectively. These
overview statistics suggest there are significant differences in full manning levels among
SCFs and FEs. Figure III-15 is a matrix of the SCF odds ratios accompanied with a scale to
aid in interpretation.
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Figure III-15: SCF odds ratio Comparison
The matrix in Figure III-15 should be examined from left to right by row. For
example, the Air Superiority (AS) SCF compared to the Agile Combat Support (ACS) SCF
has 0.576, or low odds, of being fully manned. Conversely, ACS has 1.737 times the odds,
or moderate odds, of being fully manned when compared to AS.

The top 3 SCFs with

better odds of full manning levels are Personnel Recovery, Global Mobility and Space
Superiority. This is fairly intuitive as these rows are more green. The bottom 4 SCFs with
lesser odds of full manning levels are Command & Control, Nuclear Deterrence Options,
Global ISR and Special Operations. Further, the same matrix from Figure III-15 overlaid
with turquoise outlines is used in Figure III-16 to illustrate which SCF odds ratios are
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considered significantly different.

Similar analysis is performed by FE. The FE results are

listed in Appendices C and D.

Figure III-16: SCF odds ratio Comparison with Significance Indicators
Figure III-16’s results reveal the Global Mobility, Personnel Recovery and Space Superiority
SCFs have statistically different manning levels as it relates to being fully manned or not.
Relative Risk
Relative risk (RR) are comparative ratios of the probabilities of success, (i.e. a given
SCF and FE being fully manned), and are quantitative ways to compare categories. As the
number of categorical levels increases, the number of relative comparisons grows quite large.
12 
For example, 12 SCF and FE RR one-way comparisons gives 4,224 (   combinations *32
2
FEs) permutations or possibilities. In this instance, we will only explore relative
comparisons to the ACS SCF. The probabilities of success are taken from the joint model
results depicted in Figure III-9. If the RR is equal to 1, we conclude independence or FE1
with respect to a given SCF is neither more likely nor less likely of occurring than FE2 with
respect to the same SCF. If the RR is less than 1, we conclude FE1 with respect to a given
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SCF is less likely of occurring than FE2 with respect to the same SCF. If the RR is greater
than 1, we conclude FE1 with respect to a given SCF is more likely of occurring than given
SCF is less likely of occurring than FE2 with respect to the same SCF. If the RR is greater
than 1, we conclude FE1 with respect to a given SCF is more likely of occurring than FE2
with respect to the same SCF. The RRs are computed and shown in Figure III-17.

Figure III-17: SCF/FE Relative Risk Ratio table
In the ACS column of Figure III-17, the Acquisition FE is held fixed compared to the
other FEs within the ACS SCF. If we refer to the Airfield Operations and Acquisition FEs
within the ACS SCF, we see a RR of 1.63. The interpretation is that within the ACS SCF,
the Acquisition FE is 1.63 times more likely of being 100% or more manned than Airfield
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Operations. For the rest of the columns (AS-SS), the RRs are compared within each row or
the FE is held fixed relative to the ACS SCF. For example, the 1.43 RR at the intersection of
the Acquisition FE and AS SCF, infers that within the Acquisitions FE, the Air Combat
Support SCF is 1.43 times likely of being 100% or more manned than the Air Superiority
SCF. Similarly, at the intersection of the Acquisition FE and C2 SCF, infers within the
Acquisitions FE, the Air Combat Support SCF is 1.67 times likely of being 100% or more
manned than the Command and Control SCF. A takeaway from Figure III-16 is ACS has a
relative moderate risk to the other SCFs with regards to being 100% or more manned.

Remarks
This research presents a rigorous methodology for assessing USAF manning by SCF
and FE by using logistic regression functions and contingency analyses. Statistically, there is
an association between SCFs or FEs and full manning levels. Manning relationships among
SCFs or FEs can be rigorously prioritized by odds ratio comparisons. There exists statistical
evidence of corporate preference towards certain core functions (CFs) or FEs. Whether
intentional or un-intentional, the existence of a corporate prefence sheds insight into how the
USAF corporately views certain CFs or FEs. Since CFs or FEs are statistically significantly
manned more than others, there inherently exists a weight structure among CFs, FEs or even
specific career fields that can be used for prioritization of resources. Statistical techniques
such as contingency table analysis, logistic regression and odds ratio analysis demonstrated
this phenomena.
Further, this research can inform decision makers of manning capability gaps and
substantiate advocacy for more resources to meet combat and peacetime requirements. There
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are no SCFs fully manned in the USAF. Overall, across the USAF, ‘commanders or senior
leaders’ is the only FE of 32 likely to be fully manned. This methodology helps senior
decision makers better qualify risk and enhance the strategic planning & programming
process risk assessment, which in turn, enables better substantiation and advocacy.

Limitations
While this research illustrates how manning relationships can be rigorously examined
at the SCF level, the methodology has caveats. First, criteria for success using the logistic
function is one of two options: 100% fully manned. This intuitively means CF and FE
manning levels below 100% are failing. This could be easily mischaracterized as a gross
mis-assessment of personnel risk. However, if manning levels are to be resourced at at least
100%, the logistic regression analysis sheds credible light on the lack of personnel USAF
requirements filled throughout its enterprises. This finding has strategic implications for
senior decision makers when advocating for resources among other service components. If a
USAF senior decision maker can articulate personnel capability gaps via analytic traceability
and defensibility, the advocacy message is more credible at the joint services leadership level
and beyond. When we can intelligently (through rigor) argue why we need what we need,
this increases the chances of getting the necessary resources to maximize combat capability
in a fiscally constrained environment. This methodology demonstrates personnel risk can be
objectively assessed at the enterprise level. In the next section, we examine if personnel
efficiency can be computed at the squadron level via fighter pilot manning and sortie
production. Recall, a primary objective is to examine if a significant statistical relationship
exsits between efficiency and risk.
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IV. Methodology to Determine USAF Personnel Efficiency via DEA Bootstrapping
Introduction
USAF senior leaders are faced with resource challenges in the form of overseeing
personnel and budget. As stewards of these resources, senior decision leaders have to make
tough decisions in a fiscally constrained environment. Often times, tradeoffs are made
between cost and manpower to provide an airpower capability. That is to say, the amount of
required personnel to perform a function is weighed against the cost of these personnel.
Managerial insight is required at lower echelons (e.g. installation level) to ascertain if
efficiency can be obtained to better utilize manpower to maximize combat capability.
There are five bedrock components to United States Air Force (USAF) capability:
Personnel, Training, Equipment, Infrastructure, and Institutional factors. These components
are collectively characterized as the planning force (AFMAN 90-106, 2017). It is very
difficult to provide mission capability without all five components of the planning force. If
adequate levels of personnel are not available and trained to perform desired tasks to provide
mission capability, then the remaining equipment, infrastructure and institutional components
become ineffective. This research focuses on the personnel component by providing a proof
of concept methodology based on DEA for measuring efficiency to better inform USAF
enterprise risk assessment procedures. The goal is to increase traceability and strengthen
defensibility in strategic risk assessments, which promotes analysis credibility with senior
decision makers. In particular, this case study demonstrates the use of Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) to assess active duty F-16 air base operations efficiency using fighter pilot
personnel requirements (spaces) and actual personnel (faces). This work examines efficiency
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i.e. benefits realized and resources used as opposed to effectiveness i.e. ability to state and
achieve desired goals (Cooper et al., 2000).
A methodology helps objectively determine if USAF efficiency outputs and inputs
are linearly or nonlinearly scaled. Specifically, sortie generation efficiency of 10 F-16 active
duty flying bases are compared using Data Envelopment Analysis. From a strategic risk
assessment perspective, if capability can be assessed via efficiency then risk vulnerabilities
become more traceable for decision makers. This added analytical insight can foster better
strategic decisions by identifying capability gaps and providing an objective basis to support
resource allocation. In addition, objective return to scale (RTS) determination of a USAF
dataset is explored. RTS examines whether there is a linear and nonlinear relationship
between DEA outputs and inputs. Past DEA application of USAF military data assumes
linear RTS and makes no statistical inferences (including confidence intervals) regarding
repeatability. Repeatability is the closeness of the agreement between the results of
successive measurements of the same measurand carried out under the same conditions of
measurement (Trochim, 2006). This is a critical gap in increasing managerial awareness,
which is a way to inform senior decision making as it relates to resource management.

Background
When career fields are undermanned, the remaining workforce can become stressed
and overworked which equates to increased military risk. Personnel manning is defined as
the ratio of the number of personnel to the number of funded authorizations:
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 =

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
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(Neuhaus, 1990).

Eq. IV-1

Each USAF unit has a unit manning document which stipulates the number of personnel and
funded authorizations. Each authorization represents a funded position. Ideally, funded
authorizations should have assigned, trained personnel filling the positions, but this is usually
not achieved across the USAF.
As early as 1984, DEA has been used for several military applications as a
benchmarking mechanism (Charnes et al., 1984). A USAF developmental study of DEA in
measuring the efficiency of maintenance units at 14 distinct Air Wings (AWs) was conducted
by Charnes et al. (1984). This model’s inputs included maintenance manning data while the
outputs consisted of a select group of performance metrics (e.g. cannibalization rate). This
work is apparently the first published application of DEA using USAF manning data. The
study found few statistically significant differences existed in mean Air Wing efficiency
scores, which suggests little efficiency separation exists between Air Wings. Cost was not
considered in the study.
USAF real property maintenance activities were compared using DEA window
analysis (Bowlin, 1987). Window analysis uses DEA to assess efficiency over time (Charnes
et al, 1994). In 1989, DEA was used to examine Israeli Air Force maintenance units using
time-sequenced data (Roll et al, 1989). More work from Bowlin continued into the 1990s
and early 2000s examining aerospace defense finances to include Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF) participation [(Bowlin 1995; 1999; 2004)]. A Tawainese Army study from 2000
used DEA to assess managerial inefficiency, which became a benchmark methodology to
assess and compare unit performance (Sun, 2004). Similarly, the National Defense
University of Taiwan examined military organizations using DEA and advocated this work
as a means to possibly merge like organizations (Lu, 2010).
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Boehmke (2015), utilizing 2014 data from 35 USAF organizations, revealed millions
of dollars possibly wasted due to various performance inefficiencies. The Boehmke study
prompts questions: Is there a significant association or relationship between efficiency and
manning? If there is a significant association between efficiency and manning, how do we
address it in order to mitigate risk?
A desirable DEA property is that the weight values for each assessed organization are
defined by an optimization algorithm and not decided by the user (Huguenin, 2012).
Research using DEA within the AF installation sustainment community shows that
opportunities exist to gain cost savings by comparing performance in the form of efficiency
(Boehmke, 2015). DEA attempts to measure efficiency by accounting for resource inputs,
performance outputs and exogenous factors simultaneously (Boehmke, 2015). This case
study uses DEA optimization models consisting of ten F-16 active duty (AD) Air Force
bases, the fighter pilot career field and an aircraft generation performance metric (i.e. (sortie
production)).
Bootstrapping is generally used to increase sample size to increase precision in
estimates of a population (Efron and Tibsirani, 1993). For predictive managerial efficiency
purposes, bootstrapping RTS can provide insight to anticipate future or expected personnel
efficiency levels by installation or career field. A personnel efficiency demonstration using
fighter pilot manning and sorties among 10 USAF installations is presented using DEA
coupled with bootstrapping techniques to illustrate objective ways to evaluate and predict
personnel efficiency. If efficiency is correlated with risk (e.g. the more efficient an
installation is, the likelier the installation is to have more risk), senior planners, programmers,
analysts and managers can better anticipate and assess risk in the three distinctive planning
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timeframes (near, mid and far). RTS bootstrapping provides a means to provide predictive
analytical insight into personnel efficiency and the assessment of future personnel risk.
Objective
The specific objectives of this case study are:
I.

Assess air base efficiency utilizing AD fighter pilot manning using a DEA
model.

II.

To examine technical efficiency using personnel and sortie production metrics
and thereby a way to quantitatively benchmark bases to promote ‘best
practices’ throughout the USAF.

Methodology
Terminology
DEA is an aggregation technique that compares unit performance by examining the
ratio of weighted outputs and inputs (Colbert et al., 2000). Fundamentally, DEA requires m
inputs, s outputs, k organizations and a sample size N to ultimately measure efficiency
(Subhash, 2004). A series of related DEA techniques were published by multiple authors in
the early 1950s [(Debreu, 1951; Shephard, 1953)]. The objective of DEA is to produce the
maximum quantity of output from a specific input bundle (Subhash, 2004). The benchmark
is determined by the technology itself and comparison of the actual output produced with the
benchmark quantity yielding a measure of technical efficiency between Decision Making
Units (DMUs) (Subhash, 2004). A Decision Making Unit (DMU) is technically efficient if
it can produce the maximum possible number of outputs from its capacity (Atkinson and
Cornwell, 1994).
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A DEA formulation of technical efficiency is (Huguenin, 2012):

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 =

∑𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟=1 𝑼𝑼𝑟𝑟 𝒀𝒀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
∑𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑽𝑽𝑖𝑖 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

,

Eq. IV-2

where TEk is the technical efficiency of an observed DMU k using m inputs to produce s
outputs. Yrk represents the quantity of output r produced by DMU k. Xik represents the
quantity of input i consumed by DMU k. Ur and Vi are weights of the output r and input i
respectively. DEA modeling requires prerequisite knowledge of the following properties:
returns to scale, orientation, model type and slack. Returns to scale (RTS) refers to the rate
by which an output changes if an input is changed by the same factor (OECD, 2001). DEA
variants can accommodate either of two types of returns to scale: constant and variable
[(Charnes et al., 1978; Banker et al., 1984)]. Constant returns to scale (CRS) models are
appropriate when all organizations operate at an optimal scale (Huguenin, 2012). Optimal
scale occurs when unit operations are sized such that any modifications to inputs or outputs
render the unit less efficient (Masiye, 2007). CRS is an unrealistic expectation in many
government service establishments. Variable returns to scale (VRS) is more appropriate
when all organizations under comparison do not operate at an optimal scale, which seems
typically true for USAF organizations.
Another DEA property is orientation. There are generally three types of DEA
orientation: input, output (Charnes et al., 1978) and directional distance (Chambers et al.,
1996). Input oriented (io) models measure how much an organization can decrease its inputs
(e.g. manning) to achieve given outputs such as sales or generated combat sorties, compared
to its most efficient peers. Output oriented (oo) models reverse the idea and identify how
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much additional output should be possible for given inputs, again relative to the
organization’s most efficient peers. Directional distance-type models are universally
oriented, i.e. there is no need to distinguish between input or output orientation (Toloo and
Tavana, 2017). Directional distance models are typically used to distinguish between
desirable and undesirable variables (Cheng and Zervopoulos, 2012). The inputs and outputs
for this research are not considered interchangeable, and therefore, directional distance
models are excluded from the methodology.
A third DEA property involves model type of which this study considers two: radial
(Charnes et al., 1978) and additive (Lovell and Pastor, 1995) models. Radial DEA models
require that all inputs be contracted and/or outputs expanded from a center (e.g. origin) or
radius. These models are typically the first of several explored to compare and contrast
DMU efficiency. For DEA CRS and VRS models, scale efficiency is computed as the ratio
of respective CRS and VRS efficiency values (Alvarez et al., 2016) regardless of orientation
(i.e. input or output).
The CRS and VRS DEA model solutions identify efficiency frontiers. All DMUs
which fall on the efficient frontier (i.e. CRS or VRS) are said to be technically efficient (i.e.
there are no shortages or overages of the inputs/outputs). These shortages or overages are
known as negative or positive slack values respectively. DMUs with zero slack set the
standard or ‘benchmark’ for other DMUs that are spatially located some distance from the
efficiency frontier. A practical interpretation is that DMUs operating below the efficiency
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frontier are deemed to have potential for performance improvement (Huguenin, 2012). All
of the said models use two-stage 15 optimization to compute slack variables.
The other DEA model type examined in this work is an additive model (AM). The
major difference between the radial and additive model is the way by which technical
efficiency is computed. DEA additive models simultaneously consider positive and negative
slack variables (Charnes et al., 1985) in order to determine technical efficiency.
Objective RTS determination of a USAF dataset is a topic worth exploration. Past
DEA application of USAF military data assumes RTS and makes no statistical inferences
(including confidence intervals) regarding repeatability. This is a critical gap in increasing
managerial awareness, which is a way to inform senior decision making as it relates to
resource management. RTS assumptions can be either linear (CRS) or nonlinear (VRS).
Recall, CRS assumes the constant rate of change in outputs and inputs is linear. The VRS
DEA model can be used to account for a lack of constant rate of change between inputs and
outputs. Some practitioners argue the RTS assumption is not of significance as when both
CRS and VRS models are computed, the ratio between the two establishes SE, which
determines optimality of inputs and outputs. The desired outcome of RTS assumption is to
provide more managerial insight as it relates to technical efficiency repeatability. In other
words, through simulation of a given amount of DEA data, can we develop predicted point

15

Two stage DEA optimization refers to first: optimizing the DMUs for model type (e.g. radial) efficiency and
second: computing the possible input excesses and output shortfalls or slacks to determine technical
efficiency (Alvarez et al., 2016).
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estimates and confidence intervals (CIs) of these data to determine ranges of anticipated
performance based on RTS assumption?
This work pursues both (i.e. computation of SE and implications and TE CI interval
approximation) approaches and provides objective commentary on each. Further, rather than
subjectively debate the RTS assumption, a more objective process can be used to statistically
determine RTS of DEA data, TE estimates and TE CIs. We explore a bootstrap methodology
proposed by Dario and Simar (2007).
Introduction to Bootstrap Methods to Determine Statistical Inferences
DEA is a nonparametric technique that measures efficiency as a relative estimate of a
frontier and as a result is subject to uncertainty with regards to statistical inferences, which
makes repeatability challenging (Daraio and Simar, 2007). For a general nonparametric
estimator, the following properties are necessary: randomness, positiveness, smoothness,
consistency and convergence. Randomness refers to the sample of firms to be identically and
independently distributed random variables. Positivity infers the probability of observing a
firm on the frontier is positive. Smoothness insures differentiability, which is one component
needed to determine optimality. Consistency suggests as the sample size of firms increase,
the estimator will converge to the true, but unknown value under estimation. Mathematically,
this means as the sample size approaches infinity, the probability of absolute error being
greater than zero converges to zero. Convergence is required to determine convexity or
concavity, which is essential for global optimality. The aforementioned properties are
needed in order to construct a meaningful DEA bootstrap.
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If properly constructed, a bootstrap or simulation can provide an approximation of the
firm distribution. Thus, bootstrap methods increase the number of theoretical versions of the
known firm sample to ultimately assess repeatability via the estimation of bias, hypothesis
testing and confidence intervals.
The MATLAB DEA Toolbox software uses techniques based on bootstrapping theory
advanced and proposed by (Silverman, 1986); (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993); [(Simar and
Wilson, 1998; 1999c; 2001; 2002; 2000b; 2006a)]; (Bogetoft and Otto, 2001); (Wilson,
2005a-c); and (Daraio and Simar, 2007). Their summary is stated below with modifications
for output orientation models.
1. Obtain a random sample from N sample firms with replacement from a set of 2N
� ∗ ; 𝑖𝑖 =
reflected original DEA scores: {2 − 𝛿𝛿̂1 , … ,2 − 𝛿𝛿̂𝑁𝑁 , 𝛿𝛿̂1 , … , 𝛿𝛿̂𝑁𝑁 }, which yields {𝛿𝛿
𝑖𝑖

1, … , 𝑁𝑁}.

2. Smooth the bootstrap resampled DEA scores by perturbation (random noise
simulation) via a Gaussian kernel density function with scale given by an optimal
bandwidth h defined by the following Mean Integrated Squared Error (MISE)
function:
𝑟𝑟

1

−
𝑁𝑁
ℎ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 1.06 ∗ min �𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁 , 1.34
� ∗ 𝑁𝑁 5 ,

Eq. IV-3

where 𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁 is the empirical standard deviation of N DEA efficiency scores and 𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁 is the
∗

∗
interquartile range within the sample size N. Therefore, obtaining 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖̿ ; 𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿̃𝑖𝑖 +

ℎ𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁, where 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 represents random error from a standard normal
distribution.

3. Refine the smoothed resampled DEA scores by correcting for the mean and variance:
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∗

̈
𝛿𝛿∗∗
𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 +

∗

∗

�𝑖𝑖 − 𝛿𝛿̈ 𝑖𝑖
𝛿𝛿

∗

�1+ℎ2 ⁄𝑠𝑠∗2

, 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁,

Eq. IV-4

where 𝛿𝛿̈ 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑠𝑠∗2 are the empirical mean and variance, respectively of N (DMU
∗

�𝑖𝑖 ).
values) of DEA scores (𝛿𝛿

4. Reflect the inefficient DMUs (i.e. DEA scores > 1). For 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁, inefficient
DEA scores are represented as:
𝛿𝛿∗𝑖𝑖 = �

2 − 𝛿𝛿∗∗
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝛿𝛿∗∗
𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖 > 1,
∗∗
otherwise.
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖

Eq. IV-5

5. Generate inefficient outputs or inputs (depends on orientation) within the attainable
DEA set (𝑌𝑌∗𝑖𝑖 ) and condition on the original input mix 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 and the original input level

𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 . This occurs by defining a bootstrap sample 𝑌𝑌 ∗ as follows:
𝑌𝑌∗ = ��𝑋𝑋∗𝑖𝑖 , 𝑌𝑌∗𝑖𝑖 � � 𝑋𝑋∗𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 and 𝑌𝑌∗𝑖𝑖 =

𝛿𝛿∗𝑖𝑖
�𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ,
𝛿𝛿

𝑖𝑖 = 1, … . , 𝑁𝑁}.

Eq. IV-6

Courtesy of the Dario and Simar 2007 text, we restate the interpretation of (Eq. IV-6).
The denominator of the ratio multiplying the output vector 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 projects the original

observed data point 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 on the DEA efficient facet (portion) on the ray defined by 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 .
Then, the numerator projects the frontier point inside the DEA attainable set, on the
same ray, by the random bootstrap factor 𝛿𝛿∗𝑖𝑖 . This is completed for each data point

𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁.

By iterating the aforementioned steps B number of times, we produce a B
bootstrapped sample 𝑌𝑌∗𝑏𝑏 . For any fixed point of interest (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦), a Monte-Carlo sequence of

𝐵𝐵
pseudo estimates {𝛿𝛿̂𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)} 𝑏𝑏=1
is computed by solving preferred CCR or BCC orientation
𝐵𝐵
models with reference set 𝑌𝑌∗𝑏𝑏 . The empirical distribution {𝛿𝛿̂𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)} 𝑏𝑏=1
is the bootstrap

�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦).
approximation of the sampling distribution of 𝛿𝛿

109

Using Bootstrap methods to determine Return to Scale
Utilizing the aforementioned bootstrapping procedure, Simar and Wilson (2002)
propose a test to determine CRS or VRS. Given, a significance level (α) and set of DEA
scores (𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕 ), the hypotheses are as follows:

𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜 : 𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 : 𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉

Eq. IV-7a

𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜

𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜 : 𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅

Eq. IV-7b

𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 : 𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

The test statistic to determine the rejection region is a mean of the ratios of DEA
efficiency scores and is defined as follows (Daraio and Simar, 2007):
1

� 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑁𝑁(𝑋𝑋 ,𝑌𝑌 )
𝜃𝜃
𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖

𝑇𝑇(𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁 ) = 𝑁𝑁 ∑𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1 𝜃𝜃
�

𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉,𝑁𝑁(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ,𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 )

The p-value of 𝑇𝑇(𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁 ) is theoretically defined as:

.

𝑝𝑝 − 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇(𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁 ) ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 | 𝐻𝐻0 is true),

Eq. IV-8

Eq. IV-9

where 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 is the value of T computed on the original observed sample 𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁 . This theoretical
p-value is practically demonstrated as the following approximation:
𝑝𝑝 − 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 ≈ ∑𝐵𝐵𝑏𝑏=1

𝑰𝑰(𝑇𝑇 ∗,𝑏𝑏 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 )
𝑩𝑩

,

Eq. IV-10

where 𝑇𝑇∗,𝑏𝑏 is equal to the simulated B pseudo-samples 𝑇𝑇(𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁∗,𝑏𝑏 ) of DMU size N under the null
hypothesis and I is an indicator variable, where if I(𝑇𝑇∗,𝑏𝑏 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ) =1, 𝑇𝑇∗,𝑏𝑏 ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 is true,

otherwise false and equal to zero (Daraio and Simar, 2007). This assumes CRS is the RTS
estimate of the frontier for generating the pseudo-samples. If the p-value of 𝑇𝑇(𝑋𝑋𝑁𝑁 ) is less
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than α, we reject the null hypothesis (𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜 ) and conclude the DEA scores are VRS, otherwise
CRS (Daraio and Simar, 2007).

Confidence intervals and estimated biases are computed using Monte Carlo
simulations and quantiles. Specifically, a confidence interval is constructed using quantile
methods from naïve bootstrap principles (Lu and Fang, 2003) and is noted below:
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝛿𝛿(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) = [𝛿𝛿̂ (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) − 𝑎𝑎�1−∝�2 , 𝛿𝛿̂ (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) − 𝑎𝑎�∝�2 ],

Eq. IV-11

�𝛽𝛽 are taken from Monte-Carlo distribution quantiles of values
where quantiles 𝑎𝑎

𝐵𝐵
for all β∈[0,1]. The bias corrected estimator is denoted below (Daraio and
{𝛿𝛿̂𝑏𝑏∗ (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)} 𝑏𝑏=1

Simar, 2007):

1

∗

�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) = 𝛿𝛿
�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) − 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
� �𝛿𝛿
�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦)� = 2𝛿𝛿
�(𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦) − ∑𝐵𝐵 𝛿𝛿
� (𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦).
𝛿𝛿
𝐵𝐵 𝑏𝑏=1 𝑏𝑏

Eq. IV-12

For more details, please reference Dario and Simar 2007 and Bogetoft and Otto 2001
literature.

Data Overview
Generally, aircraft flying hour training requirements drive sortie production at a given
base (AFI 11-102 (Flying Hour Mgmt), 2011). For pilot production, flying requirements is a
function of the student load. Therefore, pilot manning is assumed a sufficient input to use to
measure sortie production from an efficiency perspective. Analysis to confirm this assertion
is provided in the analysis portion of this section. The Air Force Single Flying Hour Model
(AFSFHM) provides the methodology and processes that bases need to execute flying hour
programs (AFI 11-401 (Aviation Management), 2013). This model determines the number

111

of flying hours needed to attain and maintain combat readiness for all aircrew. This case
study examines the active duty fighter pilot portion of aircrew at F-16 bases.
Data for the DEA optimization model consists of ten F-16 active duty bases. The
inputs and outputs are fighter pilot career field personnel and respective funded
authorizations and aircraft sorties by count and hours. The manning data (inputs) are
collected from Air Force authoritative personnel data sources and are current as of September
2018. The outputs are collected through the Logistics, Installations and Mission SupportEnterprise View (LIMS-EV) database and are current as of September 2018. LIMS-EV
provides a single-source business intelligence environment that delivers information and
capabilities to agencies’ fleet managers (DOD Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan,
2012).
Only fighter units that reported data into LIMS-EV were captured in this analysis.
Maintenance manning were inputs, but oftentimes maintenance squadrons are tasked to
support more than one fighter squadron (i.e. F-16, F-22, F-15, A-10, etc.), which makes
alignment of these personnel with specific F-16 units unmanageable and as a result are
excluded. More details of the inputs and outputs are provided next.

Resource Inputs/Outputs
Inputs
The input variables included in the optimization procedure are manning rates from the
fighter pilot career field (11F). Manning rates are determined as the ratio of the number of
personnel by career field and base and the number of personnel requirements by career field
and base. Table IV-1 is a career field manning rate and input summary.
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Table IV-1: Input Variables for DEA

AD Career Field/
11F
Manning rate
Manning
Assigned/Authorized
Rate
(by Base)
Base 1
Base 2
Base 3
Base 4
Base 5
Base 6
Base 7
Base 8
Base 9
Base 10

79
33
84
61
34
65
58
36
105
43

75
44
100
63
52
64
64
37
108
43

1.05
0.83
0.84
0.97
0.65
1.02
0.90
0.97
0.97
1.00

Outputs
An aircraft sortie is defined as an instance that begins when the aircraft moves
forward on takeoff or takes off vertically from rest at any point of support and ends after
airborne flight when the aircraft returns to the surface and either engines are stopped or the
aircraft is on the surface for five minutes, whichever occurs first (AFI 11-401 (Aviation
Management), 2013). Sorties are typically measured by hours. We use active duty F-16
sorties and respective hours as indicators of fighter pilot performance by base as outputs.
Table IV-2 is a summary of outputs.
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Table IV-2: Output Variables by Base for DEA

Aircraft Sorties
(by Base)
Base 1
Base 2
Base 3
Base 4
Base 5
Base 6
Base 7
Base 8
Base 9
Base 10

Sorties/Hours
612
147
789
471
522
551
725
367
771
360

905
174
984
587
659
705
1071
462
1066
498

Ratio
0.68
0.85
0.80
0.80
0.79
0.78
0.68
0.79
0.72
0.72

Correlation Analysis
A way to determine if appropriateness of outputs and inputs is to perform correlation
analysis by statistically examining relationships among the data set. Pearson correlation
coefficients are computed among and within input and output combinations. Figure IV-1
provides a correlation matrix of the active duty F-16 bases. The inputs are highly correlated
(r = 0.95). The outputs 16 are highly correlated (r = 0.98). Further, manning inputs are highly
correlated with sortie outputs.

16

In this work, we cannot distinguish between combat and training sorties.
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Figure IV-1: Active Duty F-16 Correlation Results
Pairwise correlation analysis among the dataset with α = 0.05 is conducted where all variable
estimates are considered statistically significantly correlated. Results, infer there exists
statistical evidence a strong relationship exists between sortie production and fighter pilot
manning. Therefore, the aforementioned factors are suitable for DEA application.
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DEA Analysis
First, we examine RTS via bootstrap analysis. Upon objective determination of RTS,
we compute DEA models. Results of the DEA models used to compute efficiencies for the
ten F-16 bases are discussed. The DEA modeling is computed using the DEA Toolbox for
MATLAB (Alvarez et al., 2016) and results are presented in two groups of findings. Group
one shows the results of the radial models. Group two depicts the results of the additive
models. The radial group is presented with CRS, VRS and scale efficiency scores.
Return to Scale Estimation
The hypothesis test for the F-16 DEA dataset is as follows:
𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜 : 𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 : 𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉

Based on a 5% significance level (i.e. α = 0.05) and 500 bootstrapped DEA CCR-oo samples
(B), the statistical results of the hypothesis test infer the RTS DEA technical efficiency scores
are CRS versus VRS. The statistical implications are we can be at least 95% confident in
these set of TEs and respective CIs for this dataset. The results do not suggest future DEA
results will yield similar results. While the latter is correct, the results can still provide
managerial insight into a possibility of future efficiency outcomes by base provided manning
and sortie production levels are within some small significance error of the initial results.
Table IV-3 depicts the TEs and respective bootstrapped TEs and CIs (Upper and Lower
Confidence Levels) by base. The results better inform further DEA model application.
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Table IV-3: DEA Return to Scale (RTS) Results

Base

TE

Bootstrapped Boostrapped Boostrapped
TE
TE LCL
TE UCL

Base 1
1.3683
1.5370
1.3795
1.7391
Base 2
2.9695
3.3089
3.0051
3.7260
Base 3
1.3929
1.5522
1.4084
1.7437
Base 4
1.5152
1.6313
1.5208
1.8273
Base 5
1.0000
1.2008
1.0169
1.3446
Base 6
1.3158
1.4126
1.3196
1.5905
Base 7
1.0000
1.1666
1.0150
1.2983
Base 8
1.4121
1.2291
1.1452
1.3763
Base 9
1.5868
1.7483
1.5957
1.9585
Base 10
1.3531
1.4827
1.3595
1.6620
Test-statistic = 0.8187; Critical value = 0.7514; P-value = 0.1860
Radial, addictive and superefficiency DEA model results follow.
Radial Results
Recall, for oo models, we hold inputs fixed to maximize outputs; and efficiency
scores greater than one are considered radially inefficient. Table IV-4 provides CRS-oo
(radial) inputs, outputs, efficiency score, associated slacks and rank (via efficiency) for each
base. Assuming all base outputs increase by the same proportional change as all inputs
change, we observe in the context of how well F-16 bases utilize fighter pilot manning for
sortie production and conclude Bases 5 and 7 are considered the most efficient as their
efficiency scores are one. They are also considered technically efficient because there are no
surplus slacks. The existence of slack variables infers an overage or shortage of resources.
For example, Base 1’s efficiency score of 1.37 with personnel and sortie slacks of 12 and
0.86, respectively, suggest that its current level of output activity could be improved with 12
more personnel and 0.86 more sorties. Further, the efficiency score (compared to other
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bases) suggests if Base 1 was able to get 12 more additional skilled, trained pilots per
approximately 1 sortie hour, sortie production efficiency would increase by 37%.
Further, without consideration of increasing or decreasing RTS, compared to Bases 5
and 7, Base 2’s slack only exists in sortie hours, which suggests Base 2 has capacity to
generate another 100 hours of sortie production without additional manpower. However, if
Base 2 has DRS, this suggests the base reduce sortie production by 100 hours in order to be
considered technically efficient. The Overall TE average is 1.46, which infers on average a
base can increase sortie production by 46% to become technically efficient.
The aforementioned are rigid, mathematical interpretations and should not be taken as
exact means to reduce or increase base resources. It is important for the reader to understand
the data were taken from a steady-state operations timeframe. Flying squadrons are typically
manned and staffed for wartime, contingency operations. Consequently, during wartime
operations sortie production will ramp up while manpower is fixed, thus naturally increasing
efficiency levels across the base populations.
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Table IV-4: DEA Radial (CRS-oo) Model Results
Inputs

Outputs

DMU
(Base)

Assigned
(X1)

Authorized
(X2)

Sortie
(Y1)

Base 1

79

75

612

Sortie
hrs
(Y2)
905

Base 2

33

44

147

174

Base 3

84

100

789

Base 4

61

63

Base 5

34

Base 6

Inputs*
Efficiency
Score
(𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 )

Outputs

Slack
X1

Slack
X2

Slack
Y1

Slack
Y2

Base
Rank

1.37

12

0

0.86

0

6

2.97

0

0

0

100.39

10

984

1.39

0

0

0

194.88

7

471

587

1.51

4

0

0

164.83

8

52

522

659

1.00

0

0

0

0

1

65

64

551

705

1.32

7

0

0

142.05

4

Base 7
Base 8

58
36

64
37

725
367

1071
462

1.00

0

0

0

0

1

1.14

2

0

0

91.53

3

Base 9

105

108

771

1066

1.59

7

0

0

115.76

9

Base 10

43

43

360

498

1.35

4

0

0

45.74

5

1
� 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁

1.46
* Manning slack variables are rounded for practical interpretation purposes.

Table IV-5 provides efficiency estimates (target values) and respective weights by base. For
oo models, the efficiency value for inputs (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 ) is to hold the given input fixed and subtract

the associated slack. Note Base 1’s efficient assigned fighter pilots is (79 − 12 = 67). The

efficiency value for outputs (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ) is computed by multiplying the DEA efficiency score by the
given output and add the associated slack value. Note Base 1’s relative efficient number of
sortie production is (612 ∗ 1.37 + 0.86 ≈ 839). The efficiency estimates reveal how the
bases should be manned along with associated sortie output levels if they are to be

considered radially efficient compared to benchmarked bases. For the CRS-oo model, Table
IV-5 reveals Base 1 is DRS, which suggests a reduction in size (e.g. sortie reduction). Base 2
is IRS, which suggests a mismanagement of current manpower to produce sortie generation
efficiency relative to Bases 5 and 7. Readers should realize although Base 6 is considered
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CRS by the summed weights, it has slacks, therefore, it is inefficient compared to Base 5 and
Base 7 bases.
Table IV-5: DEA Radial (CRS-oo) Targeted Value Results

839

Eff.
Sortie
hrs
(Y2)
1238

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.16

0.00

0.00

0.00

DRS

40

437

617

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.25

0.00

0.42

0.00

0.00

0.00

IRS

84

100

1099

1567

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.51

0.00

1.15

0.00

0.00

0.00

DRS

Base 4

57

63

714

1054

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.98

0.00

0.00

0.00

IRS

Base 5

34

52

522

659

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

CRS

Base 6

58

64

725

1071

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

CRS

Base 7

58

64

725

1071

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

CRS

Base 8

34

37

419

619

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.58

0.00

0.00

0.00

IRS

Base 9
Base
10

98

108

1223

1807

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.69

0.00

0.00

0.00

DRS

39

43

487

720

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.67

0.00

0.00

0.00

IRS

DMU
(Base)

Eff.
Asgn
(X1)

Eff.
Auth
(X2)

Eff.
Sorties
(Y1)

Base 1

67

74

Base 2

33

Base 3

𝜆𝜆1

𝜆𝜆2

𝜆𝜆3

𝜆𝜆4

𝜆𝜆5

𝜆𝜆6

𝜆𝜆7

𝜆𝜆8

𝜆𝜆9

𝜆𝜆10

To obtain scale efficiency, BCC-oo model computations are necessary. Recall, SE
occurs when the size of DMU (base) operations is optimal such that any modifications will
render the base less efficient. Table IV-6 provides BCC-oo (radial) inputs, outputs,
efficiency score, associated slacks and rank (via efficiency) for each base. Assuming all
bases are performing at variable RTS, we conclude Base 2, Base 3, Base 5, Base 7, Base 8
and Base 9 are considered efficient relative to the other bases. Realize how Base 5 has the
lowest 11F manning rate (56%), but is considered technically efficient among the other nonefficient bases. The results suggests these bases may possess best practices that the other
F-16 bases could adopt.

The PTE average is 1.12, which infers on average a base can

increase sortie production by 12% to become purely technically efficient. This illustrates one
of the beauties of DEA; the procedure is not biased towards higher proportions of inputs and
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outputs. The measure is focused on comparing DMU efficiency or relative rate of change
among weighted outputs and inputs. An added benefit to the use of DEA modeling is that it
measures efficiency by relative rates of change among DMUs and not by non-normalized
proportions. Therefore, higher manning rates or sortie rates do not necessarily translate into
higher efficiency. While the RTS of the data is statistically CRS, the VRS results are more
operationally representative of the bases.
Table IV-6: DEA Radial (BCC-oo) Model Results
Inputs

Outputs

DMU
(Base)

Assigned
(X1)

Authorized
(X2)

Sortie
(Y1)

Sortie
Hrs
(Y2)

Base 1
Base 2
Base 3
Base 4
Base 5
Base 6
Base 7
Base 8
Base 9
Base 10
1
� 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁

79

75

612

905

33

44

147

174

84

100

789

61

63

34

Inputs*
Efficiency
Score
(𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 )

Outputs

Slack
X1

Slack
X2

Slack
Y1

Slack
Y2

Base
Rank

1.18

21

10

0.74

0

7

1.00

0

0

0

0

1

984

1.00

0

0

0

0

1

471

587

1.51

4

0

0

161.41

10

52

522

659

1.00

0

0

0

0

1

65

64

551

705

1.32

7

0

0

142.05

9

58

64

725

1071

1.00

0

0

0

0

1

36

37

367

462

1.00

0

0

0

0

1

105

108

771

1066

1.00

0

0

0

0

1

43

43

360

498

1.20

2

0

14.74

0

8

1.12
*Manning slack variables are rounded for practical interpretation purposes.

We now compute the scale efficiency scores (i.e. overall total efficiency (OTE)
versus pure technical efficiency (PTE)). Table IV-7 reveals that Bases 5 and 7 best utilize
staffing to generate sorties. Further, average SE is 1.34, which indicates on average a base
may be able to increase sortie production by 34%.
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Table IV-7: DEA Radial (SE-oo) Model Results
DMU
(Base)
Base 1
Base 2
Base 3
Base 4
Base 5
Base 6
Base 7
Base 8
Base 9
Base 10
1
� Ω𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁

CRS
VRS
(OTE) (PTE)
1.37
2.97
1.39
1.52
1.00
1.32
1.00
1.14
1.59
1.35

1.18
1.00
1.00
1.51
1.00
1.32
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.20

SE
(Ω𝑖𝑖 )

1.16
2.97
1.39
1.003
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.14
1.59
1.13
1.34

Thus far, the USAF personnel efficiency methodology uses DEA models with an output
oriented direction with associated slacks. The next portion of this research analysis
investigates the weighted additive model (WAM) which is independent of orientation or
direction.
WAM-CRS Results
Table IV-8 provides WAM-CRS (MIP) inputs, outputs, efficiency score, associated
slacks and rank (via efficiency) for each base. While the slack estimates vary, the target
estimates (same as in Table IV-6) and base rankings remain unchanged. Assuming, DRS
(lambdas not shown), the implications are similar with varying numbers of sortie production.
For example, Base 1 results suggest a reduction in manpower by 12 personnel and
approximately 227 sorties and 333 sortie hours, respectively. Bases 5 and 7 are still
considered efficient. Further, average WAM is 1.15, which indicates on average a base may
be able to increase sortie production by 15%.
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Table IV-8: WAM-CRS (MIP) Results
Inputs
DMU
(Base)

Assigned Authorized
(X1)
(X2)

Base 1
Base 2
Base 3
Base 4

79
33
84
61

75
44
100
63

Base 5
Base 6
Base 7
Base 8
Base 9
Base 10
1
� 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁

109
65
58
36
105
43

194
64
64
37
108
43

Outputs
Sortie Efficiency
Sortie
Score
hrs
(Y1)
(Y2)
(𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 )
612
905
0.89
147
174
4.52
789
984
0.98
471
587
1.37
522
659
0.00
551
705
0.94
725
1071
0.00
367
462
0.55
771
1066
1.35
360
498
0.89

Inputs*

Outputs

Slack
X1

Slack
X2

Slack
Y1

Slack
Y2

Base
Rank

12
0
0
4
0
7
0
2
7
4

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

226.28
289.52
309.96
242.67
0
174
0
52.14
452.44
127.11

333.34
443.08
581.84
467.27
0
365
0
157.17
741.31
221.58

4
10
7
9
1
6
1
3
8
4

1.15
*Manning slack variables are rounded for practical interpretation purposes.

Superefficient Results
Superefficiency is determined by change in additive model DEA efficiency score
with 𝑁𝑁 − 1 bases. A base is not superefficient if the new DEA score with computed (𝑁𝑁 − 1)

sample size is the same as the additive model result. Superefficient bases (oo) will have
scores less than one. Table IV-6 provides SAM-CRS inputs, outputs, efficiency score,

associated slacks and rank (via efficiency) for each base. While the slack estimates vary, the
rankings remain unchanged. Bases 5 and 7 are considered superefficient, which implies
these bases exceed 100% efficiency.
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Table IV-9: SAM-CRS Results
Inputs

Outputs
Inputs*
Outputs
Sortie Efficiency
DMU Assigned Authorized Sortie
Slack Slack Slack Slack Base
Score
Hrs
(Base)
(X1)
(X2)
(Y1)
X1
X2
Y1
Y2
Rank
(Y2)
(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 )
Base 1
79
75
612
905
1.37
12
0
0.86
0
6
Base 2
33
44
147
174
2.97
0
0
0
100.39 10
Base 3
84
100
789
984
1.39
0
0
0
194.88
7
Base 4
61
63
471
587
1.51
4
0
0
164.83
9
Base 5
109
194
522
659
0.81
0
15
0
91.29
1
Base 6
65
64
551
705
1.32
7
0
0
142.05
4
Base 7
58
64
725
1071
0.76
16
0
93.41
0
1
Base 8
36
37
367
462
1.14
2
0
0
91.53
3
Base 9
105
108
771
1066
1.59
7
0
0
115.76
8
Base 10
43
43
360
498
1.35
4
0
0
45.74
5
1
� 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖
1.42
𝑁𝑁
*Manning slack variables are rounded for practical interpretation purposes.
Similar targeted outputs and inputs computations illustrated in Table IV-3 are
performed with the SAM-oo DEA models. Table IV-10 provides target values for inputs and
outputs, and weights by base. Note Base 1’s efficient assigned fighter pilots is (79 − 12 =

67). The efficiency value for outputs (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 ) is computed by multiplying the DEA efficiency

score by the given output and add the associated slack value. Note Base 1’s relative efficient
number of sortie production is (612 ∗ 1.37 + 0.86 ≈ 839). The efficiency estimates reveal
how the bases should be manned along with associated sortie output levels if they are to be

considered radially efficient compared to benchmarked bases. Similar to the WAM results,
Base 1 is DRS, which suggests a reduction in size (e.g. sortie reduction). Base 2 is IRS,
which suggests a mismanagement of current manpower to produce sortie generation
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efficiency relative to Base 5 and Base 7. Although Base 6 is considered CRS by the summed
weights, it has slacks, therefore, it is inefficient compared to Bases 5 and 7.
Table IV-10: SAM-oo Targeted Value Results
Eff.
Asgn
(X1)

Eff.
Auth
(X2)

Eff.
Sorties
(Y1)

Eff.
Sortie
hrs
(Y2)

Base 1

67

74

839

1238

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.16

0.00

0.00

0.00

DRS

Base 2

33

40

437

617

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.25

0.00

0.42

0.00

0.00

0.00

IRS

Base 3

84

100

1099

1567

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.51

0.00

1.15

0.00

0.00

0.00

DRS

Base 4

57

63

714

1054

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.98

0.00

0.00

0.00

IRS

Base 5

34

37

425

627

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.59

0.00

0.00

0.00

IRS

Base 6

58

64

725

1071

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

CRS

Base 7

42

64

643

811

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.23

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

DRS

Base 8

34

37

419

619

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.58

0.00

0.00

IRS

Base 9
Base 10

98

108

1223

1807

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.69

0.00

0.00

DRS

39

43

487

720

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.67

0.00

0.00

IRS

DMU
(Base)

𝜆𝜆1

𝜆𝜆2

𝜆𝜆3

𝜆𝜆4

𝜆𝜆5

𝜆𝜆6

𝜆𝜆7

𝜆𝜆8

𝜆𝜆9

Analysis Summary
This research shows pilot manning data in the form of personnel and funded
personnel requirements can be objectively assessed by efficiency by base.

This work only

examines 10 AD F-16 bases. There are several Guard/Reserve F-16 bases. These are not
considered because the data are not available for this study.
If only pilot staffing is considered, then Bases 5 and 7 become the most technically,
radially and scaled efficient of the ten bases. When linear rate of change assumption
between outputs and inputs is relaxed (i.e. VRS), Base 2, Base 3, Base 5, Base 7, Base 8 and
Base 9 AFBs are considered radially and technically efficient. Since Bases 5 and 7 are ranked
first among all DEA computations, this research implies Bases 5 and 7 might be considered
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as a benchmark for other F-16 active duty bases to gain efficiency in maximizing sortie
generation with current fighter pilot manning levels. Additional inputs such as logistics and
other support manning should be included in the model before any final conclusions are
reached.

Limitations and Final Remarks
There are limitations with the methodology. When outputs or inputs cardinality is
larger than the number of DMUs modeled, then discriminatory power is limited (Despotis,
2002). This can limit the number of reasonable outputs and inputs to include in the analysis.
Ideally, more career fields should be used as inputs as it takes more than pilots to generate
sorties. For example, maintenance, security forces, civil engineering and logistics personnel
should also be considered. Further, a more complete assessment involves discussions with
the actual squadron personnel (e.g. fighter pilots and maintenance personnel) and base
leadership who could provide more insight into their unique staffing and mission constraints.
For example, the local weather, infrastructure, and serviceable support equipment at one
location might cause greater inefficiencies than at other bases. The challenge with adding
more career fields, while preserving the number of DMUs (AD F-16 bases) creates very little
distinguishable separation between efficiency values.
This work introduces an objective way to compute RTS. Hypothesis test inferences
via bootstrapping computations reveal the F-16 bases globally exhibit CRS RTS. This
revelation is to be tempered with the timeframe of data capture (steady state operations).
That is to say, sortie production will increase during wartime operations, while AD manning
will remain constant. This infers efficiency estimates will improve for each base, which
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means RTS will need to be re-examined and implications could change regarding base
efficiency rankings.
In conclusion, personnel efficiency methodology utilized four output-oriented DEA
models, in which all except the VRS model provided consistent results. The analysis
suggests Base 5 and Base 7 AFBs could be potential benchmarks for other F-16 bases, but
further modeling is needed to verify these conclusions. The goal of this case study is to
show how the methodology can be used to assess efficiency at operational bases. This work
is a step forward in shedding some light on manning efficiency, which is a component of the
strategic risk associated with military combat capability.
Mathematically, a personnel productivity demonstration at the base level is computed
using DEA. The next Chapter examines an actual computation of risk by career field at the
enterprise level. DEA is utilized to determine efficiency of the same career fields, and
statistical methods are used to determine if a significant relationship exists between
efficiency and risk.
If efficiency is correlated with risk (e.g. the more efficient a career field is, the likelier
the career field is to have more risk), senior planners, programmers, analysts and managers
can better anticipate and assess risk in the three distinctive planning timeframes (near, mid
and far) regarding personnel allocation and prioritization. RTS bootstrapping provides a
means to provide predictive analytical insight into personnel efficiency and the assessment of
future personnel risk.
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Chapter V uses DEA as part of an over-arching methodology to compute and assess
efficiency and risk by career field. Other mathematical functions and distributions are
introduced to further compute risk. Due to computational expensiveness, scaled efficiency is
the metric of efficiency used to statistically compare to risk in Chapter VI.
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V. Methodology to Determine Relationships Between Risk, Capability and Efficiency
Introduction
A series of procedures are developed to objectively compute and assess personnel risk
by career field and examine relationships between efficiency, risk and capability. The
Chapter presents a repeatable way to demonstrate whether a significant relationship exists
between personnel efficiency and risk using correlation analysis and normal and sigmoid
functions. It also illustrates how to objectively accomplish manpower resource prioritization.
If efficiency is correlated with risk, then we can better anticipate personnel capability gaps in
the three distinct planning timeframes (i.e. near, mid and far).
This methodology has three-fold purposes: 1.) demonstrates that efficiency can be
objectively assessed using personnel manning data; 2. provides meaningful insight into the
relationships of efficiency, risk and capability; and 3.) paves the way for a more traceable
methodology to assess USAF personnel efficiency and risk. These added analytical insights
foster better strategic decision making by identifying capability gaps and provide an
increased level of objectivity to support personnel resource allocation. The results of the
analysis may better inform the USAF Strategic, Planning & Programming Process (SP3).
The method determines if a statistically significant relationship exists between efficiency and
risk.
The chapter provides a brief background of basic risk and applies context to strategic
military applications. Objectives are stated, followed by the introduction of normal and
sigmoid functions to compute and assess personnel strategic risk. Subsequently, a brief
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exposition of DEA is provided to compute scaled efficiency. A methodology applying the
analytical methods is proposed, followed by an outline of data used to compute the analysis.
Analytical results are presented. Lastly, a section entails limitations and summary of
findings.

Background
Risk
Maximum resource capacity does not eliminate risk. Risk is the degree of probability
of a loss (Merriam-Webster, 2017). An extension of this definition includes impact and
defines risk as the intersection of the following properties of failure: probability of
occurrence and impact of occurrence (Dumbrava and Iacob, 2013). Further, these failure
properties are mapped on a Cartesian plane delineated into risk categories ranging from Low
to High (Figure V-1). Notionally, ‘Low risk’ infers low probability of occurrence and low
impact. ‘Moderate risk’ implies high probability of occurrence, but little impact.
‘Significant risk’ suggests low probability of occurrence, but high impact. ‘High risk’
usually means both probability and impact of occurrence of failure are high.
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Figure V-1: Classic Risk Grid (www.mindtools.com, 2018)
This aforementioned categorization of risk aids decision making communities in
prioritizing resources towards mitigating risk. Practically, we can focus less on low risk
items due to the low likelihood of occurrence and low impact. Ideally, risk mitigation
strategies should be used on significant and high risk items. We apply this taxonomy
towards military risk. Military risk is a measure of the degree friendly forces and operations
are vulnerable to adverse strategic consequences (Air Force Policy Directive 90-16, 2018).
This work provides a framework to examine career field efficiency, compute career field risk
and determine statistically significant relationships between efficiency, risk and capability.
Objective
The objectives of this case study are to: measure and compare USAF active duty and
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civil servant manning by career field using a DEA model and statistical correlation
techniques via the following activities:
I.

examine if a normal distribution can be used to calculate the probability of a
failure;

II.

utilize a variant of the logistic function to compute personnel degradation and
couple this algorithm with an approved risk assessment framework scale, thus
calculating risk impact;

III.

use DEA to objectively measure and compare career field manning efficiency;

IV.

explore if there is a mathematical way to demonstrate if a significant
relationship exists between efficiency and risk.

Normal Distribution and Sigmoid curve (S-curve)
Principally, there is always a degree of uncertainty (or risk) remaining even if 100%
of requirements are obtained. A way to illustrate is by example. A restaurant owner has
requirements for 62 personnel and has 62 personnel; in this example people represent
capability. Does the fact that the owner has 100% of personnel requirements filled, eliminate
risk (e.g. risk = not being able to generate one million dollars ($1M) a month)? We argue
that even if the restaurant owner has the required amount of personnel, this still does not rule
out catastrophic events (e.g. hurricane, earthquake, tsunami, economic dearth, etc.) that could
prevent the restaurant from earning $1M for a particular month. Principally, there is always
a degree of uncertainty (or risk) remaining even if 100% of requirements are obtained. In
order to begin exploration of the said phenomena, we study the application of the normal
distribution to modeling risk demonstrating its use on USAF personnel data.
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Figure V-2 represents a descriptive statistics summary of the 32 USAF career families
(functional equities). The top left chart is histogram with a normal fit curve accompanied
with a box and whisker plot and normal quantile plot. The normal quantile plot graphically
compares empirical distribution quantiles with quantiles of the theoretical distribution (i.e.
normal) (De Laurentis et al., 2010). The y-axis shows the manning rates. The x-axis depicts
the empirical cumulative probability for each value. If the observations deviate from a
‘straight line’ pattern, the data are said to visually fail a normality assumption. Further, all
career families besides Inspections and Commanders/Sr Leaders are within +/− two standard
deviations of the mean. The visual results suggest the career field family manning rates are
normally distributed. The table on the right in Figure V-2 provides a list of summary
statistics associated with the normally fitted distribution of the career field family dataset.
The mean manning rate of the data is 97% with a standard deviation of 0.07. The bottom left
table in Figure V-2 is a summary of the ‘goodness of fit’ test using a Shapiro-Wilks metric.
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Figure V-2: Descriptive Statistics of Career Field Family Manning Rates (JMP 12, 2019)
The Shapiro-Wilks’ test statistically determines whether a probability distribution
differs from a hypothesized distribution (i.e. normal Gaussian distribution) (Shapiro and
Wilks, 1965). For example, if all 32 career field families are plotted with manning rates on
the x-axis and the number (frequency) of the number of actual observations that fall within
each manning rate category (e.g. increments of 5%) on the y-axis, we obtain something
similar to the histogram in Figure V-2. Using the mean (location parameter), standard
deviation (dispersion parameter), respective standard errors and hypothesis test statistics (∝=
0.05) of the data, confidence intervals are computed. In this case, the data are normally
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distributed, so the Shapiro-Wilk test yields a p-value greater than 0.05, and this is stated in
Figure V-2.
We can use a normal distribution to compute probability of occurrence of a given
failure because the normal distribution not only calculates probabilities based on probabilities
of success (i.e. 100% manning or more), career field manning rate (mean), the spread of the
manning mean (standard deviation), but it also accounts for uncertainty (even if personnel
requirements are 100% filled). Further, the personnel data of the Agile Combat Support 17
Risk Assessment (ACS RA) follow a normal distribution, therefore, we use this distribution
to calculate probabilities of success (manned) and failure (not manned) and incorporate them
as factors to calculate risk 18. This sufficiently satisfies the probability of occurrence portion
of the classic risk calculation 19.
Recall, the other portion of risk is impact. While, the parameters of USAF manning
career fields fit the properties of a normal distribution, in reality the normal distribution is illsuited to compute operationally representative risk alone. Arguably, the relationship
between personnel and risk follows a curvilinear pattern (e.g. Sigmoid curve or S-curve),
where risk impact is inherently high when manning rates are below or at a certain threshold
(e.g. 35%) and gradually improve as rates improve (Figure V-3). The Sigmoid function is a
𝑳𝑳

variant of the logistic function: 𝒇𝒇(𝒙𝒙) = 𝟏𝟏+𝒆𝒆−𝒌𝒌(𝒙𝒙−𝒙𝒙𝟎𝟎 ) , where e is the natural logarithm base,

17

ACS has the largest amount of funded personnel authorizations and personnel.
While the personnel data can also be represented with a binomial distribution, the function fails at
providing realistic probability of failure outcomes when manning rates are 0 and 100%.
19
Classic risk is defined as the probability of occurrence of failure and its associated impact (Mitchell et al.,
1999).
18
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𝒙𝒙𝟎𝟎 represents the midpoint of the curve, L is the curve’s maximum value and k represents
curve steepness (Verhulst, 1838). The complement of the S-curve yields:
𝒇𝒇(𝒙𝒙)∗ = 𝟏𝟏 −

𝑳𝑳

𝟏𝟏+𝒆𝒆−𝒌𝒌�𝒙𝒙−𝒙𝒙𝟎𝟎 �

.

Eq. V-1

Figure V-3: Notional S-curve depiction

Even if manning is fully achieved, we still reach a manning performance ceiling, as
risk (i.e. level of uncertainty) cannot be completely eliminated. Using an S-curve function
computation accounts for impact. The S-curve uses a manning rate from (0-100%) coupled
with a special case of the logistic function to arrive at a probability. We use these
probabilities and translate them into personnel risk factor values from the AFRAF mentioned
in Chapter I to a risk scale. Using both the normal distribution to compute probability of
failure occurrence and the S-curve function coupled with the AFRAF risk scale to compute
impact of failure, we arrive at an overall risk for a given career field. The other consideration
of the determination of personnel risk is the measure of efficiency.
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DEA
For this work, DEA is the choice of technique to measure personnel efficiency. A
detailed exposition of DEA terminology is provided Chapters II and IV. For this particularly
application, we are not concerned with slack-based methods as we seek to simply measure
efficiency using CRS, VRS and scaled efficiency approaches. The rank (1st rank is
considered the most efficient) from the scaled efficiency score is the value used as the
efficiency variable to statistically compare against the risk score for each personnel category.
What follows are the analytical methods used to demonstrate the assessment of strategic
personnel risk. The next section discusses procedures to compute probability of failure and
risk impact.

Methodology
Normal distribution
The normal distribution is a ubiquitous function observed in most natural and social
phenomena (Kalla, 2019). If we let x represent a point estimate (100% manning
requirement), 𝜇𝜇 equates to the mean manning rate by a given career field and 𝜎𝜎 represent the
standard deviation of the career field manning rate, we can use the following normal
cumulative probability density function to estimate probability of failure:
𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥 (𝜇𝜇, 𝜎𝜎) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 ≤ 𝑥𝑥) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 > 𝑥𝑥) = 1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 ≤ 𝑥𝑥) = 1 −

(𝑦𝑦−𝜇𝜇)

1
− [� 𝜎𝜎 �]2
𝑥𝑥 𝑒𝑒 2
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
∫−∞
√2𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋

(Conover, 1980). Eq. V-2

Since, the function does not have a closed form i.e. not able to be fully integrated using
calculus, standard normal numerical approximations are used and thus, yield the following
approximation (Conover, 1980):
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𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇, 𝜎𝜎) = 1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 ≤ 𝑥𝑥) = 𝛷𝛷 (𝑥𝑥) = 𝛷𝛷(
𝑥𝑥−𝜇𝜇

𝛷𝛷(𝑥𝑥) = 1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍 ≤

𝜎𝜎

).

𝑥𝑥−𝜇𝜇
𝜎𝜎

).

Eq. V-3
Eq. V-4

A correction is added to the normal cumulative function, by establishing the risk to be 1, if
manning rates are at or below 33%. This ensures career fields with severe manning
challenges are identified as higher risk entities. Assumptions of the normal distribution are:

1. The data are from a random sample or population.
2. The probability that a normal random variable X equals any particular value is 0.
3. The standard deviation of the mean is greater than zero.
Table V-1 is an example, where the Civil Engineering (CE) career field has a
historical manning rate (mean) of 92%, standard deviation of one and a 100% manning rate
requirement or 1, represents the random variable. We seek the probability of the CE career
field being 100% or less available and trained. The results yield a cumulative probability of
0.532%. That is to say, given we do not know the amount of available and trained CE
professionals, but the historical manning rate and standard deviation are known, we can say
there is approximately a 53% chance the CE function will not meet a 100% manning
requirement.
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Table V-1: Normal probability calculator (Stattrek.com, 2018)

Example Normal Probability Calculation
Normal random variable (x)

1.00

Cumulative probability: P(X ≤
0.532
1)
Mean

0.92

Standard deviation

1.00

We theorize these distinctive probabilities can be used to an extent to assess CE
personnel probability of failure occurrence. Essentially, satisfying the assumptions of a
normal distribution, we can say, the probability of CE not manned at current requirements or
more is at least 𝑃𝑃(1 < 𝑥𝑥) or 0.532 ~ 53%.

The normal distribution application to the probability of failure occurrence is ideal for

several reasons. First, the personnel data fulfill the normal distribution properties. Second,
the normal distribution function inherently, appropriately accounts for uncertainty. In other
words, if we were to simply use the CE current manning rate 92% to assess risk, we would
faultily conclude a 8% (1 - 92%) personnel risk. Third, we no longer need to strongly
consider other factors of the actual assigned CE personnel such as training shortfalls,
personnel outages due to medical issues, Temporary duties (TDYs), deployments, etc.
because the normal function has properties that account for these aforementioned
uncertainties. Fourth, the data are continuous which fit nicely with a normal distribution.
Fifth, we can use these normal probabilities to build an algorithm that assesses personnel
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capability by career field, which is one of the primary goals of this research. This
sufficiently satisfies the probability of occurrence portion of the classic risk calculation. We
further discuss the risk assessment methodology using the S-curve function to compute risk
impact.
Sigmoid function
Using an S-curve function computation accounts for impact. The S-curve uses a
historical career field manning rate from (0-100%) coupled with the S-curve function to
arrive at a probability. We use these probabilities and translate them into personnel risk
factor values from the AFRAF risk scale shown in Figure I-1. Using both the normal
distribution to compute probability of failure occurrence and the S-curve function coupled
with the AFRAF risk scale to compute impact of failure, we arrive at an overall risk for a
given USAF career field.
For example, recall, we use the normal function to compute the probability of
personnel manning rates at most 100%. However, having 100% of personnel resources does
not eliminate risk. Therefore, we assign a raw personnel risk value of 0.01, if the normal
function returns a value of 0. This algorithm correction allows risk to always be greater than
or equal to 1%. The probability of failure (𝑝𝑝∗ ) and severity of the failure (𝑖𝑖 ∗ ) computations
are combined using the mapping grid illustrated in Figure V-1 and further defnined by
Eq.V-5.
The intersection of the probability of failure occurrence and impact equate to
personnel risk for career field i.
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 . 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ) = (𝑖𝑖 ∗ , 𝑝𝑝∗ )
140

Eq. V-5

Ultimately a personnel raw risk value between 0.01 and 1.00 is computed. Eq. V-5 is
represented by two variables: 𝑝𝑝∗ represents the probability of being at most manned at the

number of current personnel for a given career field; and 𝑖𝑖 ∗ represents the impact of the said

probability using the sigmoid function. In this particular instance, 𝑖𝑖 ∗ is obtained through the
following sigmoid function parameters from Equation V-1: L = 1 (maximum height); k =
0.09 (steepness); x = manning value between 0-100 and 𝑥𝑥0 = 50 (midpoint). Figure V-4

provides an illustration of how personnel risk is obtained, assessed and prioritized. For

example, if the Air Traffic Control (ATC) career family has a notional impact value of 0.95
and a 0.88 probability of failure occurrence, then the intersection of these two values
provides an ordinal risk level of ‘High’.

Figure V-4: Personnel Risk Prioritization Example
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Figure V-4 is an illustration of how senior planners can visually prioritize risk by
career field. If all career families are considered equally important, the inference gained
from Figure V-4 suggests Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), Cyber operations and ATC
should be higher priority for resource consideration as risk scores are considered more
significant than others. Table VI-1 provides a codification of risk illustrated by the Cartesian
mapping in Figure V-4.
Table V-2: Composite Personnel Risk Ordinal Ratings
Raw Risk boundary
𝑖𝑖 ∗ = 0, 𝑝𝑝∗ = 0

𝑖𝑖 ∗ < 0.5, 𝑝𝑝∗ < 0.5

𝑖𝑖 ∗ ≥ 0.5, 𝑝𝑝∗ ≤ 0.5
𝑖𝑖 ∗ < 0.5, 𝑝𝑝∗ ≥ 0.5
𝑖𝑖 ∗ > 0.5, 𝑝𝑝∗ > 0.5
𝑖𝑖 ∗ = 1, 𝑝𝑝∗ = 1

Risk Rating
𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 = 1 → 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 = 2 → 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿

𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 = 3 → 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀

𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 = 4 → 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 = 5 → 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖h

𝑆𝑆𝑘𝑘 = 6 → 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹

Both risk inputs (i.e. probability of failure occurrence and impact) are equally
important (weighted) and scaled from 0 to 1. In order to obtain a composite personnel risk
score, the risk inputs are averaged. Ultimately a composite personnel raw risk value between
0.01 and 1.00 is computed. In practice, the computation is as follows:
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗∗ = 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = �
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𝑥𝑥 = 0, 𝑥𝑥 = 0.01, 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

(

𝑖𝑖 ∗ +𝑝𝑝∗
2

), .

Eq. V-6

Upon computation of the composite personnel risk value, we use the AFRAF scale to
determine the qualitative impact or final personnel risk. For example, if the composite
personnel risk value of the ATC career field is (

0.95+0.88
2

) or 0.915, this equates to

approximately 92% risk. The 92% risk is translated according to the AFRAF scale of impact
as high. Therefore, the personnel risk assessment for this particular task, career field, subtask, etc. would be interpreted as “achievement of goal or task is highly unlikely.”
Using a random variable of 100% manned, historical manning rates and standard

deviations, ACS career field risk scores are computed. Next, efficiency values and respective
rankings using DEA are computed. The career field risk scores and efficiency rankings are
compared using statistical correlation procedures to examine if a significant relationship
exists between efficiency and risk. If a significant relationship exists, this has inferences.
For example, if efficiency is positively correlated with risk, this can infer more efficiency is
related to more risk. Conversely, if efficiency is negatively correlated with risk, this suggests
the more efficiency, the lesser risk. These inferences have implications to how the USAF
strategic decision making community assesses the planning force. For instance, if more
efficiency infers less risk, then, personnel resource planners could recommend career field
managers better utilize current manning levels before more resources are considered for
allocation.

Data Overview
DEA Inputs/Outputs
Conducting DEA, this work uses career fields as DMUs. Since, each USAF career
field (AD and civilian) is measured differently, we use career field manning variables as the
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inputs and outputs of the analysis. These variables are the only entities we can explore that
span across all DMUs. For DEA scaled efficiency computations, the number of assigned
personnel by career field is the input within ACS. The output is the number of funded
authorized positions career field within ACS. We ask whether there are career fields that
perform more efficiently than others given the various career field manning requirements
within ACS.

Input and Output
Arguably, each career field has a unique skill needed to manage, deliver, execute,
maintain and sustain USAF capability. These career fields are further aggregated into seven
distinctive career field disciplines by the ACS core function. The 247 air force specialties
can be seen in the Air Force Specialty Codes guide (Air Force Officer Classification
Directory, 2007). Table V-2 provides a career field summary. The output represents funded
requirements by career field (AFS). The input represents the amount of personnel by career
field (AFS).
The radial orientation assumption of the dataset requires relaxation as two of the
seven examined career family disciplines have assigned personnel (input) and an absence of
funded authorizations (i.e. output). Recall, from Chapter II, the radial orientation requires
outputs and inputs to be positive as normalization is mathematically impossible when values
are zero. To account for zero-valued observations within the output, we use the directional
distance function (DDF) for the Acquisition and Special Experience career field disciplines.
This function allows outputs or inputs to be negative, positive or zero [(Alvarez et al., 2016);
(Toloo and Tavana, 2017)]. For more details reference Lovell and Pastor (1999).
144

Table V-3: AFS Career Field Summary (AFSC Wikipedia, 2019)
Air Force Specialty Designator
Career Field Discipline Title
1X (Enlisted Operations (Ops))
10X (Ops Commander)
11X (Pilot)
12X (Combat Systems)
13X (Space, Missile and Command & Control)
14X (Intelligence)
15X (Weather)
16R (Ops Support)
2X (Enlisted Logistics)
20X (Logistics Commander)
21X (Logistics)
3X (Enlisted Support)
30X (Support Commander)
31P (Security Forces)
32E (Civil Engineering)
33X (Communications)
35X (Public Affairs)
38F (Force Support)
4X (Enlisted Medical)
40C (Medical Commander)
41X (Health Services)
42X-43X (Biomedical Services)
44X (Medicine)
45X (Surgery)
46X (Nurses)
47X (Dental)
48X (Aerospace Medicine)
5X (Enlisted Professional)
51J (Judge Advocate)
52R (Chaplain)
6X (Enlisted Acquisition)
61X (Scientist)
62E (Engineer)
63X (Program Manager)
64X (Contracting)
65X (Finance)
7X-8X (Special Experience (e.g. Agent, Instructor,
etc.))

Operations

Logistics

Support

Medical

Professional

Acquisition

Special Experience

Details of the input and output variables are listed in a separate annex. The next section
provides an analysis of the outcome from the data.
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Analysis
Correlation Results
Correlation analysis is performed using JMP 12 software. A total of eight career field
disciplines (to include a combined dataset) are examined. Risk and efficiency ranks for each
dataset exhibit strong evidence of left skewedness and fail normality goodness of fit tests.
Figure V-5 reveal normality quantile and scatter plots for each variable. The results suggest
parametric correlation techniques (i.e. Pearson) are ill-suited. Therefore, non-parametric
correlation procedures are used to determine if a positive or negative association exists
between risk and efficiency.

Specifically, a technique called Hoeffding’s Dependence

coefficience (D) is used to determine if risk and efficiency variables are independent, i.e. no
statistical evidence of association (Agresti, 2010).

Figure V-5: ACS Career Field Quantile and Scatter Plots for Risk and SE
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Hoeffding’s D is a rank-based, distribution free measure that only require bivariate
data to be ordinal, continuous and random (Hoeffding, 1948). The test determines whether
or not the bivariate data are independent and takes on values within 1 to -0.5. Hoeffding’s D
is considered a superior nonparametric (e.g. compared to Kendall’s Tau) when evidence of
nonlinearity is present in bivariate data (Clark, 2011). The statistic approximates a weighted
sum over observations of chi-square statistics for two-by-two classification tables (JMP,
2018). Hoeffding’s D measures the distance between the ranks of joint and marginal CDFs
of bivariate data (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999). The two-by-two tables are made by setting
each data value as the threshold. If a perfect association exists among the bivariate data,
where 𝐷𝐷 = 1, then, the bivariate data are the same or completely dependent. If a perfect

association exists among the bivariate data,where 𝐷𝐷 = -0.5, the bivariate data are opposite or

independent. If the bivariate data are independent, 𝐷𝐷 = 0. The three steps to conduct the test

are listed below (JMP, 2018).

1. Construct a hypothesis (e.g. one or two tailed test). A two tailed test is used and
represented as
𝐻𝐻0 : 𝐷𝐷 = 0

𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 : 𝐷𝐷 ≠ 0.

Eq. V-7

2. Compute D:
𝐷𝐷 = 30

(𝑛𝑛−2)(𝑛𝑛−3)𝐷𝐷1 +𝐷𝐷2 −2(𝑛𝑛−2)𝐷𝐷3
𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛−1)(𝑛𝑛−2)(𝑛𝑛−3)(𝑛𝑛−4)

,

Eq. V-8

where n is the total of observations among the bivariate data (risk, efficiency),
𝐷𝐷1 , 𝐷𝐷2 , 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷3 are further defined as follows:
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𝐷𝐷1 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 1)(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 2)

𝐷𝐷2 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 1)(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 2)(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 − 1)(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 − 2)
𝐷𝐷3 = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1(𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 − 2)(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 − 2)(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 − 1)

Eq. V-9
Eq. V-10
Eq. V-11

𝐷𝐷1 refers to the sumproduct of one plus the number of bivariate ranks (𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 ) with

values less than the ith point, 𝐷𝐷2 refers to the sumproduct of the number of risk and

efficiency ranks (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) with values less than the ith point and 𝐷𝐷3
refers to the sumproduct of the number of risk, efficiency and bivariate ranks with
values less than the ith point.
3. Compute the test statistic and determine the rejection region. The hypothesis test
characteristics will dictate the rejection region. We use a two-tailed test, therefore,
the rejection region is as follows:
Rejection Region: |𝐷𝐷| > 𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼⁄2 , where 𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼 is the α (0.05) tail percentile of the

asymptotic distribution associated with D, for n ≥ 5, the approximation is
(𝑛𝑛−1)𝜋𝜋 4
60

𝐷𝐷 +

𝜋𝜋 4
72

.

Eq. V-12

A separate annex lists career field discipline results. Results include career field,
manning assigned and authorization numbers, scaled efficiency score, scaled efficiency rank,
composite risk score and AFRAF translated composite risk score into an ordinal rating (e.g.
0.92 = 92% risk or ‘High’).
Nonparametric correlations are computed for each bundle of career fields to include
an overall bundle. For the combined dataset (Separate Annex Table 1), a Hoeffding’s D
score of 0.0084 is computed with a corresponding p-value of 0.0059. P(|D| >𝑑𝑑0.05⁄2 ) =

0.0059, therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude there is a statistically significant
association between personnel risk and efficiency. The Hoeffding’s D coefficient is very
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close to zero, which implies, while the p-value is significant, practical, statistical significance
between risk and efficiency is suspect.

Figure V-6: Scatter plot of Risk vs DEA Efficiency Rank
Removal of one of three potential outliers from the top portion of Figure V-6 increased the pvalue beyond the 5% significance level using the Hoeffding’s D coefficient. However, the
data are examined as is and are not changed. The complete dataset statistical implications
suggest personnel risk increases with efficiency. This intuitively makes sense as when
manpower is fixed, with simultaneous maximal output (as shown with DEA), optimal
personnel scaled efficiency implies resources are extended to capacity while maximizing
output. Further stress and strain on optimized manpower increases risk.
The 247 ACS career field manning data taken from March of 2018 reveals statistical
evidence that risk and efficiency are not independent. The combined career field bundle
correlation results suggests overall career field risk has a positive association with efficiency
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ranks. Higher DEA efficiency ranks translate into poorer efficiency. This infers higher risk
more likely than not, implies lower efficiency. Medical and Acquisition communities reveal
significant negative association, i.e. lower risk tends to yield higher efficiency ranks. This
means lower risk more likely than not, infers lower efficiency. Table V-3 provides a
summary of correlation results by career field bundle. Table V-4 summarizes the top 10
higher risk career fields with respective efficiency findings.
Table V-4: ACS Career Field Bundle Correlation Summary
Discipline
Operations
Logistics
Support
Medical
Professional*
Acquisition
Special
Experience
Combined

Hoeffding’s Count
D

p-value

0.0145
-0.0257
-0.0158
0.0347
0.0000
0.2201

61
26
29
77
4
16

0.0552
1.0000
0.9285
0.0021
1.000
0.0007

-0.0005

34

0.3795

0.0084

247

0.0059

*For sample sizes ≤ 5, Kendall’s Tau 20 measure is used in lieu of Hoeffding’s D.

20

For specifics regarding the computation of Kendall’s Tau, please refer to Agresti’s Categorical Data text,
2013.
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Table V-5: Top 10 ACS Higher Risk Career Fields
Manning
Risk
*Efficiency *Efficiency
Risk
Rate
Rating
Score
Rank
Career Field 1
1
6
0.17
1.00
Failure
1
1
Career Field 2
3
12
0.25
1.00
Failure
1.5
2
Career Field 3
61
207
0.29
1.00
Failure
0.00
1
Career Field 4
3
8
0.38
0.64 Significant
0.12
21
Career Field 5
6
13
0.46
0.56 Significant
1.19
8
Career Field 6
15
30
0.50
0.52 Significant
0.02
15
Career Field 7
26
43
0.60
0.47
Moderate
2.52
27
Career Field 8
8
14
0.57
0.44
Moderate
2.51
6
Career Field 9
10
17
0.59
0.42
Moderate
1.00
1
Career Field 10
134
199
0.67
0.40
Moderate
4.04
10
*Efficiency Scores and Rank are relatively assessed within career field bundle

Career Field

Asgn

Auth

Evidence suggests higher risk probabilities may lead to lower DEA efficiency ranks.
Lower DEA efficiency ranks equate to superior efficiency. Thus, higher personnel risk infers
higher manning efficiency. A takeaway is more people (i.e. greater assigned and authorized)
equate to less risk however, more people equate to lower efficiency. A second takeaway is
if capability and risk are curvilinearly negatively related, then, more people (i.e. more
capability) lends to less risk and less capability infers higher risk or lower efficiency. A third
takeaway is considering more personnel capability implies greater funding and spending,
while resource budgeting is limited, what are the most effective manning levels to mitigate
risk? These takeaways suggest tradeoff analysis should be a highly regarded consideration
to determine manning levels in light of capability, risk, efficiency and cost.
Figure V-7 illustrates relationships between capability, risk, cost, efficiency and
effectiveness. Arguably the four of the five (effectiveness not examined) said areas are at
least curvilinearly related. The scope of this work addresses personnel capability, risk and
efficiency, but further research may extrapolate the cost and effectiveness aspects. While
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cost is not explicitly considered in this research, it intuitively makes sense that increased
resources will incur some form of fiscal increase. Effectiveness may pose challenges as
personnel performance output metrics among homogeneous career fields are scarce.

Figure V-7: Summary of Results Relationship Diagram
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Limitations/Summary
Evidence suggests higher risk probabilities may lend to lower DEA scaled efficiency
scores. Lower DEA scaled efficiency scores equate to superior efficiency. Thus, higher
personnel risk infers higher manning efficiency. A takeaway is more people (i.e. greater
assigned and authorized) equate to less risk however, more people equate to lower efficiency.
A second takeaway is if capability and risk are curvilinearly negatively related, then, more
people (i.e. more capability) lends to less risk and less capability infers higher risk or lower
efficiency. A third takeaway is considering more personnel capability implies greater
funding and spending, while resource budgeting is limited, what are the most effective
manning levels to mitigate risk? These takeaways suggest tradeoff analysis should be a
highly regarded consideration to determine manning levels in light of capability, risk,
efficiency and cost.
A 2018 US Air Force dataset containing 247 career fields is analyzed for significant
manning relationships between efficiency and risk. For the first time, career field risk is
objectively computed using normal and sigmoid functions. Six out of 247 or 2.5% of career
fields have significant to failure risk; 229 are moderate risk and the remaing 12 are either low
or success with regards to risk. This research assumes all career field capabilities are equal,
which is debatable. Unequally weighing career fields will likely change risk valuations,
which may drive varying strategic personnel resource prioritization and allocation decisions.
A series of procedures is presented, objectively computing personnel risk by career
field and examining relationships between efficiency, risk and capability. An explanation
with demonstrations provides a use case of how career field manning can be used with
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normal and sigmoid functions to ultimately compute risk, thus enabling objective personnel
resource prioritization in fiscally constrained environments.
The next section provides an overview of data elements considered to assess
personnel risk within an organizational context. The organizational assessment includes core
capabilities, which consist of tasks, sub-tasks, and career fields. A demonstration is provided
revealing the use of personnel data to objectively assess enterprise risk.
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VI. Methodology Using a Euclidean Norm to Aggregate risk
Introduction
This work provides an aggregation methodology to compute a core USAF personnel
capability risk score. Recently, the USAF has adapted its risk-based assessment to become
more capability-based. The rationale is when requested by a combatant commander during
contingency operations, the service will provide air power, regardless of risk. As a result,
the USAF’s focus has shifted fundamentally from a risk-based assessment to a more
capability-based assessment.
We tailor an algorithm used in Pacific Air Forces Command (PACAF) that used root
mean squaring via a weighted p-norm (𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑝 ) methodology to assess personnel capability. For
the first time, a personnel risk aggregation methodology is developed potentially enabling
enterprise planners and programmers to provide an objective, defensible situational
awareness procedure for senior decision makers to get a core capability-level personnel
capability assessment. To help assess the connectedness of core capabilities, the USAF
Studies, Analysis and Assessments directorate (AF/A9) has developed an interdependency
framework called the Comprehensive Core Capability Risk Assessment Framework
(C3RAF). C3RAF is a network model that combines risk and multi-domain interdependency
data to inform senior leader decisions. The non-linear model uses Core Function inputs (e.g.
ACS enterprise inputs) and aims to identify the most influential core capabilities regarding
AF-wide risk (AFGM2016-90-1101, 2016). C3RAF also aims to identify how changes in
risk affect elements throughout the USAF and identify where planning decisions might
influence systemic risk (AFGM2016-90-1101, 2016). C3RAF is being used to influence
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senior level decision making regarding budgeting of resources (e.g. ACS equities). To lessen
the negative impact of ‘Garbage In, Garbage Out’ to the C3RAF model, it behooves ACS
sub-enterprises to carefully examine current capability enablement and the impact on future
capability enablement if not resourced.
Data for the ACS RA consists of manning data in the form of personnel and
personnel funded authorizations from the ACS Core Function. The personnel data spans
across many bases and almost 250 career fields. The ACS core function is linked to six core
capabilities with numerous Program Element Codes (PECs).
All USAF programs have PECs. PECs are generally alphanumeric strings of
characters that represent groupings of career fields to carry out certain tasks. The PECs are
also assigned cost values as the primary means to track and manage funding. Other than
recent development by the author, the PECs were not linked to personnel. This linkage now
accounts for the amount of specific personnel (by career field) needed to accomplish the core
capability tasks versus respective personnel requirements in terms of resource dollars.
Figure VI-1 provides the six ACS enterprises and their associated top-level tasks.
Each task has subtasks, sub-subtasks, sub-sub-tasks, et cetera. When these sub metrics are
aggregated or ‘rolled up’ for senior decision level making, critical metrics are often
smothered and as a result do not accurately depict strategic risk implications for enterprises.
For example, we consider the Installation & Mission Support (I&MS) core capability subtask
4.8., which is to ‘Provide Installation Support’. The subtask description is very detailed and
involves producing and delivering operationally-capable facilities, real property-installed
A5/8P, 2016). Producing and delivering operationally-capable facilities, real property-
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installed equipment, These entities require personnel capability to execute, maintain and
sustain.

Figure VI-1: ACS Enterprise Task structure…v11.1 (AFMC 5/8/9, 2016)

If this subtask cannot be achieved through lack of personnel, training, funding, etc.,
can the I&MS enterprise deliver optimal operational I&MS support? Given, the aggregate
nature of the USAF strategic assessment, and given, we cannot measure all components of
capability, what is a better rigorous procedure to pursue? Assuming, some level of
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suboptimization 21, is there a rigorous way to assess personnel risk to ultimately inform
strategic decision making? C3RAF attempts to address this issue, but there is not a high
degree of confidence in the enterprise assessments that the said model uses to increase
defensibility and repeatability in assessing strategic risk.

Background
Issue
Some ACS assessments over or understate risk. Specifically, some assessments
assume a ‘single outcome’ (i.e. can either complete task or not) approach. Sometimes
organizational assessments can be very one-dimensional. For example, they define success
as binary (i.e. success or fail), which does not consider variation and forces senior decision
makers and managers to explain more (as in why they lost). This traditional form of
measurement can lead to false conclusions and have negative implications. The intent of the
AFRAF construct is to measure risk by capability output. Some ACS enterprise risk
assessments do not accurately portray capability output. Figure VI-2 is an adaptation of the
AFRAF construct. The boundaries of risk are defined by likelihood and impact of achieving
functional objective tasks. An additional consideration for impact is risk mitigation ability
during planned timeframes. Timeframes are near, mid and far as discussed Chapter I.

21

Suboptimization refers to the practice of focusing on one component of a total system and making changes
intended to improve that one component and ignoring the effects on the other components (Watkins, 2018).
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Figure VI-2: ACS adaptation of AFRAF
There are several ways to compute aggregative computations for organizational risk
assessments. What follows summarizes are summaries of techniques useful for computing
organizational risk.
Organizational Risk Assessment Approaches
Bayesian Networks
Bayesian networks (BNs) are growing in popularity particularly as it relates to
organizational assessments. BN implementation is used in risk analysis and predictive
analytics for decision making (Parra and Garrido, 2012). BNs are based on a mathematical
theory known as Bayes’ theorem, which is used to calculate the probability of an event
occurring given a known related piece of information (Cummings et al., 2008). Bayes’
theorem states,

𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵) =

𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴)∗𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴)
𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵)

159

.

Eq. VI-1

P(A) is the prior probability or the initial estimate of the probability. P(B|A) is the
conditional probability or the probability of B given A. P(A|B) is the posterior probability or
the probability of A given B.
BNs are a set of random variables (nodes) and directed edges (arcs), with each node
having a finite set of states or a set of values. For each random variable A, with parent nodes
𝐵𝐵1 … 𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛 , there exists a table of probabilities P(A|𝐵𝐵1 … 𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛 ) (Jensen, 2001).

BNs represent a potential approach for improving the understanding of how personnel

resources are strategically assessed, and a literature gap seems to exist on application in the
USAF human resource allocation domain. BNs use neobayesian attributes (Pearl, 1990) to
attempt to provide reasoning to a phenomena with uncertainty (Wang, 1993). The three main
attributes are:
•

Willingness to accept subjective belief as an substitute for raw data or a priori.

•

Adherence to Bayes’ conditional independence as the primary mechanism to provide
new information about a phenomena under examination [(Heckerman, 1999); (Pearl,
2000)].

•

All Markovian states and uncertainties of phenomena under examination are known
to have probability distributions (Postlewaite and Schmeidler, 1984).
BNs are defined by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) structure of random variables

(nodes) with joint probability distributions that can be factored into smaller local probability
distributions (Scutari, 2017). In other words, each variable is conditionally independent of
all its nondescendants in the graph given the value of all its parents (Davies and Moore,
2016). For example, consider random variables X and Y to be conditionally independent, and
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P(X,Y|Z) is to be determined. The aforementioned can be decomposed into P(X,Y|Z)*P(Z).
Further, using the idea of conditional independence we obtain P(X|Z)*P(Y|Z)*P(Z).
While the current structure of the personnel career fields is not in nodal form, we
know the (quasi) network consists of undirected and directed arcs. Essentially, conditional
independence is in constant violation due to the various interdependencies among the career
fields. This assumption violation suggests BNs may not be ideal (Sanford and Moosa, 2012)
for using personnel interdependencies to assess risk. For example, most of the maintainer
community (officer and enlisted) depend on each other to meet the demands of a flying
schedule. Bi-directional relationships among these career fields exist in order to effectively
communicate disconnects, issues, concerns, goals, instructions, et cetera. Arguably, there is
very little conditional independence in this community. We assert similar arguments apply to
the aviation medical and legal career fields. Figure VI-3 illustrates this concept.

Figure VI-3: Notional USAF AFS Network
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Further, if we consider career fields ability to generate aircraft sorties to be binary
(i.e. generate sortie or not) and there are 247 variables (career fields) to examine, we must
computationally consider at least 2(247−1) or 1.13078E+74 configurations (Scutari, 2017).
Not only is this approach (if violations were not applicable) computationally expensive, it
can also be misleading if there are decent amounts of dependent correlations among the
variables.
The literature express five commonalities relating to BNs [(Boehmke, 2016);
(Lockamy and McCormacket, 2011); (Koller and Pfeffer, 1997)]. One, the assumption of a
DAG exists, which implies directed arcs within a network. Two, the states and associated
probability distributions have to be enumerated. Three, a priori of the portfolio are required.
Four, a periodic update of risk profiles is necessary. Five, software and simulation are
needed in order to better account for certain dynamics and simultaneity. Four of the five
assumptions are fairly attainable, however, the DAG relationships are a major concern.
While possible opportunities to extend this research may include further BN
exploration, this work focuses on value-frame theory (VFT) or weighted average and systems
engineering aggregation techniques. Average, weighted average and systems reliability
approaches are compared using a generic enterprise. Case studies are explored in the next
section.
Averaging and Weighted Averaging
For multiple outcome organizational risk assessments where units or elements are
large (n > 30), averaging techniques can be explored. A Pest Risk Assessment (PRA)
performed in New Zealand conducted by the National Resources Institute of the United
Kingdom examined the incorporation of various averaging (to include weighted)
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methodologies as a means to aggregate risk [(Zhu et al., 2000); (Holt, 2005); (Black, 20xx)].
After exploring advantages and disadvantages of using averaging risk factors, Zhu, Holt and
Black conclude weighted averaging coupled with normalization are sufficient techniques to
use when 1.) there exists a large number of risk elements (e.g. tasks); 2.) there is no historical
record of valid computations; and 3.) immediate action is required.
With the aforementioned, we consider a generic enterprise comprised of many
organizations. An organizational risk assessment can be computed as the average of a set of
point estimates and is represented as follows:
1

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛 ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,

Eq. VI-2

where n represents the number of units (organizations) under examination and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is the point
estimate value. This is one of the simplest techniques to use when assessing aggregate data.

The approach is appropriate when the spread of unit effects are equally likely. For units with
more effects than others, a weighted average approach can be used. This is represented as
1

𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛 ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ),

Eq. VI-3

where a weight (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ) is added to every ith unit in Eq. VI-3 representing the amount of relative
impact of a particular unit (e.g. career field, task, sub-task, etc.). There are various ways to
set weights (i.e. by SME or objectivity). When organizations are unique and expertise is
voluminous, SME weight setting is a valid approach. Conversely, when there exists very
little insight on the organization, using an objective approach such as a normalization
technique is a common approach (Zhu et al., 2000). These approaches will be applied to an
USAF enterprise, but we first explore a systems reliability approach. The next aggregation
technique adapts principles from systems reliability principles.
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System Reliability
One way to measure system component relationships is to construct reliability block
diagrams (RBDs) in serial, parallel or a combination thereof and assign reliabilities or
probabilities of success to each component (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2006). Serial
relationships are mathematically defined as
𝑅𝑅 = (𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 )(𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 )(𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 )(𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 ),

Eq. VI-4

where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 are reliability rates of individual components. Of course, when any value of the

serial chain is less than one, the sumtotal of the chain or overall reliability will always yield a
value less than one. Further, if any value of the serial chain is zero, the overall system
reliability is zero. Parallel relationships are defined as
𝑅𝑅 = 1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 )(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 )(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 )(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 ).

Eq. VI-5

Systematically, if one component fails, while the remaining are operational, the overall
system reliability impact is relatively negligible compared to a serial configuration.
Combinations of parallel and serial components are defined in numerous configurations. An
example is listed as
𝑅𝑅 = (𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 )(1 − (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 )(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 )(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 ).

Eq. VI-6

The substitution of notional reliabilities for components A through D yield the following
probabilities:
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 = 0.95,

𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 = 0.98,

𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶 = 0.99,

𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 = 0.

Based on Equations VI-4 through VI-6, we obtain the following overall system reliabilities:
0, 0.999999 and 0.949810 or risk values 0.000001 and 0.050190, respectively.
If we consider a personnel system by USAF core function, we can construct a
notional RBD. Figure VI-4 illustrates multiple functional equities (FEs) of career families
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distributed across a network defined as a system. Each FE can be assigned a probability of
success (i.e. manning rate). Based on the relationship of Figure VI-5, the dependency begins
with the communications FE, where commander’s guidance is provided to planners, thereby
base support (e.g. Safety, Force Support, Legal services, Contracting, Security Forces, Civil
Engineering, etc.) is executed. These collective services are needed in order for flightline
operations (e.g. Distribution, Maintenance, Airfield Ops, Weather, etc.), which then allow for
sortie generation by pilots, combat systems navigators and remotely piloted aircraft
operators. The notional structure of the RBD infers if any one of these serial components is
unavailable (i.e. 0% manned), the entire system fails to provide capability.

Figure VI-4: Notional USAF Personnel RBD
A major concern with using a system reliability approach to assess the risk of this
notional version of a USAF network (i.e. Figure VI-4) is the way by which the risk is
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propagated. Using the network structure, a bootstrapped demonstration of system
reliabilities assigned to each FE ranging from 99 to 100% is performed. Assuming a linear
relationship between risk and capability, a bootstrapped sample of 500 yields an average
system overall reliability of 0.227 or 22.7% capability, which is analogous to approximately
77% risk. This theoretically means when there exists all but 1% risk in any or all
components of the notional USAF enterprise, on average, the organizational ability to
achieve a mission is about 25%. Presenting these results to a senior decision leader is illadvisable, as the results are not credit-worthy and do not depict a realistic representation of
risk when personnel capability on average is 99%.
The systems reliability approach is applied to a notional USAF core capability
consisting of multiple tasks and subtasks. The USAF has over 40 core capabilities managed
by a dozen core functions or enterprise of personnel employed to plan, manage, deliver and
execute a given capability. A core capability is an enabling function necessary for the USAF
to perform its mission as part of the Department of Defense (DOD). Assessing risk at the
core capability is a good start to assessing risk, but is still not comprehensiveness enough.
There are lots of missed, unexamined and not well-understood issues that occur below the
core capability level particularly as it relates to mission and force risk. Consequently, core
capabilities have an activity or task structure as a means to mitigate risk (Pitstick, 2017).
Largely, the ability to accomplish these tasks or subtasks is based on personnel
availability rates (McMillie, 2017) in three distinctive timeframes (i.e. Near (0-5 yrs); Mid
(6-10 yrs); Far (11-30 yrs)). We use the Installation Mission and Support (I&MS) core
capability as an illustration. Provided a serial relationship exists between tasks, notionally, if
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there are eight tasks to accomplish I&MS and any one of the tasks is assessed as 100% risk,
then the ability to accomplish this core capability is 0%.
The systems reliability (serial network), weighted (weights arbitrarily chosen)
average and average risk results are presented in Figure VI-5 coupled with a legend to
identify bands of risk. Another notional outcome of risk is displayed at the far right to
illustrate cases where if the systems reliability approach (e.g. serial configuration) is used the
overall risk results are overstated.
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Figure VI-5: Notional USAF Core Capability Assessment (AFMC/A9A, 2016)
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If the tasks are assembled in a parallel configuration, using risk values from IM&S
example in Figure VI-5 on the far left, the overall risk results are drastically different. The
overall system reliability using a parallel scheme is 100%. Further, using the aforementioned
scheme, if we consider the values used in the far right table of Figure VI-5, the result for near
term is 99.9999%. This depiction of risk is not organizationally or operationally
representative.
If we expand the discussion to include subtasks and sub-subtasks, the results become
even more unrealistic. For example, consider a core capability (e.g. IM&S) with 11 tasks,
each with 4 subtasks and each subtask has 7 sub-subtasks totaling 308 (11 ∗ 4 ∗ 7)

components. Also, each component reliability ranges from 99 to 100%. Simulated mean
system reliability result for serial configuration is 24%. The results infer a senior leader has
an abundance of resources and is still failing to deliver desired capability. For a parallel (at
task and subtask level) and serial (sub-subtask level) configuration, the mean is 99.99999%.
The latter results appear superficially reasonable, but just because the capability requirement
is met, does not eliminate risk. Further, if the lower bound reliability threshold is decreased
from 95% to 70%, the combination configuration mean is 99.99999%. From an
organizational risk assessment perspective, the risk propagation is incorrectly depicted.
While all possible outcomes of task/sub-task configurations are not explored, the
aforementioned results reveal for an organizational risk assessment, the weighted average
and average results are more realistic and operationally representative than system reliability
approaches. Ideally, an organizational risk assessment should account for mitigated risk
actions, whereby if a risk imbalance exists, management actions may be able to rebalance to

169

a certain extent. Weighted average and average techniques appear to provide a more
balanced approached to the assessment of organizational risk.
The next section of this manpower strategic assessment research examines an
aggregation methodology to compute a core capability risk score using a normalization
algorithm. We consider tailoring an algorithm used in Pacific Air Forces Command
(PACAF) that used root mean squaring via a weighted p-norm (𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 ) methodology to assess
personnel capability. Several years ago, PACAF adopted a USAF risk-based assessment to
become more capability-based. The rationale is when requested by a supported commander
during contingency operations, PACAF will provide air power, regardless of risk. As a
result, the command’s focus shifted fundamentally from a risk-based assessment to a more
capability-based assessment.

Methodology
The PACAF shift to a capability-based assessment paved the way for the warfighter
capability assessment (WCA), which is a capability-based assessment for the Pacific
Commander of Air Forces and/or the Joint Force Air Component Compact Commander on
how Air Force resources and assets are postured in terms of providing air power capability to
meet operational requirements in the Pacific theater. Capability (in response to a crisis prior
to force flow) is based upon eight functional areas (i.e. Aircraft, Munitions, Fuels,
Installation, Communications, Personnel, Medical, And Services) spanning across nine air
bases. Prior to a revision in 2014, the assessment was highly subjective. Figure VI-6
provides a notional example of the WCA used by PACAF.
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Figure VI-6: Notional example of PACAF Capability Assessment (PACAF A9, 2014).
The methodology only worked with consistent subject matter expertise (SME)
participation who were engaged with the various functional managers at bases in theater in
order to ascertain insight into capability gaps or general unit health. This approach was
often not repeatable or consistently defensible. The 2014 revision afforded the opportunity
for less subjectivity, and relied more on quality (how capable are we), quantity (how much
capability can we provide) and timeliness (how quickly can we provide the capability)
metrics by base to support a crisis. All eight functional capability (to include personnel)
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areas were successfully revised. In the next section we demonstrate a way to effectively
assess organizational risk using a norming algorithm.
P-norm
A norm or p-norm is typically expressed as a vector which consists of distance and
magnitude (Elmore and Richman, 2001). Specifically, a norm is a 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡ℎ root of all summed
elements within a sample space (e.g. career field risk scores) to the 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡ℎ power. In fact for

every real number (to include integers), a norm can be computed. The Euclidean norm or 2norm is one of the most widely used distance computational algorithms in the field of
mathematics. In many instances, the Euclidean norm is used as a component of penalization
or loss functioning in order to propagate error in regression and machine learning (ML)
(Gentile and Littlestone, 1999). The p-norm has also been used in the field of multi-task
feature selection, which is a type of ML whereby different tasks share a subset of relevant
features to be selected from a larger common space of features (Obozinski et al., 2006).
Additionally, the p-norm is used in the context of multi-task selection applications to include
speech recognition, robotics, and handwriting authenticity (Obozinski et al., 2006).
The 2-norm is a significant application to this work as it mathematically provides
more weight to larger risk items, while not dominating the sample size. Essentially, the 2norm allows numerous organizational tasks to be aggregated such that no one sub-performing
task is going to severely degrade the organizational success level. This is appropriate for
USAF enterprises that have tens of thousands of personnel performing and enabling a
multitude of tasks to ultimately provide a core capability. An additional advantage of the 2norm is while the risk space generally shrinks for individual tasks, weightier tasks (i.e. tasks
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with more risk) still have larger impacts on the organizational risk assessment than tasks with
not as much risk. If we let

 xx12 
x =  …  and x = (x1, x2, …, xn) be column and row vectors, then
 xn 
|| x ||2 =

(x1)2 + (x2)2 + … + (xn)2

Eq. VI-7

which represents the length of a line segment from the origin to x or 2-norm of x. An USAF
application using a 2-norm is discussed in the next section.
2-norm application
A SORTS-based algorithm (at the time referred to as SORTS Base Rollup (SBR))
was used to objectively assess personnel capability by base (Bradshaw and Novak, 2014).
AF-IT

22

(formerly known as Status of Resources and Training system (SORTS)) data

provides insight to unit health by base. AF-IT is the primary system of record for operational
unit health reporting (AFI 10-201, 2019). Notable effort was taken in revising the personnel
functional area of the assessment by combining AF-IT reporting and response times from
130 different operational units. This aggregation methodology was presented during the
2014 Air Force Operations Research Symposium (AFORS). The SBR algorithm is adapted
and applied to the personnel component of the ACS RA, whereby Air Force Specialties or
career field bundle risk scores will replace response time weights and the SORTS vector 23

22

23

AF-IT provides near real-time force readiness and consists of four areas: Personnel, Training, Equipment Condition and Equipment
Status.
For more details on the actual procedure, please reference classified AFORS 2014 presentation.
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(Bradshaw, 2014) will be replaced with risk scale vectors using the AFRAF. Details of the
procedure are what follow.
Assuming a function has a uniquely determined property (i.e. boundary condition) for
any vector (distance) within the vector space, using a weighted p-norm (Bourbaki, 1987), we
can express a task risk score (TR) between zero and infinity ([0, ∞) as
𝑝𝑝 1/𝑝𝑝
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = [∑𝑁𝑁
.
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 ∗ (‖𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 ‖) ]

Eq. VI-8

The risk score (𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 ) is represented as a weighted value within the bounds of 1 and 10 or

(1 ≤ 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 ≤ 10). Recall, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is the expectation of probability of failure occurrence and

consequence of respective impact. These values are obtained from the normal, Sigmoid and
expectation functions discussed in Chapter V. Sk represents a distinctive vector (value) from

the AFRAF scale, within the set {1,2…,6}. The p-norm (p ≥ 1) produces a reasonable
spread across a span of risk scores. This is the most critical component of the algorithm to
account for proper aggregation of the various career field bundle risk scores. In this specific
case, we use the 2- norm. N represents the total number of career field bundled risk scores
within a given task. Similarly, if we normalize the algorithm for a given number of career
field bundles for a task, we can achieve an aggregated value or capability risk value (CR).
We express the minimal (best) and maximum (worst) possible task risk scores as:
1/2

2
𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀[𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = (∑𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 ∗ (‖1‖) )

and

1/2

2
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀[𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = (∑𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 ∗ (‖6‖) )

]

]

Eq. VI-9

Eq. VI-10

Collectively, these parameters are used to express an aggregation risk score or CR as:
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 =

(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇−𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 )
(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 −𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 )

, (0 ≤ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ≤ 1).

Eq. VI-11

For the personnel risk prioritization in Chapter V, magnitude of impact was a value
between 0.01 and 1. Since, the career fields are theoretically equal, this level of magnitude is
sufficient in order to compute personnel risk by career field in isolation. However, when
career field risk is aggregated or propagated to a task or core capability level, further
computations are needed. To prepare the data for 2-norm aggregation, we consider a simple
translation of the composite personnel risk scores computed in the methodology section of
this Chapter V.
We note the translation of the composite risk score to the AFRAF did not have an
additional magnitude to account for weightiness of each career field. We introduce a scale
depicted in Table VI-1, which shows bounds for each AFRAF risk level and ordinal ratings,
respectively. This measure allows more separation between sub-tasks and tasks as they are
computed to ultimately assess aggregated risk within a core capability (i.e. I&MS).
Table VI-1: Risk to AFRAF Translation for Aggregation
Composite Risk boundary

Risk Rating

0 < 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) ≤ 0.005

𝑖𝑖 = 1 → 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

0.005 < 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) ≤ 0.20

𝑖𝑖 = 2 → 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿

0.20 < 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) ≤ 0.50

𝑖𝑖 = 3 → 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀

0.50 < 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) ≤ 0.80

𝑖𝑖 = 4 → 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

0.80 < 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) < 1.00

𝑖𝑖 = 5 → 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ

𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 1.00

𝑖𝑖 = 6 → 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
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Case Study
The case study uses the prescribed methodology to assess personnel capability
shortfalls. The methodology can be applied to a near, mid or far term planning cycle. Tables
VI-2-4 provide a visualization of the step-by-step process used to the ACS RA to include
subtask association to career field manning rates. Table VI-2 shows overall manning of the
I&MS task (4.x) to be 93%. This simple rate assumes personnel are trained and available
and does not adequately account for risk. Further, where certain sub-tasks are overmanned in
career fields, does not mean these overages can be applied to undermanned career fields as
the skillsets and level of expertise differ. Analysis at lower levels of manning echelons are
needed in order to more adequately assess personnel capability and risk.
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Table VI-2: Notional Core Capability Sub-task Career Field Manning

Career Field

Core Capability Sub-task

Asgn
Auth Manning
(Actual) (Allocated) Rate

Airfield Mgmt

4.1.1 Provide Airfield Mgmt

499

499

1.00

Clinical SW

4.1.5 Provide Socially Safe Environment

937

950

0.99

Logistics Plans Officer

4.2.1 Provide Airfield Operations

65

111

0.59

Fuels Specialist

4.2.2 Perform Installation Supply Log.

162

162

1.00

Aero. Medical Service

4.3.1 Provide Emergency Services

77

77

1.00

Security Forces

4.4.1 Provide Protection Services

810

816

0.99

Force Support Officer

4.5.1 Provide Family Services

25

63

0.40

Traffic Mgmt

4.6.1 Command Community Log. Service

265

266

1.00

Services Mgmt

4.6.2 Fitness and Rec. Operations

41

122

0.34

Explosive Ord. Disposal

4.7.1 Provide Combat Support

40

134

0.3

Materiel Mgmt

4.8.3 Sustain Operating Locations

740

744

0.99

Pavement/Construction

4.8.3 Sustain Operating Locations

375

354

1.06

Personnel Mgmt

4.8.4 Operate Facilities

966

970

1.00

Civil Eng. Officer

4.8.5 Maintain/Sustain Infrastructure

654

662

0.99

Civil Eng. (Electrical)

4.8.5 Maintain/Sustain Infrastructure
4.8.5 Maintain/Sustain Infrastructure

103
174

0.61

Civil Eng. (Ops Mgmt)

63
106

Civil Eng. (HVAC)

4.8.6 Provide Family Housing

0
5800

1
6208

0.00
93%

Table VI-3 applies risk components (probability of failure and impact) to manning
rates from Table VI-2 to ultimately compute composite risk scores, which are translated by
the AFRAF risk scale into ordinal ratings. A correction procedure is applied to the
probability of failure occurrence algorithm computed by the normal cumulative distribution
function. If a career field is 33% manned or less, the probability of failure is 100%. This
purposefully serves to send a severely degraded personnel capability indicator. We seek to
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0.61

obtain the overall task personnel capability assessment, given the individual subtask
assessments. The 2-norm is used to compute an overall core capability risk value.
Table VI-3: Notional Core Capability Sub-task Personnel Risk Assessment
Normal Sigmoid (𝒑𝒑∗ + 𝒊𝒊∗ )⁄𝟐𝟐
*Prob. of
Personnel AFRAF
failure
Impact
Core Capability Sub-sub
Comp.
Risk Risk
Career Field
Occurrence (𝒊𝒊∗ )
task
(𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊 )
(𝑺𝑺𝒌𝒌 )
(𝒑𝒑∗ )
Airfield Mgmt
0.49
0.011
0.251
3
4.1.1 Provide Airfield Mgmt
Clinical SW
4.1.5 Provide Socially Safe
0.50
0.012
0.256
3
Environment
Logistics Plans Officer 4.2.1 Provide Airfield
0.55
0.308
0.429
3
Operations
Fuels Specialist
4.2.2 Perform Installation
0.50
0.011
0.256
3
Supply Log.
Aero. Medical Service 4.3.1 Provide Emergency
0.49
0.011
0.251
3
Services
Security Forces
4.4.1 Provide Protection
0.50
0.012
0.256
3
Services
Force Support Officer 4.5.1 Provide Family
0.72
0.711
0.716
4
Services
Traffic Mgmt
4.6.1 Command Community
0.48
0.011
0.246
3
Log. Service
Services Mgmt
4.6.2 Fitness and Rec.
0.63
0.808
0.719
4
Operations
Explosive Ord.
4.7.1 Provide Combat
1.00
0.858
0.929
5
Disposal
Support
Materiel Mgmt
4.8.3 Sustain Operating
0.50
0.012
0.256
3
Locations
Pavement/Construction 4.8.3 Sustain Operating
0.48
0.0048
0.242
3
Locations
Personnel Mgmt
0.49
0.011
0.251
3
4.8.4 Operate Facilities
Civil Eng. Officer
4.8.5 Maintain/Sustain
0.50
0.012
0.256
3
Infrastructure
Civil Eng. (Electrical) 4.8.5 Maintain/Sustain
0.57
0.271
0.421
3
Infrastructure
Civil Eng. (Ops Mgmt) 4.8.5 Maintain/Sustain
0.58
0.271
0.426
3
Infrastructure
Civil Eng. (HVAC)
4.8.6 Provide Family
1.00
1.00
1.00
6
Housing
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Table VI-4 demonstrates the use of the 2-norm algorithm to compute aggregated risk
for a task (e.g. Provide Installation & Mission Support capability). Weights are simply
multipliers of the probability of failure rates (i.e. (10 ∗ 𝑃𝑃∗ )). Subtask, best subtask and

worst subtask scores are computed based on weights and AFRAF vectors. The values are
summed and normalized to determine an overall risk score.
Table VI-4: Notional Core Capability Personnel Risk Assessment

Career Field
Airfield Mgmt
Clinical SW
Logistics Plans Ofcr.
Fuels Specialist
Aero. Med. Service
Security Forces
Force Support Ofcr.
Traffic Mgmt
Services Mgmt
EOD
Materiel Mgmt
Pave./Construction
Personnel Mgmt
CE Officer
CE (Electrical)
CE (Ops Mgmt)
CE (HVAC)

Core Capability Sub-subtask
4.1.1 Provide Airfield Mgmt
4.1.5 Provide Socially Safe
Environment
4.2.1 Provide Airfield Operations
4.2.2 Perform Installation Supply Log.
4.3.1 Provide Emergency Services
4.4.1 Provide Protection Services
4.5.1 Provide Family Services
4.6.1 Command Community Log.
Service
4.6.2 Fitness and Rec. Operations
4.7.1 Provide Combat Support
4.8.3 Sustain Operating Locations
4.8.3 Sustain Operating Locations
4.8.4 Operate Facilities
4.8.5 Maintain/Sustain Infrastructure
4.8.5 Maintain/Sustain Infrastructure
4.8.5 Maintain/Sustain Infrastructure
4.8.6 Provide Family Housing

𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖

AFRAF
Weight
vector
rj
sk

Subtask
Score
TRi

Best
Task
Score
bi

Worst
Task
Score
wi

0.251

3

4.9

14.7

4.9

29.4

0.256

3

5

15

5

30

0.429
0.256
0.251
0.256
0.716

3
3
3
3
4

5.5
5
4.9
5
7.2

16.5
15
14.7
15
28.8

5.5
5
4.9
5
7.2

33
30
29.4
30
43.2

0.246

3

4.8

14.4

4.8

28.8

0.719
0.929
0.256
0.242
0.251
0.256
0.421
0.426
1.000

4
5
3
3
3
3
3
3
6

6.3
10
5
4.8
4.9
5
5.7
5.8
10

25.2
50
15
14.4
14.7
15
17.1
17.4
60

6.3
10
5
4.8
4.9
5
5.7
5.8
10

37.8
60
30
28.8
29.4
30
34.2
34.8
60

362.9

99.8

598.8

𝛴𝛴 =

The complement of the overall risk score is the core capability expressed as a rate (e.g. 58%).
Thus, the I&MS core capability assessment when considering the potential lack of available
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and trained professionals, is 42% or 58% risk, which by the AFRAF scale is considered
‘significant risk’.

Limitations and Final Remarks
The analysis is presented under the assumption of maximum resource capacity does
not equate to risk eradication. There are several career fields that appear to be overmanned,
only when training and availability of personnel are not considered. Only viewing manning
from people versus people requirements is a myopic approach to assessing personnel risk.
Known mathematical functions are applied via normal probability distributions, sigmoid and
expectation functions to account for the lack of available and trained personnel by career
field. Further, a Euclidean norm is applied to objectively propagate risk in an enterprise.
Strengths and limitations of the Agile Combat Support personnel capability
assessment methodology are discussed. A strength of the said personnel risk aggregation
methodology is the ability to provide an objective, defensible situational awareness
procedure for senior leaders to get an enterprise-level personnel capability assessment. The
procedure is a proven technique used in Pacific Air Force PACAF command, and is adapted
for core function core capabilities. As long as personnel data are available, the procedure is
repeatable and can be easily tailored for USAF wide usage. While the strengths outweigh the
limitations of the personnel capability assessment procedure, a summary of limitations is
provided.
An upfront limitation of the ACS core capability assessment is anecdotal evaluation
along with other functional assessments to make accurate assessment of base personnel
capability cannot be eliminated. While highly objective, the assessment requires managerial
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and functional oversight; it is not intended to replace common sense. Another limitation is if
the AFRAF model becomes obsolete, the assessment procedure will have to be re-examined
as 2-norm vectors will need to be re-established.
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VII. Conclusions and Recommendations
Overview
The final chapter provides a comprehensive set of conclusions and recommendations
from the body of research presented in Chapters I through VI. First, the chapter begins by
drawing conclusions from this research objectives and questions. Second, the chapter
discusses this research significance and potential benefits of the various proposed
methodologies to meet USAF enterprise risk assessment challenges. Third,
recommendations are stated for further research. Fourth, the chapter concludes with a
summary of the dissertation contribution.

Research Conclusions
A building block approach of numerous mathematical techniques from logistic
regression to linear optimization were used to examine USAF personnel capability. Review
of this research suggests several conclusions can be made. Chapters I and II provide the
foundation for which the problem is scoped and defined and known mathematical formulae
are explored as potential solutions. The literature search (Chapter II) explored several
discrete and continuous distributions and concluded the normal distribution is the best known
distribution to use to compute probability of personnel failure. The sigmoid function is a
well-known function used in numerous risk assessment applications, and thereby is the best
candidate for risk impact determination. The coupling of these two mathematical functions
yields an operationally representative, objective risk score.
Chapter III presents the use of categorical data analysis techniques to create a
repeatable, measureable baseline personnel capability assessment across the 12 USAF core
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functions. Specifically, logistic fit analyses via logistic odds ratio comparisons and
contingency table analyses revealed significant manning shortfalls in all 12 core functions.
This work demonstrates how seemingly disparate types of raw data; can be systematically
synchronized to produce meaningful insight relating to personnel capability, not only at the
core function, but functional equity (career family) level. The methodology can serve as a
way to standardize how enterprise-level manning assessments are computed across the
USAF.
One of the goals of this research was to examine if efficiency could be examined
using personnel data and airbase resiliency metrics. Chapter IV demonstrates that fighter
pilot manning data and respective sorties can be collected by base to compute efficiency
using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). The methodology uses a bootstrapping technique
to estimate future efficiency trends of the 10 F-16 bases examined. This research identified
potential base benchmarks as a means to improve aircraft sortie production with current
fighter pilot manning levels. The next portion of this research seeks to examine if there is a
statistically significant relationship between efficiency and personnel risk.
Chapter V illustrates four outcomes: 1.) personnel data can be decomposed by career
family; 2.) assuming equal equity, personnel capability can be objectively prioritized; 3.)
DEA can be used to compute efficiency by career family and; 4.) risk and efficiency can be
nonparametrically statistically examined to determine significant relationships. Until this
work, none of the these have been studied and published. This research is further expounded
to include a use case of how to compute risk in an organizational context.
Chapter VI examines aggregation methodologies to compute a core USAF personnel
core capability risk score. This work is a capstone of Chapters I through V, which presents a
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use case of an organizational risk assessment using career field data by task and subtask.
Numerous risk aggregation techniques were surveyed, but the 2-norm root mean squaring
function appeared to be the most operationally representative way to depict USAF personnel
capability and risk from an organizational perspective. Normal and sigmoid functions are
used to compute composite personnel risk values by task/subtask; these values are then
codified using an existing USAF risk assessment framework. A 2-norm is used to aggregate
the tasks and subtasks to an overall personnel risk or capability score, and an ultimate
assessment is developed.

Significance of Research
Currently, each USAF core function independently assesses risk. Some enterprises
strongly consider manning shortfalls and overages, while others do not. Until recently, there
was no repeatable, measureable way to assess baseline personnel capability assessment
across the six enterprises in Agile Combat Support (ACS). Understanding potential
personnel shortfalls at the career field level should better inform core capability analysis, and
thus increase credibility and defensibility of strategic risk assessments. ACS Planners and
programmers no longer have to defend the needs of their programs emotionally or base their
arguments on precedence. These experts can use data coupled with mathematical acumen to
produce credible, defensible risk/capability assessments. This is needed for improved senior
decision making as it relates to resource allocation and prioritization.
ACS enterprises are dependent upon one another to deliver capability in order to
achieve a given mission. Not only is this true, but other core functions heavily depend on the
success of the ACS mission in order to deliver and execute airpower globally at any given
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time or place. Deliberately, examining risk by greatest USAF capability asset (i.e.
personnel), objectively affords senior decision makers opportunities to advocate for resources
when needed.
Examining the relationship between efficiency and risk among USAF career fields
has never been fully studied. Using applied statistics and optimization, we discovered there
is a statistically significant correlation between personnel manning risk and efficiency. In
other words, more people equate to less efficiency. However, more people equate to less
risk.

More people (to include training) equate to more cost. Additional analysis is needed

to ascertain if competency levels of various personnel career fields are the real force
multipliers in determining personnel capability. If the personnel management community is
able to increase personnel competency levels while sustaining current manning levels, this
may yield lower risk and higher efficiency.
With the aforementioned, at least a minimum, a level of managerial insight is
provided to enhance personnel capability at the enterprise and sub-enterprise level. If a
defensible, traceable personnel risk assessment methodology were developed, all ACS
enterprises could more easily defend why they need more resources to perform required
tasks. Further, the successful implementation of a repeatable, proven process lends credence
to other core functions using this approach, which should increase USAF strategic risk
assessment confidence at very little or no cost.

Way Forward
Currently, ACS is the only core function with a ‘task structured’ library. The other
core functions have activities aggregrated to their respective core capabilities. With the
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current ACS construct, this research has created a repeatable process to link enterprise tasks
to program element codes (PECs) by career field, thereby increasing risk assessment
traceability, defensibility and credibility. If ACS planners and programmers now know the
number of airmen required to complete a task at the PEC level, they can better justify why
they either need or do not require resources. This makes defending requirements more
traceable and credible. If this approach is extended across the USAF, we now have a
standardized way to assess personnel risk. In fact, the analysis can be conducted by one
organization as the data are centrally managed.
General Ellen Pawlokowski (former commander of Air Force Materiel Command
(AFMC) and ACS core function) had four goals for Fiscal Year 2016 and one was to
“Bolster Trust and Confidence of those we serve, by meeting our commitments.” (AFMC CC
FY16 Report, 2017) She planned to achieve this objective by
“…striving to earn and maintain the trust of our partners by delivering the right
capabilities at the right time. We want those we serve to value our support and come to us
for solutions because they trust that we will deliver what they need when we say we will and
at the agreed upon cost or better.” –Gen. Ellen Pawlokowski
The former commander of the ACS core function was clearly stakeholder conscious. Dr.
Charles Keating, a Systems Engineering professor at Old Dominion University teaches a
main systemic error to avoid when complex system problem solving, and that is not
considering all stakeholder viewpoints to the problem domain (Keating, 2005). Stakeholder
analysis is necessary in order for an enterprise-level risk assessment upgrade is to be
successfully implemented.
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Stakeholder analysis aims to identify stakeholders and assess how they are likely to
be impacted by the project. The primary goal of stakeholder analysis is to develop
cooperation between the stakeholder and the project team to assure a successful outcome
(Camilleri, 2011). Stakeholder analysis needs bounds in the form of assumptions. We
assume all stakeholders share similar worldviews for the ACS risk assessment, otherwise
problem resolution is extremely difficult.
After successful identification of the stakeholders, problem resolution needs
exploration. In 20 years of experience with enterprise level problem resolution
implementations, the success rate percentage is 0% when there are not leadership ‘buy in’,
middle management salesmanship, facilitation expertise and subject matter expertise. If any
one of these critical components is absent, the implementation will either not occur or not
have the intended impact. Provided those four critical components are present, we can use
whatever current organizational staffing solution tools (e.g. Task Management Tool (TMT),
Senior Officer Communication Coordination Electronic Resource (SOCCER), etc.) to give
key personnel an indication of leadership expectations.
An implementation of this magnitude will take at least a year if inefficiencies are
considered before assessing (personnel) risk. Bottom line: scope drives the length of
implementation. The more resources (e.g. personnel, infrastructure, equipment, etc.) to
consider, equates to more decision space; which means more time and money are needed to
ensure all of the elements of the complex problem system are identified first before
resolution. For more details on complex problem resolution, please request access to a
document entitled ‘Keating’s Top 10: ten ways to increase complex problem system
resolution.”
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A project charter is needed in order to provide a level of codification/governance to
enhance the chances of successfully implementing the new initiative. A charter is a
governing document for a new initiative that outlines leadership expectations, identifies the
problem, identifies the suppliers, inputs, products, outputs and consumers (SIPOC), key
personnel required to tackle the initiative, goals and impact of the initiative if successful.
The analysis could be conducted within the HQ AFMC Strategic Plans, Programs,
Requirements, and Analyses Directorate (AFMC A5/8/9), whereby the Analyses and
Assessments Division (AFMC A9A) would serve as the lead integrator. The collection of
this information requires support from the AFMC 5/8 (Plans, Programs and Requirements
Division). If the personnel databases are unavailable, then the proposed framework is void.
The personnel capability/risk research is open to other proven methods/approaches with
regards to proper portrayal of strategic risk notably as it relates to the ACS core function or
AFMC.

Recommendations for Future Research
An interdependency model is needed to examine the interdependencies among USAF
career fields. As of July 2016, there were over 400,000 active duty military and civil
servants in the USAF. Of the 400,000+ (assigned) personnel, 55% are enlisted, 13% are
officer and the remaining 32% are civil servants. To date, there is no visual or mathematical
representation of how each Air Force Specialty or career field is connected to the other.
This research would inform strategic decision making by illustrating multi-order effects of
resource constraints on career fields. In other words, senior leaders could visually observe
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the dependencies between career fields and recognize the potential impact of under/overfilling certain career fields.
The dependency model could be explored in the context of aircraft sortie generation.
The model would make several assumptions. The model should assume an inherent level of
dependency among functional communities (i.e. rated operations, maintenance,
communications, intelligence, medical, finance, acquisitions and resiliency support (e.g.
chaplain, legal, force support, etc.)). For example, the safety function is something
equivalent to the legal or chaplain career field. That is to say, the safety functional service
or some career field equivalent, is required for most operational career fields. This infers
there is a level (albeit not exactly known) of safety career field dependency in order for the
operational career fields to accomplish a mission. This research should also seek to identify
a mathematical way to use the career field dependency model to assess risk.

Summary
Procedurally and wisely using mathematical application coupled with SME insight
are proven ways to inform strategic decision making. Applied statistics and optimization (to
suggest a few) are ways to increase rigor, traceability, defensibility, repeatability and better
inform strategic decision making. If used correctly, hard data (e.g. personnel current and
historical manning rates) can provide substantiating insight to help quantify risk. These
added analytical insights foster better strategic decision making by identifying capability
gaps, and provide an increased level of objectivity to support personnel resource allocation.
The results of the analysis contribute to better inform the USAF Strategic, Planning &
Programming Process (SP3).
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Appendix A. Joint Model from Chapter III
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Appendix B. SCF and FE Assigned Manning levels by Demographic

Figure B-1: SCF Assigned Manning Levels by Demographic

Figure B-2: FE Assigned Manning Levels by Demographic
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Appendix C. (FE Manning Odds Ratio Analyses)

Figure C-1: FE Manning Odds Ration Analyses
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Appendix D. FE Significant Difference in Manning Odds Ratio Analyses
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